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Role of Governance in Urban Transformation of Seoul

Best Practices

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서울연구원
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01 Urban Transformation of Seoul

In the 1960s and '70s, the public sector led the transformation of Seoul in areas such as building major urban highways, constructing a subway system and residential redevelopment on a large scale. It was not the local government, but the national government which took the most initiative. As the national government strived to achieve the growth of Seoul in a short period of time, efficiency was the first and foremost goal for the Seoul Metropolitan Government(SMG). During this period of compressed growth, the quality of the residential environment was improved, and an efficient transport network was set up. However governance and citizen participation had to make way for efficient growth strategies.



[Figure 1] Seoul in 1970s

Source: <http://photoarchives.seoul.go.kr>

This situation began to change in the 1990s. Since the citizens of Seoul began electing a mayor in 1995, a latent desire among them to participate in local matters began to emerge. There were in general two issues weighing on citizens' minds. For

the one, the negative side effects of the compressed growth became more and more apparent. One could clearly see it in the collapse of the Sampoong department store and the Seongsu bridge in 1995. For the other, redevelopment projects through the demolition of aged infrastructure and housing continued. The momentum for growth through physical development was strong, and perhaps necessary. However, since the democratization of the country in the early 1990s, citizens increasingly wanted their voices heard on their concerns such as historical conservation, restoration of the natural environment, and preservation of their cultural heritage. With local democracy thriving, citizens demanded a higher quality of living as well. And that meant more than just the physical improvement of the city.

As people became able to express their opinion on local matters, it was perhaps inevitable that conflict arose between different interest groups, NGOs and the public sector. This made it more and more difficult to undertake large-scale physical development projects. Taking on such a project would mean that the public sector needed to get involved with multiple stakeholders and accommodate their demands from the start. At least that was how the citizens and SMG officials felt. It was no longer feasible to demolish old neighbourhoods for residential redevelopment without the full consent of local residents. The will of the city (or national) government was insufficient to initiate such a large project. However there still was significant room for improving the conditions of the existing environment in places around Seoul. It was a pivotal moment for Seoul in the sense that the road ahead was divided in two. One way was to taper off physical improvement projects that would be controversial for citizens and many stakeholders. The other way was to begin all-out participatory planning programs to engage the citizenry for all development projects.

Seoul took the latter route. Strong leadership was an essential component in enabling city officials to continue improving the quality of Seoul's physical environment with multiple need and changing conditions. A case in point is the Cheonggyecheon stream restoration, Dongdaemun area regeneration, and the

Yonsei-ro transit mall project, which this report will examine in more detail in later chapters.

Governance was another critical element that pushed public officials to further improve the lives of citizens. In the last few decades, the city has experienced dramatic changes, from both unprecedented technological innovation and unfettered economic globalization. These changes undoubtedly have delivered substantial improvements to the lives of citizens. Seoul's GDP has grown by a multiple of 10 over the past 40 years, but social and economic polarization has also increased. Government-led development in the past brought wealth to the city, but also gradually disintegrated community ties, local identities, and communal traditions. Effective governance was the key to the success of large-scale projects such as the Cheonggyecheon stream restoration. The effort to build working governance in individual projects will be described in detail in the later chapters as well.

We believe that SMG's effort to engage citizenry and build effective governance was in fact the response to the citizens' latent desire to participate in local matters. Such effort was also visible in the Cheonggyecheon stream restoration, the Dongdaemun area regeneration, and the Yonsei-ro transit mall project. The participatory planning effort reached its peak in creating "2030 Seoul Plan" under the leadership of Mayor Park Won Soon. A master plan is a planning document that sets the very basic direction of city developments and urban policies. Seoul is the city which sets fundamental basis of where the city should be headed based on citizens' inputs. Participatory planning for the 2030 Seoul Plan is also described in this report in details.



[Figure 2] A large-scale development in the 1960s and '70s

Source: <http://photoarchives.seoul.go.kr/>

02 Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration Project

Declining Cheonggyecheon and the Urge to Demolish It

A shanty-town near the Cheonggyecheon (or Cheonggye stream) was one of the biggest slums in Seoul in the 1950s and '60s. The poorest group of people lived along the stream. Their homes were exposed to fire hazards, and falling accidents were common for people walking along the stream. Small factories around the stream deteriorated the water quality. Poor sanitation and excessive sediment deposits in the Cheonggyecheon were persistent problems. The stream served as an open sewer, blighting the city from east to west and ruining the cityscape and living conditions of the residents.



[Figure 3] Cheonggyecheon Stream in 1973

Source: Cheonggyecheon Museum

Indeed, the Cheonggyecheon and its surrounding area was the shame of the city. Many people thought that the dangerous shanty-town should be demolished and the whole stream needed to be covered by a roadway. There was a consensus back then that paving over the stream was critical in order to refurbish the cityscape and ensure the safety of residents. In fact, similar discussions had taken place back in the

Japanese colonial era. However, due to a clash of interests and a series of wars, paving was carried out only in some parts of the stream.

In the late 1950s, SMG completed its post-war restoration plan and moved on to longer-term projects. The issue of the Cheonggyecheon re-emerged. Previously, any discussion of the stream was limited to the sewer system and sanitation problems. For the first time, SMG began to take a holistic approach to problems of the stream. In 1960, the population of Seoul stood at 2,445,402, with an annual increase averaging 225,000. Traffic problems emerged, including congestion during peak hours. In an effort to relieve this problem, road and bridge construction was carried out in every corner of the city. An elevated expressway constructed above the Cheonggyecheon was part of this effort. After the stream was entombed by pavement, a new roadway, Cheonggye-ro, was built on its surface. The road was further extended after a larger part of the stream was covered. Cheonggye-ro was 5.8km-long, 50m-wide, and had 18 traffic lanes. Along the street, there were about 60,000 stores with more than 200,000 workers, naturally forming a large commercial district.



[Figure 4] Cheonggyecheon Stream in 1973

Source: Cheonggyecheon Museum

On both sides of the road numerous facilities were erected. Gathering momentum from the new roadway, the Dongdaemun area continuously expanded to the east. Traditional market places such as the Pyeonghwa Market, Sinpyeonghwa Market, Dongpyeonghwa Market, and Cheong-pyeonghwa Market opened in this period. These consumer goods markets led to export-oriented industrialization in the '60s and '70s. In the 1990s, high-rise shopping malls were constructed along the stream,

turning the area into a world-famous fashion market. The area was also packed with numerous industrial tool shops and lighting stores. Indeed, there was a saying that “nothing is impossible to obtain or make in Cheonggye-ro”. The area represented Korea’s modern industrial development.



[Figure 5] Elevated Expressway above the Cheonggyecheon in 1995

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/psearch>

The once-proud Cheonggye elevated highway, a symbol of Korea’s industrialization, was reduced to an eyesore three decades after its construction. The old structure continuously threatened public safety. The area under the expressway turned into a slum. Citizens started suggesting that the buried stream be restored when the expressway was demolished.




[Figure 6] Before demolishing the elevated expressway above the Cheonggyecheon in 2000

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/psearch>

There were two different opinions: 1) Repair the highway for traffic or 2) Demolish the expressway and restore the stream. The issue of the Cheonggyecheon was highly contentious during Seoul's third mayoral election. Then-mayoral candidate Lee Myung-bak argued to restore the stream immediately. His electoral commitment was to demolish the dangerous elevated highway and restore the stream by eliminating the covering structure over it, providing a pleasant waterfront environment for the people. Opponents criticized this, pointing to urban traffic problems and funding issues. The opposition candidate contended that SMG needed to repair and use the expressway for the moment, and that the restoration issue must be considered in its long-term perspective. The debate drew public attention to the issue, and was a determinative factor in the election. Lee was elected largely around his push to remove the old roadway and revive the stream. The project was launched as soon as he took office.

The Cheonggye elevated highway was demolished on Aug. 3, 2003, followed by the removal of the Samil elevated highway and the roadways under them on Oct. 5, 2003. After two years and three months, the city completed its restoration of a 5.84km stretch of Cheonggyecheon.



Restoring Cheonggyecheon Stream

Overall Vision

The Cheonggyecheon restoration was part of a broader regeneration of Seoul's central city. In the early 2000s, planners determined that regenerating the heart of Seoul was a necessary critical step for continuing a sustainable development effort and turning Seoul into a truly global city. In that respect, the Cheonggyecheon restoration was a means to revitalize central Seoul. To unleash Cheonggyecheon's potential as a place of nature, offering access to under-utilized environmental assets near the Central Business District was an essential task. Planners involved in the project envisioned that the restoration would exert a ripple effect which would help revitalize the downtown and neighbouring areas. The overall vision was that the restored Cheonggyecheon would serve as the focal point of urban regeneration in the heart of Seoul.



[Figure 7] Before demolishing the elevated expressway above the Cheonggyecheon in 1990s

Source: The Academy of Korean Studies

■ Key objectives

There are 4 key objectives for this project: 1) Enhancing safety; 2) Restoring the environment; 3) Preserving the cultural heritage; and 4) Balancing growth within Seoul.

1) Enhancing safety

Built in the 1970s, the dilapidated elevated highway had become a constant safety issue. Although SMG allocated a large budget to repair the highway every year, it eventually had to be demolished as a basic safety measure.

2) Restoring the environment

The Cheonggye-ro, by nature of the elevated highway, was a freeway for private automobiles. It naturally induced car travel. Considering that effective travel demand management is key to creating a sustainable city, removing a freeway which penetrated into the Central Business District was more than desirable.

3) Preserving the cultural heritage

Recovering the history and culture of the Cheonggyecheon area was one of the most important issues throughout the project. The city placed a priority on preserving the heritage of the area. However, the city had to be realistic, since it had to deal with immediate concerns such as flooding, traffic, and water quality. With the help of experts, SMG established plans to reconstruct historical remains and initiated an earth surface investigation in February 2002, followed by excavation.

Prior to construction, SMG conducted an earth surface investigation to locate historical sites and remains in the Cheonggyecheon area. It then carried out a trial-digging investigation in areas where a sedimentary layer had developed, or where it was likely to find historic remains. Based on the results of these precautions, an excavation investigation ensued in the Supyo-gyo (bridge), Gwangtong-gyo, and Ogansumun (5-hole sluice gate) site and stone walls. The Cheonggyecheon Cultural Properties Advisory Committee determined the principles of the restoration, with the approval of the Cultural Heritage

Administration. Gwangtong-gyo was relocated and restored at a spot 155 meters away from the original location, toward the upstream area. The city left it as a long-term project to relocate Supyo-gyo and restore Ogansumun and the stone walls. It also decided to preserve part of the Cheonggye elevated highway as a substantial reminder of it.

4) Balanced growth within Seoul

Through the Cheonggyecheon project, SMG also aimed to promote balanced development between the north and south areas of the city. It has been the case in Seoul that residents in the northern area have felt deprived compared to citizens living in the south. Many factors in the north, such as the quality of schools, housing prices, and living environment were relatively inferior to the south. The Cheonggyecheon restoration was planned as a starting point for revitalizing the north.

■ Conflict Management

The objectives described above would be achieved upon completion of the restoration. There was a critical problem to solve even before addressing the objectives of the project. At the time, many people feared that the Cheonggyecheon restoration project would have a negative effect on residents and merchants, and therefore fierce opposition was expected. Even though the target area was limited to city-owned land, there would be an indirect impact on the surrounding areas. Most of all, it was inevitable that the merchants would pay the price for radical changes in the commercial area after restoration. SMG therefore focused heavily on negotiating and working with the merchants, and many initiatives and strategies were devised for dealing with them.

The Cheonggyecheon area, at the heart of the industrial network across the country, was the largest business district for industrial products, with 60,000 stores, 210,000 workers, and 1,000 street vendors. It was estimated that the number of merchants in business circles of the area exceeded one million. Most of the shop owners in the area were tenants, who started their careers as employees. More than

twenty years in business, they had a strong mutual sense of solidarity and deep affection for the area.

At first, the merchants believed that SMG would not be able to undertake the restoration project, considering the enormous size and influence of the area, which is why they just watched the discussions on the restoration plan. This soon changed to a sense of crisis when Mayor Lee took office, promising the project as his key election pledge.

The merchants thought that the project would determine the fate of the region. If Cheonggye-ro, an important infrastructure in the commercial area, were removed, the road would be narrowed, worsening traffic congestion, which would hurt business. They also worried about the negative impact of noise, dust, and other inconveniences on businesses during the construction. A prolonged downturn in the business district, which was much worse than the 1997 Asian financial crisis, fuelled opposition to the project. Out of fear that their markets would shrink, the merchants formed the Cheonggyecheon Commercial Rights Protection Committee and the Fashion Shopping Centre Committee to oppose the restoration project.



