ABSTRACT: On Liberation Day in 2010, President Lee Myung-Bak called for the creation of a Fair Society. As the urban planning process and the resulting urban built form influence the distribution of costs and benefits of contemporary society, the challenge for urban planners is to develop cities that reflect this ideal of justice. To inform this effort, this paper introduces Susan Fainstein’s concept of the Just City, which is the focus of the contemporary US debate over achieving urban social justice, and develops three critiques of the Just City from other theoretical viewpoints. These theoretical critiques demonstrate that the communicative theory critique provides a valuable extension of the Just City and that the political economy critique serves to reinforce Fainstein’s choice of strategy for implementation. The paper then offers three tentative implications for Maeulmandeulgi based on the theory and its extensions.

Key Words: Just City, social justice, fair society, Village Building, planning theory

요약: 2010년 광복절 축사에서 이명박 대통령은 ‘공정한 사회’를 중요한 국가정책의 가치로 내세웠다. 도시계획 절차와 그 결과로 만들어지는 물리적 도시환경은 사회적 비용을 반영으로 사회 전반에 걸친 이익 또는 공공성에 직접적으로 영향을 주기 때문에, ‘공정한 사회’ 조성을 위한 목표를 달성하기 위해 이상적인 정의를 반영할 수 있는 도시를 만들어가는 것이 도시계획가에게 주어진 과제일 것이다. 이를 위한 이론적 바탕을 구축하기 위하여 본 연구는 미국의 도시계획 이론학자인 Susan Fainstein의 “정의로운 사회(Just City)” 이론을 소개한다. 이 이론은 현재 미국 도시들이 당면하고 있는 사회적 정의를 달성하기 위한 도시계획 관련 이론적 논의에 초점을 두고 있으며, 다른 관련 이론들로부터 “정의로운 사회”의 세 가지 이론적 관점을 발전시키고 있다. 이러한 관점을 통해 ‘Communicative 이론’은 “정의로운 사회” 이론적 확장을 제공할 수 있고, 정치경제론은 Fainstein 이론의 실행을 위한 전략을 강화할 수 있다는 것을 보여준다. 본 논문은 이 같은 “정의로운 사회” 이론과 분석을 바탕으로 한국의 마을 만들기를 위한 세 가지 시사점을 제공한다.

주제어: 정의로운 도시, 사회적 정의, 공정한 사회, 마을 만들기, 계획이론
I. Introduction

At the reopening of Kwanghwamun on 15 August 2010, current President Lee Myung-Bak made a historic speech in which he sought to give hope to struggling Koreans by declaring his support for a Fair Society (공정한 사회). In response to growing income inequality, skyrocketing housing prices, and intensifying competition for well paying jobs, President Lee’s vision called for an ethical market economy governed by a liberal democracy that gives “equal opportunities ... to everyone, without exception, both from the very beginning and throughout the process of pursuing goals”. In exchange, individuals are expected to take responsibility for the outcomes of their actions. His position directly reflects the liberal view of justice as fairness, which emphasizes equal participation in market processes over distributive outcomes. Thus, the Fair Society can genuinely be called the Just Society.

Social justice is directly reflected in the design and operation of our cities. Housing quality—from size to age to amenities—differs by social group. One need only look at Tower Palace and the squatter settlement next to it to appreciate this. Access to quality schools is higher in neighborhoods with more expensive housing. Ease of access to transportation varies by wealth. Travel times to work and shopping are often much less for wealthier residents than poorer. Infrastructure quality varies. Wealthier residents can more readily avoid adverse environmental conditions, like polluting industries and highways. If urban planning develops projects and legal tools that support exclusive developments for the wealthy or poor quality conditions for the poor, urban planning perpetuates social injustice.

The charge for planners in Korea then is to determine what just cities should be in a just society. Are some planning processes more just than others? What makes a process fair and just? Should the distribution of outcomes matter if the process is fair? How can we achieve just outcomes? Fortunately, the question of urban justice has experienced a revival over the last several years in the United States. The work of Susan Fainstein has been central to this reexamination of urban justice. Fainstein’s concept of the Just City has been in gestation since the mid-1990s and has taken its full form with the publication of a collection of essays debating the concept entitled Searching for the Just City in 2009 and the publication of her full elaboration in 2010 entitled The Just City. Though she has actively confined her analyses to the developed nations of the West, Korea’s accession to the OECD, recognition as a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member, advanced stage of development, and new commitment to social justice suggest that the applicability of her ideas be considered here. This article thus offers a summary of the Just City concept, several critiques from other theoretical frameworks, including an evaluation of her strategy for making our cities more just,
and a tentative application to one current planning trend in Korea: Maeulmandeulgi(마을 만들기). The communicative theory critique is shown to extend the Just City and the political economic critique to reinforce Fainstein’s choice of strategy. The recommendations build on these to provide means for Maeulmandeulgi to function as a “non-reformist reform”.

As a theoretical exploration, this study’s methodology necessarily employs a survey of the literature on justice and justice in cities and combines it with a close reading of Susan Fainstein’s work over the past fifteen years. The application to Korean planning is built upon interviews with Korean planners, particularly academics, and papers presented at conferences and seminars. Detailed examinations of particular projects are held in abeyance for closer examination in future papers. As the concept of the Just City is one of broadly applied principles, it is anticipated that the findings here will be generally applicable to cities in South Korea.