[Figure 8] A Protest march against restoration project

Source: <http://m.newscham.net/news>

Conflict management with the merchants was the key to the success of the project. For the public sector, consistency in principles is essential in conflict management. If the negotiator adheres to pre-announced principles, it is easier to reach an agreement because the counterpart can trust the negotiator. This is the case even more so when there are multiple stakeholders.

Mayor Lee and SMG officials believed a one-on-one consultation with the merchants would not be an effective method of dealing with 220,000 of them. They decided it was important that all public officials, from the mayor to low-ranking employees, provide the same answers to protesting merchants. Therefore, five principles were established for the restoration project:

- 1) There is no direct compensation for loss of business.
- 2) The city will make only verbal agreements regarding relocation, remodeling, redevelopment, reconstruction, and financial support.
- 3) The city will support merchants who are willing to relocate, within reason. That is, the city will find ways, as far as possible, to provide the administrative and financial support necessary for relocation.
- 4) The city will fully compensate any loss of goods or buildings caused by the construction work.
- 5) All principles and measures will apply equally to anyone, anywhere, any time.



[Figure 9] Cheonggyecheon Stream in 2015

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

There had been a practice in Korea that the results of negotiations were changed at the last moment by top-ranking officials. Higher-ranking officials tended to provide special favours to their counterparts, ignoring the negotiations the lower-level officials had worked on. Therefore, stakeholders had a tendency to make unreasonable demands, or call for one-on-one consultations with chief officials. This practice was ineffective and inefficient, often leading to deadlock. With that in mind, the fifth principle of the Cheonggyecheon project was established to avoid such practices.

According to the five principles, those who observed the laws and principles would be protected and supported, while those who held illegal violent protests would receive nothing. After establishing these principles, Mayor Lee authorized the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters to negotiate with the merchants. It was a top priority for the restoration project to obtain agreement of the Cheonggyecheon merchants. For those merchants who wanted to remain after completion of the project, the city devised measures to revitalize the commercial area and minimize inconvenience due to the construction work.

More than 4,000 meetings were held in various forms between city officials and the merchants, after which SMG came up with a number of measures. It decided to build a specialty shopping district for the Cheonggyecheon shop owners, and expected about 7,000 out of 62,000 businesses would relocate. The city government planned to build a shopping complex in a 297,520m² area, and allocate 39,669m² for the Cheonggyecheon merchants. However, the merchants claimed that they needed the whole 297,520m² for themselves in order to maintain their existing network. After much discussion, the city decided to establish another shopping complex in a different part of Seoul, the Dongnam Distribution Complex (Munjeong-dong). The city provided financial and administrative support for businesses that relocated to the new complex.



[Figure 10] Cheonggyecheon Stream in 2017

Source: <http://mediahub.seoul.go.kr/>

Another source of fierce opposition was the street vendors. SMG suggested utilizing part of the Dongdaemun Stadium as a folk flea market to accommodate the Cheonggyecheon street vendors (it later became an issue in the Dongdaemun Design Plaza project, as explained in this report). Eventually, the city promised to create new places for the street vendors in other new redevelopment projects. In the meantime, the Dongdaemun folk flea market opened in 2004. The city established a Counselling Centre for Street Vendors, which provided them with free vocational training and counselling.

There were also measures to alleviate traffic inconveniences, as traffic management was another contentious issue. The average traffic volume of Cheonggye-ro exceeded 170,000 vehicles a day. It was essential to prevent traffic disturbance caused by the restoration project. The city government created two-lane roads on each side of the stream and parking spaces for trucks during the construction. The city also pledged to provide better parking management for trucks and minimize the inconvenience to freight transport. It also tightened up on illegal parking and stopping, because numerous cars used to park illegally on the Cheonggye elevated highway at night, which impeded construction. Mayor Lee thus decided to use Dongdaemun Stadium as a parking lot. Free shuttles were provided to minimize the inconvenience to merchants. The demolition was

completed two months earlier than planned (14 months), and so the parking problems of the merchants were resolved earlier than expected.

Still, the most urgent problem was to reduce the overall traffic volume heading towards the city centre, although the city provided detours to disperse traffic. To that end, SMG proposed a fundamental solution for increasing the capacity and speed of the public transit system. In 2004, about 200km of median bus-only lanes, with free transfers between buses and the subway, were introduced.

The strategies above were based on exhaustive research on the merchants. The city conducted actual inspections to analyse a sphere of influence for the restoration project. It collected basic regional information such as the shopping areas, and the number and types of stores. It also investigated current conditions for business operation such as types of rent, size of stores, items for sale, employees, primary customers, means of transportation, and parking needs. SMG also collected data on conflict management examples in major national projects and local public works. The city was able to devise comprehensive measures for the merchants based on this thorough preparation.



[Figure 11] Cheonggyecheon Stream in 2016

Source: <http://blog.naver.com/prologue/PrologueList.nhn?blogId=ghsjlike&parentCategoryNo=9>

Model for New Governance

SMG established a triangular governance structure for the Cheonggyecheon project, establishing the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters in 2002. This Headquarters directed the project and canvassed for public opinion. The Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee suggested policy direction, gathered public opinion, and promoted the project. The Cheonggyecheon Research Group conducted various studies with regard to the project and established a comprehensive plan.

■ Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters

The city formed a task force for the Cheonggyecheon project. The Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters was comprised of three teams (managing, planning and implementation) and was the main project implementation arm. The organisation was modified to adapt to the evolving stages of work. Specifically, the headquarters took charge of basic plans, heritage restoration, and traffic management as well as demolition, stream management, ecological restoration, and urban planning. SMG allocated 28 civil servants and 15 deputy directors or higher to the headquarters. Meanwhile, the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters decided to operate a special negotiation team (Civil Petition Management Team), anticipating that the merchants would be the main opponents.



[Figure 12] Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters Organization

Source: <http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/>

■ Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee

In practice, the role of the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee was most critical. Launched in 2002, it was based on a special ordinance for the Cheonggyecheon restoration. The committee was in essence an official channel to collect the opinions and concerns of the public with regard to the restoration project. A series of hearings and briefings to build a consensus were conducted by the committee. Based on input from the general public, the committee determined the direction of the restoration project. Consolidating public opinion was integral in making the public understand the direction set for the project.

The Committee was composed of a main committee, and six subcommittees, plus a planning and coordination subcommittee. The planning and coordination subcommittee took charge of communication and mediation between the 6 subcommittees. They referred the agendas to the main committee. This organisational structure was officially approved by ordinance.



[Figure 13] Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee

Source: <http://blog.daum.net/caferansky/12306379>

At first, the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee excluded the merchants, reasoning that they lacked expertise in planning and construction. However, it soon realized that collecting the opinions of the merchants was crucial to facilitating the project. Thus, one of the subcommittees, the Public Opinion Subcommittee,

assumed responsibility for mediating between SMG and the merchants. Starting in 2002, the subcommittee held regular meetings to conduct a variety of tasks: discussing measures for the merchants, hearing the opinions of stakeholders, paying site visits, and persuading interest groups.

There were many in the private sector, such as NGOs, keenly interested in restoring Cheonggyecheon. SMG invited these groups to the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee to form a partnership from the beginning, in order to facilitate the project. By officially involving the private sector in governance at the initial stages of the project, the city would have a strong ally while the merchant group formed their own alliance. Inviting allies to the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee was a smart strategy for maintaining the momentum in pushing for this project.


Most conflicts surrounding urban development projects tend to evolve into a deadlock from mere disagreements between the city government and the stakeholders. This time, by involving citizen groups favourable to the restoration in governance as early as possible, SMG would be largely immune from the common criticism that citizen participation was insufficient. SMG took the high ground, being able to defend its actions with the opposition. With this role, SMG was able to effectively manage conflicts.

■ Cheonggyecheon Research Group

The Cheonggyecheon Research Group supported the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters and the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee. Also established in 2002, it was under the auspices of the Seoul Development Institute (now the Seoul Institute), conducting research to set the direction of the project. With 58 researchers, the group provided expertise on various issues: land use plans, restoration strategies, culture plans, traffic management schemes after restoration, and measures for redeveloping the city centre. It organised a number of public meetings with experts and citizens to promote the restoration.

■ Triangular Governance

As a result, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project became dominated by a “triangular governance” framework involving the headquarters, the committee, and the supporting research group. Most important decisions were made by the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee. The Cheonggyecheon Research Group fed research outcomes and analysis results to the committee to help it make informed decisions. After that, implementation became the job for the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters. They were the main players with their own unique roles. Communication was always two-way, with feedback loops. For instance, the committee was not the only consumer of the research. The headquarters asked the research group to propose new innovative approaches when the project encountered heavy going. The Cheonggyecheon Research Group did not just conduct studies that were requested by the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee or the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Headquarters; sometimes they initiated their own research to support their agenda. Especially, researchers from the Seoul Institute have had a long history of consulting and leading SMG on various issues. The headquarters and the committee also communicated frequently regarding issues which would arise during implementation. This open communication between the different groups facilitated the whole development process.



[Figure 14] A Triangular Governance for Merchants

SMG also listened carefully to the major stakeholders—the merchants. SMG organised the Cheonggyecheon Resident and Merchant Council in 2002 to collect their opinions. The Council was comprised of resident representatives, city and district councilmen, merchant representatives, experts, and civil servants. Since the merchants were not a part of the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee, the Council played an important role in including their voices throughout the whole process.

However it is noteworthy that this council was not a part of the triangular governance. It was formed because SMG wanted to preserve its forward momentum. SMG showed no negligence in hearing from the merchants and incorporating their concerns. At the same time, SMG did not want the project to be stopped and dragged out because of merchant protests. This meant that while a key to success of the project was to establish an inclusive governance structure, strong will on the part of the political leadership also played a part. These two important qualities, strong leadership and inclusive governance, were balanced in the Cheonggyecheon restoration project, and in time, led to the desired outcome.



Outcomes and Limitations

The year 2015 marked the 10th anniversary of the Cheonggyecheon restoration project. It took less time than expected to transform a covered stream under a deteriorating elevated highway into a clear waterfront with rest areas. The restored Cheonggyecheon immediately became another tourist attraction, and it is now one of the most popular places in Seoul. Currently, about 60,000 people a day stroll and relax near the stream. The citizens of Seoul are greatly satisfied with this new area. The Cheonggye Plaza, cultural facilities, the Dongdaemun Shopping Town, and forest trails have all formed around the stream. Over the past decade, large office buildings have been constructed as well. The purposes for visiting the area vary, including sightseeing, relaxation, strolling, research, and exploration. According to the Seoul Metropolitan Facilities Management Corporation, 180 million people visited the stream in the nine years after the restoration, 7 million of whom were foreigners. The Cheonggyecheon is not only a new tourist attraction, but also a model example of stream restoration. Urban planning experts and public employees from home and abroad visit the city and the Cheonggyecheon Museum to learn about the restoration project. We can summarize its major achievements as follows:

■ Creating a public transit and pedestrian-oriented urban transport network

The Cheonggyecheon restoration project played a crucial role in changing Seoul's transport emphasis from car-oriented to transit- and pedestrian-oriented. Traffic problems were one of the most contentious issues surrounding the restoration project. However, as the city government expected, there was little traffic disturbance during and after the construction. The restoration project removed the four-lane elevated highway and reduced the width of the roadway by half. Nevertheless, according to traffic monitoring data, the overall traffic flow of the city improved after the project. Traffic speed during the morning rush hours increased, except for the first three days of restoration construction. Earlier

predictions by SMG were fairly accurate and within the error range. Despite the reduced road capacity, it has had a positive impact on travel demand management, and the transit system was organised well enough to alleviate the effect of the changes in the roadway network. Indeed, subway use in central Seoul increased by about 5%.

The successful traffic management of the Cheonggyecheon project had a ripple effect in Seoul. The restoration project served as momentum for the city government to take bold initiatives in reorganizing transport system. SMG created a pedestrian plaza in front of city hall, which had been postponed due to traffic problems. The city also built more crosswalks on arterial roads, placing more emphasis on pedestrians than cars. The new crosswalks also had a positive influence on the adjacent commercial districts. (Merchants in Bukchang-dong even put up a banner to celebrate the creation of crosswalks.)

The Cheonggyecheon project also had influence in the way transport infrastructure was managed. Thanks to the successful demolition of the Cheonggye elevated highway, others were torn down in turn, such as the Samil, Wonnam, Mia, Seoul Station, Gwanghui, and Hyehwa elevated highways. The design of Gangnam Beltway, one of the major projects being planned at the time, was changed to include an underpass instead of an elevated expressway.

This trend can be seen across the nation: there has been growing public demand for demolishing existing elevated highways and public resistance to building new ones. Of course, an elevated highway is a useful transport infrastructure. However, it is obvious that citizens want an eco-friendly road environment rather than roadways convenient only for vehicular traffic. A number of plans to build elevated highways were scrapped when they met opposition from local residents: the elevated highways in Dusan Ogeori in Daegu, Namhang Bridge in Busan, and Meonae Ogeori in Yongin, Gyeonggi-do, and construction work to cover streams in Daejeon. Furthermore, the Cheonggyecheon project even seems to have influenced a movement to demolish the elevated expressway crossing over the Nihonbashi (Japan Bridge) in Tokyo.

■ Providing Momentum for Stream Restoration

In the process of industrialization, most urban streams were covered by pavement or turned into roadways, because they were considered a nuisance that obstructed traffic. The same occurred to the majority of the streams in Seoul. The most recent example is the Naebu expressway crossing the Jeongneungcheon stream in the early 1990s. Stream-covering elevated highways were a symbol of growth in the past. However, citizens now understand that covering the streams resulted in destruction of the urban ecosystem. In addition, air pollution, noise, and vibration caused by cars intensified environmental degradation. These are now considered the main obstacles preventing Seoul from becoming one of the world's most advanced cities. In that respect, the Cheonggyecheon restoration project was a significant event.

The city's stream restoration projects continued in Seongbukcheon, Jeongneungcheon, and Hongjecheon. The city government even commissioned a study drafting strategies aimed at restoring all of the streams in Seoul. Fortunately, restoration plans have gained public support, as the restored streams proved to be beneficial for both the environment and the local economy. According to a study in 2013, an ecosystem was reintroduced in Cheonggyecheon. There were 365 plant species, 19 fish species, 13 bird species, 6 mammal species, 83 insect species and 29 benthic invertebrate species in and near the stream. As the local environment improved thanks to the restored stream, property prices of the area increased significantly as well.

The Cheonggyecheon project triggered other stream restoration projects across the nation. Busan and Daejeon are cities actively implementing stream improvement projects. Busan started restoring the first section of Dongcheon in 2005, followed by 4 other covered streams (Oncheon, Suyeongcheon, Chuncheon, and Gudeokcheon). The city of Daejeon decided to improve its major streams, including Gabcheon and Daejeoncheon. Other cities have also gone with this trend: Gwangjucheon in Gwangju, Jeonjucheon in Jeonju, Musimcheon in Cheongju, Hoewoncheon in Masan, Gongjicheon in Chuncheon, Suwoncheon in Suwon, and Anyangcheon and Hak-uicheon in Anyang.

Foreign cities are inspired by the Cheonggyecheon restoration project as well. Tokyo Metropolitan Government sent its experts and city councilmen to the Cheonggyecheon in order to acquire knowledge for revival of the Shibuya River. Civic groups, experts and public officials from Osaka referred to Seoul's experience in order to better use its own streams, rivers, and seas, pursuing the "City of Water" project.

Balanced, sustainable urban development between the northern and southern areas. A number of global cities have long suffered from regional disparity issues. Seoul is no exception. Since the 1970s, the southern area had been intensively developed, while the north had undergone a decline of its Central Business District, with the restoration of old buildings postponed. The disparity between the south and the north was one of the city's contentious issues. The Cheonggyecheon restoration was a starting point in revitalizing the north. Changes that the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon brought about will be described in this report (answering the question regarding the effect of the project on the community).

■ Setting up new standards for conflict management

The most significant achievement of the Cheonggyecheon project is that it opened a new chapter in conflict management. For this project, the city faced conflict from various interest, regarding traffic disturbance, business losses, and historic restoration. With clear principles set out beforehand, the city was able to carry out the project in a rational, pacific manner. It became a model of conflict management for government projects, attracting attention from both the public and private sectors.

As noted several times, the major opposition came from the merchants in the Cheonggyecheon area, who stubbornly opposed the project at first. However, the city adhered to its own principles when managing conflict. The main principle was that the city would never allow illegal protests or unreasonable claims, but would consider all legitimate issues. Consequently, the merchants, who had held illegal protests, agreed to the city's reasonable suggestions, finally supporting the project.

The city's consistent attitude was critical to gaining public support. With its unwavering principles, SMG was able to persuade other stakeholders of the value of the project.



[Figure 15] Early autumn in Cheonggyecheon

<http://mediahub.seoul.go.kr/>

Since the latter half of 2003 when the restoration project was completed, illegal strikes and violent protests have not been able to gain public support, usually ending in failure. The national government has also taken a stricter stance against violent protests than before. According to a study, the number of protests held for 18-month period after the restoration project (Jul. 2003 to Dec. 2004) was 12, while there were 26 cases during the 18-month period prior to the project (Jan. 2002 to Jun. 2003). Indeed, the total number of protests decreased by more than half after the project.

The decline, however, was sharper in instances of protests that were not related to the Cheonggyecheon project: there were 20 cases before the project, while decreasing to about one-third, only 6 after the project. It is difficult to prove that there is a strong causal link with the restoration project. Still the city government's conflict management and negotiation principles may have influenced people's attitude regarding handling social conflicts.

It is important for labour unions and civic groups to be supported by the public. However, once their demonstrations are stigmatized as violent and illegal, they cannot receive positive public opinion. This is a significant change from the past. People no longer tolerate inconvenience and damage caused by illegal demonstrations. We believe that a social consensus has been formed in Korea that stakeholders need to pursue win-win strategies through communication and cooperation rather than violence and unlawful acts. It can be said that experience with large government projects, such as the Cheonggyecheon restoration, played a part in forming such consensus.

The city also established an expert negotiator system to better respond to citizens. Since first beginning to elect their mayor, the citizens have gained a mature sense of citizenship, and the city government realized that merely avoiding demonstrators would not solve problems anymore. It took the initiative to train negotiators by providing a systematic curriculum. The city's initiative inspired the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Construction & Transportation, and the Blue House to establish their own conflict management systems.




[Figure 16] Garden 5 in 2015

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr>

■ Happier citizens with the Cheonggyecheon restoration


According to a 2013 survey (The Seoul Institute, 2014. Historic Preservation and Ecological Restoration of Cheonggyecheon. Seoul, Republic of Korea), the Cheonggyecheon was recognised as a place for resting, picnicking, dating, and walking, as well as an eco-space. Indeed, citizens were most satisfied with the area as a new promenade, where they could enjoy waterside scenery near the city centre. In a survey of those who visited the stream before restoration, the respondents recognised environmental improvement as follows: 84.4% of respondents indicated a decrease in unpleasant odour, better air quality (84.3%), better water quality (82.3%), more sunlight (76.5%), and less noise (64.7%). Based on a one-to-five scale, the decrease in unpleasant odour rated the highest (4.07 points), followed by water quality (4.05 points), air quality (4.03 points), sunlight (3.98 points), and noise (3.68 points).



[Figure 17] Environmental improvement


The survey also showed that creating a new rest area in the heart of the CBD was considered as the greatest achievement of the project (54.1%), followed by restoration of the stream's ecosystem (20.9%), creating a new tourist attraction

(17.4%), historical and cultural restoration (3.5%), and balanced city development by reviving the northern area (3.5%). Minor responses included demolition of the elevated highway (0.3%) and environmental improvement of the stream (0.1%) as benefits. For the overall project, 77.5% of respondents felt the project was successful (improved-20.8%, slightly improved -56.7%).



[Figure 18] The greatest achievement of the restoration project

With regards to what Cheonggyecheon's primary contribution was to society, the citizens considered it to be providing leisure space (59.6%). Other responses included restoring the ecosystem (16.2%), creating a natural environment (9.5%), promoting space for unique cultural events (7.3%), boosting the local economy (2.8%), restoring historical and cultural space (2.4%), and stabilizing urban flood control (2.0%).



[Figure 19] What Cheonggyecheon contributed the most to society

Also There are various community effects in Cheonggyecheon area.

First, the Cheonggyecheon area saw its rent and land value rise. According to the World Bank Group report (Seoul: Downtown Regeneration Through Restoration of the Cheonggyecheon Stream, Urban Development Series, 2016), comparing land parcels within a 600 meter radius of Cheonggyecheon, prices of land within a 100 meter radius increased by 30 percent after the restoration. Office rents in the same area increased by 20 percent. There is also evidence that the Cheonggyecheon area had an impact on the CBD real estate market. The rents of downtown studios increased by up to 11% during construction in 2004. The average growth rate of rent and land value in the Cheonggyecheon area was much higher than other areas in Seoul. Increased land values tend to lead to gentrification, shoving the economically disadvantaged out from their original locations. However, thanks to the restoration project, the investment value of the city centre and the Cheonggyecheon area also increased. This contributed to resolving the regional disparity, which had been a major policy goal of the city government.



[Figure 20] Busking in Cheonggyecheon

<http://mediahub.seoul.go.kr/>

Second, real estate transactions have also sharply increased in the Cheonggyecheon area. According to a survey in January 2005, 1,600 apartments in the area were to be sold even during the construction (Hwang- K., Byun- M., and Nah- T., 2005. Cheonggyecheon Project: Conflict Management Strategy. Seoul: Nanam). In addition, local and foreign investment has increased in the adjacent Dongdaemun Fashion District since an American company first decided to invest. The real estate market in the northern area has also revived, which has contributed to resolving the regional imbalance.

Third, the project had an impact on adjacent areas. A number of old buildings on the upper stream were repaired, extended, or rebuilt as new. Neighbourhood facilities were established in most of the adjacent areas of the stream (The Seoul Institute, 2014. Historic Preservation and Ecology Restoration of Cheonggyecheon. Seoul, Republic of Korea).



[Figure 21] Changes in development patterns near the Cheonggyecheon stream after project completion

Source: Seoul Institute, 2014

Fourth, the Cheonggyecheon acted as a catalyst for industrial changes in Seoul's CBD. Before the project, the CBD was suffering from the decline of the retail and manufacturing industries. The restoration, with its subsequent developments, helped shift the economy of the CBD toward financial and professional services, in line with the general trend of the rest of Seoul. Accordingly, land use was reorganised for commerce and the service industry. Meanwhile, as the city government eased regulations on the floor area ratio, buildings over 100 meters

high were constructed in the city centre. All these changes, triggered by the Cheonggyecheon restoration, contributed to making Seoul a global city.

There are lessons to be learned from this project. SMG officials intended to complete this project within two years from planning to completion. This fast-moving process is what distinguishes the Cheonggyecheon restoration project from other projects of similar size. To facilitate the process, the planning and construction phases had to overlap. The planning, design, and construction were conducted simultaneously. This had its intended effect of reducing the time required for completing the project. Thus SMG was able to minimize the disruption of business and traffic as well as lessening the financial burden. Perhaps this last was a key leading to the final success, since SMG was able to persuade the merchants on the ground that the potential losses would be minimal with the short period of time needed for construction.

Nonetheless the simultaneous process was controversial. A negative by-product would be that the fast-moving process could not ensure the complete historical preservation of the Cheonggyecheon, something which was an important principle of the project. SMG attempted to restore the stream to its original condition by preserving all of the heritage items excavated during construction. However, this was not feasible with the short amount of time available until completion. For instance, the Cheonggyecheon Citizens Committee and experts argued for restoration of the Gwangtong-gyo Bridge, built in the early Joseon dynasty (early 1300s), to its original state in the original location. To do this, the city would need privately-owned parcels of land. Eventually, the bridge was restored at a location that was 150 meters away from the original. Without sufficient time to negotiate with the private land owners, historical preservation had to be adjusted to the reality of the situation.

The desire to complete the project as quickly as possible is understandable. However, the fast-moving process has its inherent weaknesses as well as strengths. This sort of process inevitably misses an important opportunity to create a better environment. Perhaps some important issues would have been completed, given

more time for analysis and negotiation. Those tasks, which were pushed back on the priority list, but still meaningful for the entire project in the long term, were lost. “Hurrying always” has been the spirit of Korean economic growth in the past. However, that era might now be past, considering that citizens are aware of the lack of historical preservation from the project.



[Figure 22] Cheonggyecheon in 2015

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

03 Dongdaemun Area Regeneration with the Dongdaemun Design Plaza

Industrial Changes & Its Impact


After the third industrial revolution swept over the country, industrial changes were manifested in Seoul. However, there was little room for the manufacturing sector to grow within the city. A weakened manufacturing sector was one of the reasons why Seoul was losing its economic vigour. In the early 2000s, manufacturing accounted for only 13% of the regional economy of Seoul, which ranked 15th among 16 cities/provinces in terms of manufacturing growth in Korea. Regions of Seoul with previously strong manufacturing sectors were declining. The Dongdaemun area was a manufacturing hub in the 1960s and '70s where sewing factories and fashion industries flourished. It started to decay when factories began to move to other locations such as China and Southeast Asia, looking for cheap labour. The competitive edge of the manufacturing sector in Dongdaemun started to weaken.



[Figure 23] Dongdaemun Area in 2005

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

In the early 2000s, the area was also hit hard by an excessive number of shopping malls in other parts of Seoul and the emergence of online-shopping. The Dongdaemun area lost its appeal. Furthermore, the nationwide recession in the 2000s undermined the situation to the point where a newly-opened fashion shopping mall remained vacant. In July 2003, approximately 20% of the shopping malls in the Dongdaemun area were empty. Some recorded a 50% vacancy even in 2006. In addition, there were other factors that made shopping in the Dongdaemun inconvenient: the decrepit facilities of the Dongdaemun traditional markets, and Heunginmun-ro, a street that obstructed pedestrian traffic.



Dongdaemun Area Regeneration with the Dongdaemun Design Plaza

■ Overall vision

In the past, the Dongdaemun area was a naturally-formed centre of fashion and design. The area had a robust fashion market and the potential to grow even more. In 2006, Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) came up with measures to revitalize the Dongdaemun area. The fourth popularly-elected mayor, Oh Sehoon (2006 to 2010), presented as an election pledge that the city would transform the Dongdaemun Stadium into a major fashion design centre, a focal point of the regeneration of the Dongdaemun area.

In its General Downtown Regeneration Plan, the city initiated a project to build a world-class fashion and design cluster in the Dongdaemun area. A design complex was planned on the site of the Dongdaemun Stadium. This complex, the Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP), would be the core facility for the Dongdaemun cluster. The DDP was initially planned to foster design and creative industries as a growth engine for the local economy. Once successful, the DDP would form a landmark as a hub for culture and design in Korea.


■ Key objectives

To implement the plan, several strategic objectives were established: Developing 1) creative design industries, 2) a strategic base for design industries, 3) a global design-knowledge exchange system, 4) an international platform for a designers' network, 5) a hub for cultural and art activities, 6) a Korean tourist landmark, and 7) a sense of place for "creative environment".

■ Major initiatives

We should start with the city's overall industrial policies and strategies. SMG selected five new industries as growth engines: Tourism, Conventions, Design,

R&D, and Finance/Retail/Services. In line with this policy, the city prepared a plan to strengthen its industrial competitiveness, designating four industrial belts in Seoul.



[Figure 24] Four Industrial Complex Belt

Source: www.seoul.go.kr

The Downtown Creative Industry Belt consists of the Sangam Digital Media Centre (DMC), Yeouido and Yongsan International Business Districts, and the Dongdaemun area. Each of them will be nurtured as hubs for the broadcasting, movie, gaming, finance, and fashion industries, with the DDP at the core of this belt. For the Dongdaemun area specifically, the city drafted a comprehensive regeneration plan which aims at reviving the local area by promoting higher value-added businesses. Under this plan, individual development activities in the adjacent areas are to be reviewed for orderly area-wide growth. A development plan was carried out to support the whole scheme. The surrounding area of the DDP was planned to be the centre of the design and fashion industries in Seoul, and the plan includes specific regulatory standards such as land use, the number of floors in each building, the floor area ratio, the building coverage ratio, and street design. SMG recognised that its role was to establish the foundation which would enable the private sector to

grow. The city focused on creating a physical environment for the future growth of the Dongdaemun cluster.

■ Conflict Management

In implementing the plan for the Dongdaemun area, various conflicts with multiple stakeholders arose. Demolition of the Dongdaemun Stadium was the most controversial issue since the stadium had historical significance and symbolic meaning due to its inception during the Japanese colonial era. It was the first modern sports facility in Korea. Furthermore, existing shop owners had to relocate to other areas once the DDP was introduced into the area. Conflict management was an area in which SMG officials had to be persistent and resourceful.

Conflict with Korean athletic circles

In 2007, an NGO, the Civic Network for Justice in Sports (CNETJS) hosted a solidarity meeting against removing the Dongdaemun Stadium. The organisation criticized the agreement between SMG, the Korea Baseball Organisation (KBO), and the Korea Baseball Association (KBA) to demolish the stadium. The CNETJS argued that the ballpark should be remodelled for professional baseball games. A declaration was issued by the CNETJS and an association of eight civic groups, along with congressmen and well-known players. The declaration emphasized the historic and cultural value of the stadium. They suggested transforming the ballpark into a multi-complex with a sports field, a sports museum, and a park.

To resolve this, the city government organised a task force consisting of the city's Sports Promotion Division and the Seoul Sports Council, which discussed the concerns with the opposing civic groups. Communicating through both official and unofficial channels, the task force emphasized the necessity of the DDP project, while it also collected various opinions on the issue from the opposing groups. A variety of ideas were discussed, including construction of a memorial and an alternative stadium, and partial preservation of the facilities.



[Figure 25] Various stakeholders

Source: <http://blog.ohmynews.com/kanae9/197860>

Conflict with the merchants

The DDP project required the relocation of the merchants in the area. Those were the merchants in the Dongdaemun traditional market, the street vendors, and shop owners in the ball park and the underground shopping centre. These merchants opposed the project for fear of losing their livelihoods. SMG strived to resolve these conflicts, proposing solutions suitable for each group.



[Figure 26] Dongdaemun merchants discussion

Source: http://m.pressian.com/m/m_article.html?no=1769#058n

1) Merchants in the Dongdaemun traditional market and the street vendors

In 2003, when the city started restoring Cheonggyecheon stream, it temporarily moved the neighbouring street vendors to the Dongdaemun Stadium, who soon formed the Folk Flea Market. When the DDP project was announced in September 2006, these merchants demanded that the city build a permanent marketplace, arguing that this was promised during

the Cheonggyecheon restoration project. When the street vendors had opposed the project, sporadic demonstrations had broken out. This time it was different, as the merchants had collectivized to form an association to oppose the DDP project. Street vendors surrounding the stadium also joined the opposition, claiming their right to make a living.

SMG held about 1,500 meetings with the merchants to persuade them, explaining the necessity of the project and the range for possible negotiation. SMG officials also scrutinized the actual condition of the street vendors. In an effort to complete the negotiations as early as possible, the city proposed a relocation plan. With the opening of the Seoul Folk Flea Market in Sinseol-dong in April 2008, the city initiated relocation negotiations with the merchants. It pledged to provide full support for those merchants who agreed to the plan, such as modernized facilities, start-up assistance, and marketing and PR support.



[Figure 27] Seoul Folk Flea Market in 2014

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr>

2) Shop owners in Dongdaemun Stadium

Since 1966 when the ballpark was first remodelled, sports shops had sprung up in the area through private contracts with SMG. The land for the shops was owned by the city, but for a long time, shop owners had earned a livelihood. When the DDP project was announced in the early 2000s, it was natural that the shop owners claimed possessory right to their shops. They also demanded compensation for their contribution to the local economy. However, the city took a strong stand against these demands, and filed eviction lawsuits. The merchants then responded with

counter-suits. As SMG realized the confrontation might not be resolved in this manner, the city soon took a more flexible approach.

SMG assigned to its divisions the tasks of negotiation support, relocation support and legal services. It conducted in-depth interviews with the merchants to understand their needs. Based on this examination, the city proceeded to negotiate with the head of the merchant associations. SMG found that each shop owner had a unique claim and different concerns. For want of space, it is difficult to describe them in detail in this report, but SMG did its best to satisfy most of these small demands. As a result, both parties were able to reach an agreement before February 2008, which was possible because of exhaustive research on the concerns of the merchants.

3) Shop owners in the underground shopping centre

The DDP project included a plan to develop part of the underground space in front of the stadium, which made it inevitable that the merchants in the underground shopping mall would have to move out. The shop owners demanded that the city provide new stores within the DDP. They also requested a guarantee of their livelihood during construction. The city expressed its concern that it would be difficult to meet all their conditions. City officials returned the security deposit payments to the shop owners at the same time as asking for evacuation of the shops. It also suggested two alternative shopping centres to move into: an underground shopping centre in Euljiro 1-ga and Seoul Plaza, and a private shopping centre in Jamsil. The merchants refused to negotiate. After constant discussion, agreement was reached on moving into the Euljiro 4-ga underground shopping centre, another alternative closer to the DDP location, at the suggestion of the merchants. However, the association of the existing shop owners in Euljiro 4-ga opposed the relocation plan. They worried that increased store density would cause inconvenience to the current shoppers. It also argued that sports shops might be unsuitable for the area considering the characteristics of the existing shops. SMG officials constantly communicated with the merchants in various ways,

including “a 12-hour marathon discussion.” These negotiations were finally concluded by mutual consent.

Conflict with cultural heritage conservation groups

Civic NGOs such as Cultural Solidarity carried out a campaign against demolition of the stadium. They argued that the ballpark must be listed as a cultural heritage, considering its historic and cultural value. Indeed, the stadium stood there during the modern times of Korea, going through the Japanese colonization and the Korean War. The Modern Cultural Heritage Committee in the national government shared the view that it must be preserved. However, SMG had already proceeded with a project to restore the ancient city wall, a heritage of the Joseon Dynasty. After deliberation for many years, SMG hoped to demolish the Dongdaemun Stadium since they were making a different conservation effort in restoring the wall. The national government (the Cultural Heritage Administration) conceded, with a small demand. They requested that SMG preserve symbolic parts of the stadium, if not all, and the city agreed. Two lighting towers at the north of the stadium maintained their existing locations, while the flame holder on the east side was moved to a location in a new park. There would be an exhibition area in the DDP containing three-dimensional images and a model of the stadium, which seemed to end the conflict.



[Figure 28] Heritage area in the DDP

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

Another arose, however, when remains of the ancient castle wall buried beneath the stadium were discovered. The Cultural Properties Committee in the Cultural Heritage Administration demanded to excavate the whole area for complete restoration because of its historic significance. SMG, on the other hand, advocated a partial restoration to avoid major changes in the DDP plan. City officials held meetings with the committee members and concluded three measures for preservation. First, the base part of the wall and the Igansumun (2-hole sluice gate) would be preserved at the original site after minimal repair. Second, major historic remains, such as the Hadogam (a military training barracks during the Joseon Dynasty) would be relocated to a new park to the east of the wall. Third, part of the Hadogam remains in the ballpark would be preserved in the underground square of the DDP. In addition, SMG renamed the park Dongdaemun History & Culture Park, emphasizing its cultural value. In this way, the city government successfully achieved two conflicting goals: preserving cultural heritages and fulfilling the DDP development project.



[Figure 29] Heritage area in the DDP

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

Outcomes and Limitations

■ Nurturing design industries

The impact of the DDP on the sales of businesses in the area is unknown. However, the fashion industry has been invigorated. In March 2014, the city held the largest Seoul Fashion Week ever, with the opening of the DDP. The event was intended to display capable young fashion designers as well as enhancing the competitiveness of the top-notch designers. The event was also expected to help create new business opportunities from home and abroad, further developing Korea's fashion industry. The city plans to hold various fashion events such as joint fashion shows and fashion fairs in the DDP. These events will help revitalize the Dongdaemun area and improve sales.



[Figure 30] Dongdaemun Fashion Cluster with DDP

Source: <http://www.ddp.or.kr>

■ Revitalizing tourism

The walking population apparently increased by more than 10% after the opening of the DDP. The number of foreign visitors is also continuously increasing. According to an official at DDP headquarters, on average, 24,000 individuals visit the DDP every day, 1.5 times more than expected. The reason DDP became a landmark in such a short period lies in the artistic and cultural content it has

provided. SMG expects that more than half of all foreign tourists coming to Seoul will visit the Dongdaemun area in the future. (Source: <https://seoulsolution.kr>)



[Figure 31] Flea market in DDP

Source: <http://www.ddp.or.kr>

■ Better Conflict Management

The DDP project provided SMG with an opportunity to build a better conflict management system. Since the DDP, the city now operates conflict management teams for all public projects, and has produced a document with information for dealing with public conflict. It has also trained expert negotiators within SMG.

■ Developing a new system to manage construction

This project was the first to introduce a nominated design competition in the public sector with the intention of upgrading the quality of public projects. This process first nominated renowned architects and solicited their proposals. It also adopted new management methods such as Construction Administration (CA) and Construction Management (CM) for transparent management of the entire process. The project contributed to developing a new standard for public building procurement.



[Figure 32] Aerial View of DDP in 2015

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

■ Making difference to the community

Since its opening, the walking population in the Dongdaemun area has increased by 20%, which, coupled with an increased walking population in the surrounding areas, brought about positive economic ripple effects. According to a study done by SMG, the DDP sparked KRW 881.7 billion worth of production and created 5,129 jobs. In addition, expected inducement effects amount to KRW 210 billion in the neighbouring commercial districts. While there was at one time some doubt about whether DDP would be a success, it is now recognised as a major attraction for the area. Since its opening, sales in the area have indeed notably increased.

According to the Seoul Design Foundation, clothing product sales at a shopping mall in the area grew by more than 10%. Another shopping mall, the “Lotte Fitin,” saw increases in the walking population of 35%, coupled with an increase in sales of 23%. Overall mall vacancy dropped by 2 to 4%. Surrounding restaurants and retail shops witnessed an increase in sales of 5 to 10%. Use of the Dongdaemun History & Culture Park Station increased to 2.23 million. (Source: www.ddp.or.kr)

■ Lessons learned

When the DDP project was announced, various interested parties opposed the spatial rearrangement of the area. It was counter to the interests of various groups of

people, including athletic circles, merchants and the Dongdaemun Stadium advocates, street vendors, the Cultural Heritage Administration and other civic NGOs. Conflict continued throughout the whole process, from demolition to completion. Dealing with these conflicts was the most essential task of the project, and the city strived to conduct effective negotiations.



[Figure 33] Dongdaemun Stadium Memorial

Source: <http://www.ddp.or.kr>

The DDP project provided an important lesson in public conflict management: it is essential to reach agreement through negotiation with multiple parties by expanding civic participation. For the DDP project, it was not that participation was necessary to complete the project, but to produce a better outcome for the citizens: a meaningful difference. In the past, conflict management in Korea focused on dealing with the issues after concluding that the output of the project should remain unaffected. The issues were then considered to be obstacles to the completion of the project. At this point, persuasion was undertaken, not conflict management. The DDP project showed that this approach was not effective. This time, the city recognised that the outcome of the project might be altered, depending upon what stakeholders thought of the project. While there was some confrontation between SMG and other parties, completing the DDP was a process of shaping the project as the stakeholders wanted. This was a major paradigm change.

A variety of opinions were gathered throughout the planning process. The DDP Operation Preparation Committee and the DDP Planning & Coordination Group were formed to discuss various alternatives, with assistance from the Expert Advisory Council. To propose an urban design scheme that would be acceptable to multiple interests, the city actively collected opinions from stakeholders through workshops and idea contests. The DDP project was carried out with the participation of different groups, including the Dongdaemun merchants. It was these stakeholders who designed the DDP, not just the original design architect.



[Figure 34] A panoramic view of DDP in 2014

Source: <http://data.si.re.kr/>

For instance, when the ancient buried wall appeared, the national government (the Cultural Heritage Administration) demanded full preservation, which was unfeasible to SMG, so they came up with an alternative: partial restoration on-site, but full preservation by relocating the historical remains intact. This was difficult to implement in practice, but it was a creative solution that satisfied both parties. Conflict management with the Korean athletic circle was also noteworthy. The Korea Baseball Organisation (KBO) fiercely opposed the demolition of the Dongdaemun stadium. To SMG, it was clear that the Stadium's days had expired, and that the location should become a new focal point to regenerate the whole Dongdaemun area. Benefits clearly outweighed the costs to SMG officials. The city

agreed to partial preservation of the original stadium with a new memorial. Because of these and similar measures, the initial design scheme, completed by renowned architect Zaha Hadid, was altered several times.

Initially, SMG wanted to keep the original plan intact. However it turned out that the initial plan was just the starting point in a long process of shaping the final outcome. In the end, the completed DDP was the outcome which was best for all. Indeed, it was a new way of conducting urban planning and design. The lesson here is that there should be room for citizens to participate in designing a project. It is not always in the public interest to follow the exact plan even if the designer or planner is a world-class expert.



[Figure 35] DDP Oullim Square

Source: <http://www.ddp.or.kr>

04 Yonsei-ro Transit Mall

Yonsei-ro: From Hot Spot to just a Congested Street

Seoul Transport Vision 2030 was announced in May 2013 and championed by the mayor of Seoul. The plan contained new vision for the future Seoul: “Seoul: easily accessible and enjoyable without cars”, with three key concepts: “People-first transport”, “Transport for everyone” and “Environmentally-friendly transportation”. It was an important paradigm shifts in Seoul’s transportation policies that the Vision 2030 set forth.

To this end, the national government made efforts to promote a pedestrian-oriented built environment. The Ministry of Land and Transport announced the first Basic Plan for Public Transport in 2006. It initiated discussions on a “transit mall” as one of the measures to better manage transportation demand in congested areas of the city. In the second Basic Plan for Public Transport in 2011, the ministry suggested expanding transit malls throughout other cities in the nation. In line with this trend, SMG strived to create a space (a district) where pedestrians and public transit are given priority. In an effort to improve the public transport system and create a walkable environment, the city presented a new vision, “Walk-friendly Seoul” in 2012. Although the idea of creating transit malls perfectly corresponded to the vision, it had never been implemented in Seoul.



[Figure 36] A car-oriented environment in Yonsei-ro, 2012


Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

The Seoul Institute conducted research to determine the optimal location for the first transit mall in Seoul. The researchers considered various factors for the candidate areas, such as density of shops, volume of pedestrians, size of the sidewalk, volume of traffic, and the amount of parking space nearby. Yonsei-ro was selected for the first transit mall in Seoul.

Yonsei-ro is a street which stretches from Yonsei University to Sinchon Rotary. It was infamous for its frequent congestion. The street was always filled with cars and buses. Poor walkability was another problem. In a 2009 survey on the walking population in Seoul, the pedestrian volume of Yonsei-ro was 2,000 to 3,000 per hour (an average of 30,000 a day). Technically, the sidewalk of Yonsei-ro was wide enough for walking, as it was 3 to 4m wide. However, the available width was only 1 to 2m due to obstructions such as power distribution boxes and street stalls.



[Figure 37] Aerial view of a car-oriented environment in Yonsei-ro, 2012
Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul



Making the First Transit Mall in Seoul

■ Selecting the Best Location for Transit Mall


To examine the feasibility of the Yonsei-ro transit mall project before it was undertaken, the Seoul Institute research team considered 13 criteria ([Table 1]). Based on these criteria, Yonsei-ro was selected for the new transit mall from more than 30 other candidate areas in Seoul.

[Table 1] Criteria for the Selection of Transit Mall Candidate Locations for Seoul

Selection Criteria	Rationale
The density of shops	The higher the shop density, the higher the probability of successful transit mall.
The size of large facilities that induce walking	It is desirable to have large facilities that induce walking for new transit mall.
The density of car dependent facilities	It is undesirable to select an area with car dependent facilities for new transit mall.
Walking population per day	Walking population should be above a certain level, since Installing transit mall alone does not bring walking population.
Deviation of daily walking population	Transit mall should be installed in a street where walking population does not vary greatly between time slots in a day.
The width of sidewalk	To maximize the effect of new pedestrian-friendly urban design from new transit mall, the width of sidewalk should be narrow.
The number of bus routes passing the Yonsei-ro	Good transit access is pre-requisite for successful transit mall.
The number of subway stations nearby the Yonsei-ro	
Traffic volume of private cars passing the Yonsei-ro	To maximize travel demand management effect of new transit mall, the traffic volume of private cars should be high.
Traffic volume of all the cars passing the Yonsei-ro	At the same time, if the traffic volume on the street is large, it would transfer traffic congestion to another street (This criterion is to consider the negative impact of large traffic volume as well as its potential impact of traffic demand management).
The number of parking spaces available nearby the Yonsei-ro	The more the parking spaces nearby, the less the resistance from private cars.
The number of parking spaces available within the Yonsei-ro	The more the parking spaces within the street, the more inconvenient for the existing customers.
The traffic impact on the whole transport network of Seoul	If the traffic impact of new transit mall on the whole transport network of Seoul is great, it is undesirable to convert the street to transit mall.

To weigh the relative importance of each factor, the Seoul Institute researchers applied the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) method throughout surveying by planning and transportation experts. In accordance with this analysis, the experts considered the density of shops and the size of existing large facilities as the two most important features for a transit mall. It also appeared that the traffic impact on the whole transport network of Seoul was another important factor. Table 2 below shows the relative weight for each criterion. Yonsei-ro was selected for the first transit mall in Seoul because it gathered the highest points from this analysis.

[Table 2] Rating Categories



Source: Introducing Transit Malls in Seoul. Seoul Institute

These 13 criteria are obtained from a careful analysis of transit malls in cities abroad. The researchers found that a number of transit malls did not produce desired outcomes, while successful transit malls had many things in common. These factors were reflected in choosing the first transit mall of Seoul. Among those, two features are considered very important. First, a street, before conversion to a transit mall, needs enough pedestrians every day. Second, the street must be highly accessible from a city-wide public transit system. It was clear that simple blocking of traffic would not rejuvenate the street or the area.

■ Overall vision

In one phrase, the vision of the project is “Walk-friendly Seoul”. The reasoning is that the city can reduce demand for private cars by improving public transit and walkability in the Yonsei-ro district. It is assumed that the impact of a transit mall would not be limited to one street, but to a broader area as well. In the long run, if an adjacent area is developed into pedestrian-friendly special districts, vehicle-free promenades, and pedestrian-priority streets, and eventually connected to the Yonsei-ro, it would create a walkable network within Seoul.

■ Key objectives

The Yonsei-ro transit mall project had 3 main purposes: 1) Manage transportation demand, 2) Enhance the public transit experience, and 3) Improve the pedestrian environment.

Manage transportation demand

As set forth in the national Basic Plan for Public Transport, the main purpose of a transit mall is to reduce passenger car usage. Yonsei-ro was a four-lane street with a heavy volume of private cars and buses. The main users of the street are Yonsei University students, most of whom presumably do not own cars, making it safe to assume that they increase the demand for public transit. With a two-lane roadway in each direction, it was difficult for bus operators to be on-time if it was congested, as was often the case. Since this street is a key connector between Yonsei University and adjacent areas, restricting access by cars would reduce the use of private vehicles throughout the whole region. A study for monitoring traffic conditions has not yet been performed, but we can infer from anecdotal evidence that traffic congestion on the streets around Yonsei-ro has not particularly increased.

Enhance the public transit experience

A Yonsei-ro transit mall would inevitably limit the use of passenger cars while enhancing the timeliness, speed, and frequency of public transit. It,

therefore, made sense to turn Yonsei-ro into a transit mall where public transportation services would be concentrated. After the Yonsei-ro area was designated as a transit mall, routes and frequency of public transit were increased to improve user convenience.



[Figure 38] Yonsei-ro in 2014

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

Improve the pedestrian environment

Yonsei university students are the main users of the street, both day and night. The sidewalk was always jammed with young students bustling with various activities. There were interesting small shops attracting visitors and tourists alike. Thus there had been significant impetus for improving the pedestrian environment. Pedestrian-friendly urban designs such as widened side-walks, ample space for waiting areas for buses, and more shelters in the district created a sense of place attractive to pedestrians. In addition, whereas the presence of vehicles can pose a potential threat to pedestrians, a transit mall can help improve their safety. This was the case in Yonsei-ro, where jaywalking was common. With no cars on the street, it is no doubt that Yonsei-ro became safer for pedestrians.



[Figure 39] Yonsei-ro in 2014

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

■ Major initiatives

SMG's plan for the transit mall placed the greater priority on pedestrians, making the most important goal in the project the securing of enough space for them. The two-lane roadway was narrowed to a single lane in each direction (called "road diet"). City officials identified the sections of the street where pedestrian traffic was concentrated, and in these areas the sidewalk was expanded up to 8 meters to accommodate the heavy flow of pedestrian traffic; the new width being determined based on the volume of pedestrians. As a result, a chicane was naturally formed in the area, slowing down vehicles. Major obstructions on the sidewalk such as electricity distribution boxes were removed or relocated.

All private vehicles were prohibited from passing through or stopping on the street. Violations resulted in a fine of KRW 40,000 for passenger vehicles and KRW 50,000 for vans. Cars that were allowed access into the transit mall were slowed down, with a new speed limit of 30km/h imposed on all vehicles. Vans carrying 16 or more passengers, emergency vehicles and bicycles are allowed to pass at all times. Taxis are only allowed between the hours of midnight and 4 A.M., when public transit is not available. Vehicles for business purposes must obtain prior approval for access at 10~11 A.M. and 3~4 P.M.

Various measures were introduced to use the transit mall as a cultural space. On the weekends, Yonsei-ro is temporarily converted into a pedestrian-only zone. From 2 P.M. on Saturday to 10 P.M. on Sunday, all buses must detour around the area. This is a progressive attempt to create a better pedestrian environment compared to other transit malls in Korea. Since prohibiting vehicles creates dead-end streets, the space is used to hold various cultural events such as an open art theatre (every Saturday from May to October), B-boy battles, and other events. The street is open to anyone for performances, without any requirement of pre-approval. In this atmosphere of freedom, a unique local culture was created in the Sinchon area, providing entertainment and attractions for visitors. The city is planning to encourage local artists, students, and citizens to participate in public activities. To make the area as inclusive as possible, SMG eliminated the height difference between the sidewalk and the roadway. With no kerb stones, citizens in wheelchairs can now freely navigate the street.

The city plans to create more transit malls in other areas, considering the designation of a pedestrian-only zone. Another transit mall might be effective in an area where there is limited space for vehicles, and congestion because of narrow roadways. SMG has a long-term plan for building a pedestrian network within Seoul that includes the Yonsei-ro transit mall. A transit mall is not necessarily limited to a street, but can be expanded to an entire district. For example, the streets near Yonsei-ro, where traffic slows down, can be gradually incorporated into the transit mall. As mentioned above, the vision for the Yonsei-ro transit mall is for it to be connected to neighbouring special districts or vehicle-free promenades, creating a walking network within Seoul.



[Figure 40] Situation before implementation in 2012

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul



[Figure 41] Situation after implementation in 2014

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

■ Conflict Management

Yonsei-ro transit mall brought about conflict among the stakeholders due to the restriction of car access. Various potential problems were discussed, such as traffic inconvenience, decrease in sales for small shops, and fear that the business community would become stagnant. There were conflicts between SMG and other entities as well. For instance, the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, not affiliated with SMG, expressed their concern that the transit mall would cause gridlock in the entire area, because the transit mall required detours of the existing traffic flow. A traffic management plan was drafted to minimize traffic congestion in nearby streets. KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corp.) was concerned about relocating electricity distribution boxes currently on the sidewalk in order to improve pedestrian space. There were numerous other conflicts as summarized in Table 3 below, with information about how SMG dealt with each issue and provided solutions. Since different stakeholders had different interests, SMG officials conducted exhaustive research on what kind of response was appropriate for each issue.



[Figure 42] A Protest march against Transit mall

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

[Table 3] Major Conflicts between Relevant Administrative Authorities and Resolution

Parties Involved	Issue	Resolution
Residents & Merchants	• Reduced business due to controlled vehicle access • Nearby road networks congested due to detours • High demand for public parking facilities	• Convey the analysis result that 80% of vehicles passing through cause congestion, but only a few enter the area. • Offer actual examples of how increased foot traffic has positive effects on business, locally and abroad. • Explain ways to attract visitors (e.g., cultural events). • Outline effective transportation plans (e.g., detour, new intersection). • Explain traffic simulation results (e.g., similar road-diet projects like Cheonggyecheon, Gwanghwamun were cited). • Provide extra parking capacity after investigating parking facilities in the Sinchon area. • Agreement signed with Hyundai Department Store and night time discounts offered to merchants to counter a potential drop in customers.
Hyundai Department Store	• Reduced revenues due to access control • Demand for a new intersection in front of Hyundai Department Store on Yanghwa-ro	• Potential issues from building a new intersection was explained. • Allow left turns from Sogang Bridge to Donggyo-dong Intersection to secure an extra access route.
Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency	• Concerns of traffic congestion from the extra crosswalk in front of Yonsei University and a new intersection in front of Severance Hospital	• Work with Yonsei University to simplify and link the signals by removing the straight-ahead/ left-turn signals for vehicles leaving Yonsei University.

Parties Involved	Issue	Resolution
		• Propose a detector that prevents lines of tailgating cars entering the intersection at red signal. • The merchants' association can participate in a review of traffic safety facilities to understand the importance of the programme.
KEPCO	• The definition of the programme as prescribed by the Urban Traffic Readjustment Promotion Act • Demand for the city to finance the cost of moving 40 power distribution units, which were blocking the sidewalks	• The transit mall as prescribed by the Urban Traffic Readjustment Promotion Act is related to the operation of the roads. The construction itself is controlled by the Road Act. • Due to KEPCO's reluctance to move the electric distribution boxes, three legal advisors were engaged to convince that the demand for the city to pay for moving of the power distribution units is not consistent with the KEPCO guidelines and the Road Act.
Street Vendors	• Demand to stay in the current locations even after transit mall opens • Demand for a new intersection in front of Hyundai Department Store on Yanghwa-ro	• Proposal to move to alternative locations. • A council was formed, consisting of the Seodaemun-Gu district office, the merchants' association and street vendors to develop a protocol for street stalls that specifies the locations, numbers, sales methods, etc.

Source: Walkable and Bikeable Cities, Centre for Liveable Cities, 41-42page

As an example, fierce opposition came from the street vendors; the city government came into major conflict when it tried to relocate them. To alleviate this conflict, officials from the Seodaemun district government communicated with the street vendors in person. As part of this effort, the district government held a number of meetings with the local residents, merchants, and street vendors to produce win-win strategies. In the end, 27 newly-designed street stalls were set up in the expanded sidewalk thanks to the road improvement works. The district government decided to cover the expense of designing and providing the stalls. The street vendors would pay a fee for exclusive use of the stalls (KRW 1.5 million each annually) to the district office. The district government also provided varied support

to the vendors such as business consulting services to boost sales. For example, after such consultation, a vendor who used to sell Korean sweet pancakes started selling takoyaki at the entrance of the overpass and is currently enjoying higher sales than before.




[Figure 43] Yonsei-ro in 2014

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

In an effort to manage all these conflicts, SMG organised a committee to encourage interested parties to express their concerns about the project. This committee was comprised of six groups (the city, the local district government, the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, and local merchants' associations (which included the Hyundai Department store, civic groups, and Yonsei University)). The city organised three subcommittees to address issues regarding transportation, design/construction and public relations, with emphasis on effectively communicating with those parties. Public hearings and orientations were frequently held for local residents and shop owners. The city consulted with local district government officials and the police on how to revitalize the local economy and ways to improve the traffic system. With its clear legal grounding, SMG successfully convinced relevant administrative agencies and business communities to accept the project in a short period of time. In 2013, the project was selected as one of the best conflict

management cases in the city. It also became one of the best operations for the Joint Government Assessment Program conducted by the national government.



[Figure 44] Promotion Committee for the Yonsei-ro Transit Mall Programme

Outcomes and Limitations

Yonsei-ro transit mall brought about numerous positive effects. In 2014, according to the Seoul Transportation Headquarters, traffic accidents decreased by 35% in a six-month period, compared to the same period the previous year; the citizen satisfaction rate improved; and the number of bus users increased. Let us look at these one by one:

From January to June 2013, there were 29 traffic accidents on the Yonsei-ro. During the same period in 2014, this number was down to 19 (35% less than the previous year). Notably, accidents on adjacent alleyways connected to the Yonsei-ro dropped by 22%. On the Yonsei-ro from Sinchon Station to Yonsei University, accidents decreased by 55%. While there had been concerns that a transit mall might encourage more jaywalking, the number of accidents actually fell, thanks to the reduced speed limit of 30km/h and decreased traffic volume.

[Table 4] Traffic Accidents, Comparing First Half of 2013 and 2014

	Total	Jan.-Jun, 2013	Jan.-Jun, 2014	Change (%)
Total	48	29	19	-34.5
Yonsei-ro	16	11	5	-54.5
Side roads	32	18	14	-22.2

Source: <https://seoulsolution.kr>

SMG conducted a satisfaction survey with 1,000 citizens and 300 visitors to the Yonsei-ro mall, which showed a 70% satisfaction rate, an increase of 58 percentage points from the previous survey. Specifically, the majority of respondents showed satisfaction regarding road safety. Before the transit mall opened, pedestrians and vehicles had to share narrow, crowded streets. Others felt positively about improved aesthetic values and convenience in taking public transit.

Another study examining 10 bus routes showed that 54,000 people visited Yonsei-ro via bus from January to May 2013. During the same period in 2014, this

number was 61,000, up by 11%. Yonsei-ro used to suffer from heavy traffic congestion, with cars passing through at an average speed of 3 to 4km/h. Thanks to the transit mall, the punctuality and accessibility of the bus services improved remarkably.

[Table 5] Number of Visitors, Comparing First Half of 2013 and 2014

Daily bus users (on average)	Total	January	February	March	April	May
2013	54,974	10,799	10,665	11,278	10,937	11,295
2014	61,089	10,751	12,013	12,992	12,312	13,021
Change (%)	+11.1	-0.4	+12.6	+15.2	+12.6	+15.3

Source: <https://seoulsolution.kr>



[Figure 45] Bus stop in Yonsei-ro, 2014

Source: Seodaemun-gu office, Seoul

Yonsei-ro became one of the best tourist attractions in Seoul. The transit mall project created new vibrancy to the street. After the project was completed, various cultural activities were performed and interesting local shops were opened. Indirect evidence of the creation of a vibrant street would be the increase in customers and sales in the area. New activities led to a revival of the local economy; the transit mall indeed helped boost sales. In 2014, the number of visitors to shops located in the

Sinchon area (the area that includes the Yonsei-ro) increased by 29%, compared to the same period in 2013. The number of transactions and sales grew by 11% and 4% respectively.

[Table 6] Sales, Customers & Transactions at Sinchon Businesses

	2013					2014				
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May
Total Sales (million won)	16,840	16,292	17,633	16,714	17,782	17,692	16,096	18,654	18,063	18,315
Total Customers (1,000 people)	198	192	211	211	220	245	244	274	276	290
Total Transactions (1,000 cases)	564	494	609	598	651	592	550	687	680	717

Note: Based on analysis of data from 1,000 BC Credit Card member stores in the Yonsei-ro transit mall.
Source: Press release by Seoul Metropolitan Government (2014).

The Yonsei-ro transit mall is a remarkable case, as the first transit mall in Seoul. The city had attempted to introduce transit malls and pedestrian-only zones several times in the past, but such pursuits had failed due to various conflicts and lack of cooperation between stakeholders. This project, however, was different: The city successfully communicated with interested parties, settling conflicts in a short period of time, and setting an example of effective conflict management. This does not mean that managing conflicts had been easy. As shown in Table 3, the list of conflicts suggests how complicated resolution was. It is always the case that it is difficult to overcome silo issues between public agencies. It is even more difficult when the private sector is involved. Therefore, many of the conflicts took unprecedented effort by SMG to mediate between the different entities. SMG learned that although it is a lengthy and complex process to manage conflicts, only a sustained effort can result in success for the project, and the role of a mediator between different parties with different demands is critical when introducing a

controversial project. It was the role of SMG officials to get a consensus that the Yonsei-ro project would eventually serve the public interest.

Seoul's first transit mall has been applauded as a success. It is one of the best verifications of Seoul's efforts to create a sustainable urban environment by placing the needs of the people and public transit first. The city is now considering a plan to permanently designate the Yonsei-ro area as a pedestrian-only zone, and is also planning for a second transit mall.



05 2030 Seoul Plan


Pre-2030 Seoul Plan

The participatory planning effort is manifested in drafting 2030 Seoul Plan. One could argue that building effective and inclusive governance and inclusive planning processes for the three physical improvement projects may have been process for preparing 2030 Seoul Plan. Indeed, the current master plan of Seoul, the 2030 Seoul Plan, provided a turning point for Seoul. It brought new mind-set for public officials as to how to carry out daily business of Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG). In essence citizen participation and participatory planning effort has been placed at the heart of all the urban planning and policies.

Before creating 2030 Seoul Plan (the master plan for Seoul), planning experts and citizens critiqued previous master plans. For instance, Seoul Plan 2020 had significant limitations. It included 12 divisional plans with 52 objectives, resulting in a planning document which had more than 600 pages. The plan enumerated a number of objectives for different departments in SMG. As the actions and objectives were scattered all over city hall, it was not effective for coping with changes in social conditions. This was problematic, since Seoul is a city of 10 million people, with many dynamic changes.

Partly this was a problem with regard to the entity which drafted the master plan. Thus far the principal agent for drafting master plans for Seoul had been the Department of Urban Planning at SMG. It is just one of many divisions in the city administration, whereas the success of a master plan largely depends upon collaboration between different urban planning disciplines such as environment, transportation and economy. A master plan is supposed to encompass a wide range of planning activities and policies. Since our master plan had been created in one department without substantial cooperation with other divisions within the city, it

was not widely adopted or referred to within SMG when devising specific actions and policies.




[Figure 46] Established Independently By the Urban Planning Dept.

Most of all, it was a master plan created ‘by the planners’ and ‘for the planners’. The drafting of Seoul Plan 2020 involved urban planners at the Seoul Institute, planning experts (academics) and city officials. However, engagement with the citizenry was kept to a minimum. As the planning process left little room for the voices of citizens, input from the general public was minimal. Without such support from citizens, it was natural that the master plan would be significantly limited in acting as a guiding principle. Essentially, master plans for Seoul in the past were so-called “cabinet plan”. Without an effective master plan, the development of Seoul was not guided by consistent principles. In other words, individual development projects were proposed and implemented based on each separate plan, and Seoul was in danger of creating a disorderly style of development scattered all around the city.

Another problem was that the plan was not effective for coping with immediate challenges in the near future. During the last decade, indicators monitoring social conditions in Seoul have shown dramatic shifts in multiple aspects. For example, 29.5% of households in Seoul are single-person occupied, while this percentage was only 4.5% in 1980. Moreover, Seoul had already become an aging society in 2005, when 7.1% of the residents were more than 65 years old. This rate is now

12.3%. In 2025, experts forecast that 20% of all Seoulites will be older than 65. It was predicted that new voices would spring up for new demands and services. Besides planning needs from demographic trends, sluggish economic growth, climate change, and social problems such as gender equality started to put pressure on the city administration. These were not issues that a “cabinet plan” could effectively deal with. After seeking the advice and input of the citizens, 2030 Seoul Plan identified 5 major challenges that needed to be dealt with in Seoul:

- Aging and an increase of one- and two-person households
- Sluggish economic growth and social polarization
- Intense competition at the metropolitan level
- Environmental issues due to climate change
- Lack of development land, coupled with dilapidated urban areas
- Thus, from the beginning, 2030 Seoul Plan began with what matters to the citizens of Seoul.



Key Planning Processes for 2030 Seoul Plan

■ Major Initiatives

Before Mayor Park Won Soon took office in late 2011, the Seoul Institute, under the direction of SMG, was preparing a tentative master plan from 2009. After the election, the city needed to review the entire plan (being drafted) to adopt the new values of the new administration. City officials and planning experts had taken the lead in the master plan effort, focusing primarily on physical development. New mayor wanted something different. The new master plan aimed to reflect the new social values that placed the interests and needs of the citizens first. The master plan being drafted was revised so that it was not limited to physical urban planning, but also encompassed various sectors such as welfare, education, history, and culture. The outcome was 2030 Seoul Plan.

What differentiates 2030 Seoul Plan from other conventional urban master plans is that the citizens themselves proposed the vision and the action plans for Seoul. In order to obtain public support, from the very beginning of the planning process SMG invited its participation. The centrepiece of 2030 Seoul Plan was the 100 citizen participatory group. One hundred citizens were randomly selected for 2030 Seoul Plan. This group of citizens, together with city officials, planning experts and local politicians, conducted numerous roundtable discussion sessions to conceive ideas as to what the future of Seoul should look like. They were key agents for identifying major critical challenges for the future of Seoul. These citizen representatives set forth their own perspectives and proposed strategies for handling the problems ahead.



[Figure 47] Citizen Participatory Group for 2030 Seoul Plan

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

In August 2012, through two preliminary meetings and a two-day plenary session, citizens discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the city, major challenges, and the future of Seoul. The citizen body finally proposed “A Liveable City of Communication and Consideration for Citizens” as the 2030 vision of Seoul (the vision of Seoul that citizens hoped for by 2030). The citizen representatives officially submitted their vision to the mayor, who then accepted the proposed vision to be the official vision for Seoul 2030. SMG launched the “2030 Seoul Plan Development Committee,” comprised of various civic groups, city councilmen, experts and city officials. Through the committee, the citizens engaged in action plans for major challenges, together with city officials, local politicians and planning experts. The committee created a tentative plan for 2030 Seoul Plan, including action plans for major challenges, land use plans, regional development strategies, and implementation methods. The tentative plan was finally confirmed in May 2014 after completing the necessary administrative procedures, including public hearings and briefing sessions for citizens.



[Figure 48] Citizen Participatory Group for 2030 Seoul Plan

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government


The plan suggested necessary projects to translate the vision into reality. According to the selected major challenges, five subcommittees, with 108 members in total, were organised. These five subcommittees dealt with the five major challenges identified by the 2030 Seoul Plan Development Committee, which were as follows: 1) Aging and an increase of one- and two-person households; 2) Sluggish economic growth and social polarization; 3) Intense competition at the metropolitan level; 4) Environmental issues due to climate change; and 5) Lack of development land and dilapidated urban areas. Each subcommittee was composed of 20 people, made up of experts, city officials, city councilmen, civic group members, and researchers from the Seoul Institute. They set goals and strategies for each major challenge. The action plans are a set of strategies and projects, and can be viewed as customized plans for specific challenges. The action plans consist of basic directions, major indicators, goals and strategies for each challenge.



[Figure 49] 2030 Seoul Plan Development Committee

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

The result was a succinct plan which was comprehensible for the average citizen. Seoul Plan 2020 was a lengthy planning report (687 pages) with 52 goals, comprised of plans for 12 sectors, such as the future vision, spatial structure, and living spheres. In 2030 Seoul Plan, however, the format of the report was revised to provide better understanding of the plan for public officials. The master plan is also readable to interested citizens. The contents of the planning report focused on major challenges and their relative action plans. The length of the report was decreased to about 200 pages. To cope with the 5 challenges that were considered the most critical to the citizens, 2030 Seoul Plan included 5 key issues with 17 goals and 60 strategies.



[Figure 50] Strategic Planning centred on Key Issues

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

As noted, the previous master plans were not widely adopted within city hall because the plan had been drafted in one of the departments. For creating 2030 Seoul Plan, the Office of Planning and Coordination with higher authority than all the city departments was deeply involved from the beginning. Thus, 2030 Seoul Plan was indeed work of cooperation between all the agencies and adopted widely in devising various follow-up action plans.

To create a plan tailored to Seoul's unique circumstances, proposing the right strategies was critical. 2030 Seoul Plan at its core was a strategic plan for the future of Seoul. It was not just about setting up the general direction of the city's future; it contained strategies to achieve the future of Seoul that its citizens wanted. Citizens, along with experts and city officials, discussed each and every strategy as to whether it was effective in realizing the vision of 2030 Seoul Plan. In order to bolster strategic planning efforts, the city placed emphasis on the following tasks: 1) Concentrate on key issues and their action plans; 2) Form consensus among various stakeholders; and 3) Connect the plan to administrative policies and strengthen monitoring. One of the benefits of strategic planning is that the various strategies and policies from different sectors can be incorporated in the achievement of goals. The goals and strategies for the 5 key issues are shown.

Issue 1. Together Without Discrimination, People-centered City

Goal

Welfare System in Response to an Aging Society	Healthy City	Well-Integrated Social System without Discrimination	Opportunities for Education Available to Everyone	Gender Equality and Social Care
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Strategy

- Enhance social support to guarantee stable life for the elderly. - Expand opportunity for the elderly to participate in society and create a culture of unifying all age groups.	- Provide ubiquitous healthcare with an efficient public welfare and healthcare system. - Enhance preventive healthcare for each age group. - Prevent and control environmental disease and improve food safety.	- Improve protection of rights for the minority to eliminate discrimination. - Establish customized welfare service by region. - Establish a voluntary welfare community through sharing and participation. - Create a society that respects the value of cultural diversity.	- Provide education opportunities to all people. - Establish an educational society to improve citizen capacity. - Restore the school's function for whole-person education. - Build a community of education by utilizing regional resources.	- Create a family-social culture of gender equality. - Establish the social environment for expanding women's economic participation. - Develop an environment that is safe from danger and violence.
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Indicator



Issue 2. Dynamic Global City with a Strong Job Market


Goal

Global Economic City Based on Creativity and Innovation	Synergetic Growth Among Economic Units Co-Development Among Regions	People and Job-Centered Vital Economy
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Strategy

- Improve the competitiveness of the industry of growth engines through a strengthened foundation for creative economy. - Promote creative small and medium-sized venture enterprises. - Establish Seoul's unique sustainable industrial ecology. - Promote the innovation cluster and revitalize the existing industrial agglomeration.	- Revitalize the social economy of coexistence and cooperation. - Support the growth of small businesses to enhance their self-sufficiency. - Expand independent job opportunities for the vulnerable social group.	- Expand the creative class by training creative human resources. - Create a global environment where global human resources want to work. - Establish a 21st-century-style city economy environment by creating an integrated space for life-job.
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Indicator



Issue 3. Vibrant Cultural & Historic City

Goal

Historic City
Where Culture and Life are Integrated

City Landscape
That moves the minds of citizens

Diverse City Cultures
for Everyone to Enjoy

Strategy

- Create a city space structure that emphasizes historical characteristics.
- Improve citizens' accessibility to historical resources.
- Time and spatial expansion of historical landscape.


- Restoration of natural scenery
- Preservation and management of historical landscape
- Management of street and downtown scenery
- Landscape management carried out together with citizens

- Establish a cultural environment for all citizens to enjoy.
- Develop regions specializing in culture
- Establish a cultural ecological network.


Indicator



Cultural Environment Satisfaction



Number of Cultural Infrastructures



Number of Foreign Tourists

Issue 4. Lively & Safe City

Goal

Park-oriented Ecological City

**Energy-Efficient
Resource Recycling City**

Creating a Safe City for Everyone

Strategy

- Focus on park infrastructure to create a park-oriented city.
- Improve the city's climate control capacity.
- Preserve-restore ecology within the city and expand its role in public benefit.
- Create a pleasant environment for city life.

- Advanced management system in preparation for the energy crisis.
- Secure a low carbon energy production-consumption system.
- Expand resource recycling.

- Advanced system for obtaining and utilizing risk information.
- Promote higher speed and improved capacity for early response.
- Expand safety governance for city life.
- Improve the capacity to prevent natural disasters and measure the environment.

Indicator



Proportion of Regions Excluded from Park Service



Usage Rate of New Renewable Energy



Rate of Decrease in Disaster Victims

Issue 5. Stable Housing and Easy Transportation, Community-Oriented City

Goal

Urban Regeneration for Harmony
Between Life and Work Spaces

Green Transportation Environment
for a Convenient Life Without Cars

Provide Various Choices for
Stable Housing


Strategy

- Mixed land use around station areas for increased job-house proximity.
- Promote balanced development through specialized growth for each region.
- Revitalize regions through resident participation-based urban regeneration.

- Restore the public transportation-centered city and establish a complex integrated transportation system.
- Reform roads and create an environment for safe walking and bicycling.
- Reasonable management of car usage.

- Expand affordable housing supply.
- Expand the customized housing welfare program.
- Establish residents' community for enhanced lifestyle.

Indicator



[Figure 51] Goals and strategies for 5 key issues

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

2030 Seoul Plan and its strategies will continue to shape the future of Seoul in a way that the citizens want. While the individuals who participated in the planning process have fulfilled their roles, a citizen participation model has been established by 2030 Seoul Plan. Since 2030 Seoul Plan, the governance structure that was created for the master plan has served as a platform to reach social consensus on all sorts of follow-up plans, with citizens at the centre of all planning processes. In essence, 2030 Seoul Plan was a master plan which contained strategies for the better future “of the citizens”, “by the citizens” and “for the citizens.” This was an important step for Seoul to progress (not just in material prosperity) in a way that the citizens desired.

■ Impact of 2030 Seoul Plan

Since Seoul is a city that is already built out, major infrastructure or large scale development projects such as the Cheonggyecheon Stream restoration were completed under previous city administrations. The impact of 2030 Seoul Plan is

not visible or tangible. It has however, tremendous impact on how planning matters are dealt with in Seoul. Prior to 2030 Seoul Plan citizen participation had been limited to pro forma public hearings (or public notices as legally-required procedures) after a certain plan was completed. For instance, the vision for the previous master plan had been determined according to the following process:

- Statistical data (by field) and citizen surveys were examined to come up with a forecast
- Discussion sessions would be held with experts and city officials
- Experts would propose their visions
- Mayor of Seoul would finalize the plan

In this process, citizens were involved only indirectly - taking part in the survey or choosing from proposed options. Citizen participation was just a routine procedure to be engaged in when projects were implemented. Therefore, it was natural that planning processes did not gain the empathy of the general public. Sometimes there were planning issues caught up in controversy.


All this has changed with 2030 Seoul Plan. At present, as previously noted, the governance for 2030 Seoul Plan became the model that all planning processes must follow. Governance structure with citizen participation at the core has become the norm in urban planning. Its impact is shown in other planning efforts. For instance, community plans are currently being established for sub-regions of Seoul. These are the plans for translating visions and strategies prescribed by 2030 Seoul Plan into realities in smaller regions of Seoul. In the planning process, citizen participatory groups have been formed at various levels as small as neighbourhoods. The regional planning process was designed as a bottom-up planning format where citizen input is fully counted. SMG takes actions such as arranging educational programs to cultivate the ability of citizens or disclosing all the information produced during the planning process, to make sure that this bottom-up process runs smoothly.

In sum, citizen participation has now become the core of the planning process in Seoul. Once it does, the voices of the citizens will not shrink in the future. This indeed is a transformation brought about by 2030 Seoul Plan.

■ Integrating with national and regional issues

Although the economic region of Seoul embraces Gyeonggi province and the city of Incheon, the administrative boundary for the master plan is Seoul itself. Even so, 2030 Seoul Plan emphasizes cooperation between neighbouring cities and regions, since major issues in planning such as commuting, air quality and housing are regional in nature. In 2030 Seoul Plan, the spatial structure of the city was designed to strengthen its competitive edge as the centre of the metropolitan area. As competition between cities worldwide has intensified for attracting economic and human capital, city officials felt the need to reshuffle the city administrative structure. In previous master plans, the Central Business District (CBD) has been planned as one-and-only centre of Seoul, with 5 sub-centres. 2030 Seoul Plan proposes a new structure of multiple cores with 3 centres and 7 sub-centres (Figure 55). The plan focuses on functional specializations of and smooth connection between activity centres.

For the Central Business District, 2030 Seoul Plan recommends recreating it as a more pedestrian-friendly area. As it is currently a major tourist destination, rich with historical resources, the area would strengthen its appeal with a pedestrian-friendly urban design. The other two centres are planned as major economic activity hubs. These 3 centres constitute the major axis for future development. Growth then would expand to the areas outside the city of Seoul. The three centres would function as the focal points of growth that could expand to the whole metropolitan region. The task ahead will be to guide orderly development and improve transport networks along the important development axes. There will be tests to see if 2030 Seoul Plan can better relate to its metropolitan area in this way.



[Figure 52] Establishment of City Axis for Interface between Centers and Mutual Development with Nearby Cities

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

In spite of such efforts for creating potential for regional planning within the boundaries of Seoul, a regional governance system was not set up for drafting 2030 Seoul Plan. Instead, after the Plan was completed, a range of action plans were proposed for individual issues (conducted by various organisations in Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi province), which dealt with regional problems. For instance, transportation planners at the Seoul Institute, the Incheon Development Institute, and the Gyeonggi Institute formed a research team in 2015. They conducted research on transportation policy that investigated problems and opportunities for an efficient regional transportation system. Our research identified a significant room for improvement. The findings and recommendations were presented to the authorities in each area. This regional transport plan was in part guided by and referred to 2030 Seoul Plan. This sort of regional cooperation has continued since the implementation of 2030 Seoul Plan. Nevertheless, as the White Paper of 2030 Seoul Plan acknowledges, creating a regional plan with regional governance is homework for Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi province.


2030 Seoul Plan is also meaningful in that it gained independence from the national government. SMG has been trying to gain independence from the national government in the drafting of its master plan. Seoul, as a city, has a unique status in Korea; the city is peerless in terms of its population, land use intensity, and the magnitude of its economic activities, and is relatively rich in financial resources. Most of all, the position of SMG (or the mayor of Seoul) on a contentious issue can have a significant impact on public opinion, and consequently on national policy (the mayor of Seoul is a member of the nation's Cabinet). Thus it has been the case that policies or programs that SMG initiates are often replicated in other local governments in Korea. National government officials believe it is indeed unnecessary to assist SMG which possesses abundant financial and technical resources. Therefore there was little support from the national government for Seoul's master plan, although it did retain the right of approval for the plan.

This has changed since 2009. The planning law has been revised so that the right of final approval has been transferred to the mayor of Seoul. 2030 Seoul Plan was thus the first plan approved to gain legal status from the mayor. This means that Seoul can now reflect the unique status and qualities of the city in the plan. And that is what happened with 2030 Seoul Plan. (Even so, urban planners in Seoul consulted public officials at the Ministry of Land and Transport for months during the planning process).

Still the national government reviews the master plan before final approval. Planners at the Ministry of Land and Transport submit their opinions on a draft of the master plan, based on national planning guidelines. They determine whether the master plan for Seoul has met the requirements in the national planning guidelines, which are applied to all city master plans in Korea. The national government is interested in preventing regional rivalries and providing balanced development within the country. Although not required by law to incorporate the opinion of the national government, Seoul considers their opinion to be valuable to the sustainable development of the city. After revising the plan in accordance with the national guidelines, it is then the mayor's turn to finally approve it, after which the master

plan becomes a legal document. The fact that the master plan is legally binding does not mean that local planners need to carry out all the proposed projects. Rather it means that the master plan itself cannot be modified or revised even in the event of changes in leadership.

The master plan for Seoul is legally required to be updated every 5 years. During this 5-year gap, monitoring the progress of plan implementation is important. In 2015, SMG promulgated a city ordinance that requires monitoring the outcomes from the master plan on a yearly basis. Therefore, after 2030 Seoul Plan was completed, the Seoul Institute established the Master Plan Monitoring Centre. The main task of the Centre is to set up indicators to monitor the progress of improving the quality of lives for citizens. The monitoring results are publicized in the press. This process ensures that citizens understand how every aspect of Seoul has been progressing. It also provides an opportunity for citizens to provide more feedback.



Monitoring and Evaluation

As noted, 5 major challenges for Seoul has been presented in 2030 Seoul Plan:

- Aging and an increase in the number of one- and two-person households
- Sluggish economic growth and social polarization
- Intense competition at the metropolitan level
- Environmental issues due to climate change
- Lack of development land and dilapidated urban area


To monitor the progress of the above, issue-by-issue, the monitoring centre at the Seoul Institute proposed tracking 70 indicators in 7 areas, which are 1) Population & Households; 2) Housing; 3) Industry & Economy; 4) Land Use & Urban Regeneration; 5) Transportation; 6) Safety & Environment; 7) Living Services. The 70 indicators in various areas are presented in Table 7 below.

[Table 7] 70 Indicators Selected in 7 Areas

Area	Category	Basic Indicators	Area	Category	Basic Indicators
Population & household	Population change	Population increase/decrease, population density, population estimate, total fertility rate	Transportation	Traffic characteristics	Traffic volume by objective, modal share rate
	Population & household structure	Population make-up by age, aging index, population of foreign nationals, household increase/decrease, household make-up by number of household members		Public transport use	Subway congestion level, number of route/vehicle by bus type
	Population migration	Status of migration to/from Seoul Status of migration to/from Seoul, Incheon/Gyeonggi		Transport infrastructure	Road ratio (road area & length), bicycle path ratio (bicycle path length), total length of bus-only lane, share of parking lot (number of plane partition for car parking)
Housing	Housing stock	Housing stock, percentage of housing by size, housing supply rate, percentage of housing by year, percentage of housing by type of occupation	Safety & environment	Urban safety	Fire incident trend, crime trend, trend of death in traffic incident
	Housing supply	New housing supply trend, percentage of government housing		Environment-based	Area of park per person, daily supply of water per person
	Housing price trend	Housing price index, jeonse housing price index		Air, environment, energy	Air pollution status, general waste treatment facility status, consumption by energy source, emission of greenhouse gas
Industry & economy	Industrial structure	Increase/decrease in business/related professions, Composition of business and related professions by type of business, trend of six strategic industries, trade specialization by industry	Living related services	Welfare	Status of welfare facilities for children/women, leisure facilities for senior citizens, amenities for the disabled, and recipients of the National Basic Livelihood Security benefits
	Job	Trend of economically active population, number of employed/unemployed, employment & unemployment rate		Culture	Number of cultural facility per 10,000 population, number of public library per 10,000 population, number of designated cultural heritage, number of international tourists
	Scale of economy	Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), financial independence of local district government		Education & medical	Public childcare facility share, number of student in a class at primary school, number of medical institution/bed per 10,000 population
Land use & urban regeneration	Zoning/district area status	Zoning change & status, special regulating area status			
	Land use status	Floor area by type of building use, floor space index by zoning, zoning change			
	CBD status & characteristics	Residential/non-residential ratio by CBD, floor space index & building-to-land ratio status, number of floor in building by CBD			
	Urban development and improvement	Degree of building deterioration, building permit trend, housing redevelopment & reconstruction status, urban environment improvement program status			

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government


From the monitoring results using the data in 2013, one can find both bright sides and dark sides at the same time. The birth rate has been decreasing since formulating 2030 Seoul Plan, while the aged population increases. Twelve percent of the total population is now over 65 years old - the highest ratio nationwide.



[Figure 53] Population Change

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government


Credit must be given for the city's efforts to supply housing, as the amount of public housing has been increasing since 2005. However, it is still only 6% of the total housing stock.



[Figure 54] Government/Public housing

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government


Seoul's economy has been growing, while creating jobs has been more difficult than expected. The Growth Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) was up by 22% between 2005 and 2013. The number of workers in Seoul younger than 30 has been falling since 2000 while the number of elderly workers has risen by 99%. It reflects phenomenon that Seoul is becoming an aging society where senior citizens are looking for job opportunities.



[Figure 55] GRDP & Number of workers

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government


Floor area of business facilities has increased to 51 million m²(up by 1.23 million 2 annually). Of this, 61% of all business facilities (in terms of floor area size) were concentrated in 3 core areas in 2013: CBD, Gangnam and Yeongdeungpo. It means that the 2030 Seoul Plan strategy to utilize 3 core centres as major development hubs is working.



[Figure 56] Floor area of business facilities

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

Travel data also suggests that the city of Seoul functions as the economic centre of its metropolitan region. Commuting between Seoul and Incheon/Gyeonggi province is on the increase. Travel from the outside of Seoul to the city increased by more than a million daily trips (1.25 million) between 2002 and 2010. The opposite is true as well. Daily trips from Seoul to Incheon/Gyeonggi have increased by about 600,000 per day; up by 50% from 2002.




[Figure 57] Commuter Traffic

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

The number of approvals or permits issued for physical improvement projects has declined since 2010. This could be interpreted as a sign that the economic growth in Seoul is weakening. However, as mentioned, this is a time when large-scale physical improvement projects are not always welcomed by the citizens.


Modal share by public transportation has been steadily growing up to 66% as of 2012. The average annual increase rate has been 1.4% since 2004. Public transit share has been increasing. To some, this rate of increase may seem too small to call Seoul a sustainable city. However, in a city with a decreasing population, maintaining a steady increase in transit share is not an easy task. This increase tells us that the city is making every effort to improve the public transit system.



[Figure 58] Public transport share

Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

With all this effort in transportation and other sectors, Seoul is becoming environmentally friendly. Particulate Matter 2.5(PM2.5) concentration has decreased to 25 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$. While still greater than other major cities in the world such as London (16 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$), New York (13.9 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$, and Paris (15 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$), our efforts will continue into the future.



[Figure 59] Ultrafine particle concentration ($\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$)
Source: 2030 Seoul Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government

In sum, there has been both good progress and areas of retreat. These monitoring results provide SMG planners information about where innovation is needed, and in what aspects additional endeavour is required.

06 Closing Remarks

After the democratization of Korea, citizens became vocal in expressing their opinions on planning issues. Although this made it difficult to initiate large-scale physical development projects, the city of Seoul engaged with multiple stakeholders and accommodated their demands from the starts. This report provided details of participatory planning processes for completing physical improvement projects in Seoul: Cheonggyecheon stream restoration, Dongdaemun area regeneration and the Yonsei-ro transit mall project. Participatory planning effort is highlighted in the process of drafting 2030 Seoul Plan.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Seoul had a heavily top-down planning process with an authoritarian leadership. Similarly, cities in developing countries had pushed policy agendas that focused on efficient economic development. And it worked. That world is now gone. People in any cities in the future will be freer with WikiLeaks and Facebook based on a ubiquitous Internet. City governments all around the world will be the same. Urban planners now need to deal with the political process with encouraging economic development at the same time. It is difficult to get things done without citizen involvement, and furthermore, citizens can offer useful advice in many cases¹.

As you have read, participatory planning process is not always nice and neat; it is not perfect, and sometimes it is messy. Nonetheless, this report documented possibilities, potentials, difficulties, and limitations of citizen participation. In this respect, I believe the stories in this report can offer a lesson to other city governments around the world preparing for the citizen involvement in their planning and policy agendas.

¹ A Collective Effort to Improve Seoul: The Seoul Institute Research Abstracts, 2013~2015, the Seoul Institute

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**Role of Governance
in Urban Transformation of Seoul**
Best Practices

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