II. Fainstein’s Concept of the Just City

The examination of social justice in the urban context extends at least as far back in history as Plato’s Republic. Benevolo(1967) has dated the concern with justice in urban planning to a formative split in 1848 in France into planners who concentrated on the efficiency of the city and planners who were concerned with the social ideas espoused in planning. However, the modern concern with social justice and the city emerges in the wake of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights and related movements of the United States. Highlighting the social injustice suffered by black Americans, these movements prompted planners and urbanists to consider how urban form contributed to these inequities. Though the definition of justice—and thus the Just City—remains an unresolved and active debate, the modern concern can be disaggregated into three broad approaches: the political economic, the communicative, and the liberal political(Connolly and Steil, 2009). Though Fainstein draws from the first two approaches, her ideas are most strongly rooted in the third tradition, liberal political philosophy.

1. Process versus Outcomes

There are two primary sources underlying Fainstein’s conception of justice. The first is John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, and the second is Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s elaboration of the capabilities approach. Both sources offer essential insights for operationalizing justice in practice. Importantly, though both leave important space for process as a component of justice, they also emphasize the non-negotiability of outcomes.

John Rawls’ Theory of Justice(1999), originally published in 1971, has probably been the most influential work on justice in the twentieth century. Rawls’ claim for the legitimacy of his concept of justice relies on an attempt to abstract from contemporary social relations by placing the theoretical individual in the original position
behind a veil of ignorance. The original position is a view from outside the existing social order, and the veil of ignorance refers to the theoretical individual’s lack of knowledge of her place in society. Thus, the individual must choose a social and economic order without knowing where he or she will ultimately wind up. To avoid a miserable life, Rawls argues, the rational individual will choose a well-ordered society that is fair and that results in a roughly equal distribution of primary goods, including rights, liberties, opportunities, and income. This results from two principles of justice. The first principle is that of liberty, which implies that the society should guarantee to each person “an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others” (Rawls, 1999: 53). That is, every individual should enjoy all liberties that do not impinge on the liberties of others. The second principle is known as the difference principle and provides that any social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they benefit the most disadvantaged members of society.

The first principle is in line with President Lee’s Fair Society, but the second goes beyond it, or at least pushes it to its limits. The first calls for extensive freedoms and liberties to make one’s own choices in life and take responsibility for them. The second principle fully embraces equality of opportunity, as does the Fair Society, but it goes further to emphasize that equality of opportunity requires a roughly equal distribution of resources. Based on the principle of redress, which states that undeserved inequalities must be compensated for, Rawls argues that genuine equality of opportunity must redress inequalities due to lack of native assets or to being born into less favorable social circumstances for which the individuals are not responsible (Rawls, 1999: 86). If one projects this process of remedying inherited inequalities forward, it becomes apparent that the endpoint of society is one of roughly equal resources, including wealth and income. Thus for Rawls, the process of offering equal opportunities is inseparable from the outcome of a roughly equal distribution of wealth.

The capabilities approach, which underlies the United Nation’s Human Development Index, goes further by evaluating any socio-political system by the minimum capabilities it provides its participants. And capabilities are effectively outcomes. Drawing on Aristotle, capabilities are defined as the actual ability to do and become (Sen, 1999: 75). These include such fundamental aspects of living as the capability to maintain one’s health and to use one’s power of reason. But they also include such process-oriented capabilities as the capability to participate in democratic decision making. Thus, in line with Rawls, the capabilities approach emphasizes that each government’s responsibility lies in providing equality of opportunity to do or to be (Nussbaum, 2000). There are two primary and relevant differences. First, the capabilities approach shifts the focus of policy away from the provision of specific resources and toward actual living conditions. Second, the capabilities approach also
prioritizes participation in democratic processes as a fundamental, self-reinforcing capability that has both instrumental and intrinsic value as both a process and an outcome (Sen, 1999).

At its core, Fainstein’s Just City concept reduces these concepts of justice down to two principles. The first (from Rawls) is that planning practice “should opt for that alternative that improves the lot of the relatively disadvantaged or minimally does not harm them” (Fainstein, 2009: 56). This basically means that when evaluating alternative development proposals, the minimal requirement is that the relatively disadvantaged stakeholders are not harmed and the maximal requirement is that their interests are directly addressed. The second principle (from both Rawls and the capabilities approach) is that planning processes and outcomes should maximize democracy, equity, and diversity.

2. Democracy, Diversity, and Equity

Although Fainstein “names” urban justice as incorporating equity, democracy, and diversity and calls for their maximization in her most recent book The Just City (Fainstein, 2010), equity takes priority, while democracy and diversity play supporting roles. From the beginning of the book, she situates equity as the core component of a just city, suggesting that decades of scholarly critique of urban policy makers has implied a model of the just city as “a city in which public investment and regulation would produce equitable outcomes rather than support those already well off” (Fainstein, 2010). This focus on equity as justice permeates the book so deeply that it can be difficult or impossible at times to distinguish between justice and equity in her analysis. Meanwhile, democracy is subordinated to equitable outcomes in her critique of deliberative democracy’s overemphasis on good processes (Fainstein, 2010). In turn, Fainstein (2010) identifies diversity as an “aspirational goal” and emphasizes its conceptual distinction from equity, but she acknowledges the term’s “instrumentality when equality of access is really meant” in the United States (Fainstein, 2010: 68) and this instrumentality informs most of her recommendations in the final chapter. In sum, in the Just City model, equity defines justice, while democracy facilitates equity and diversity constrains it.

III. Critiques

The central contribution of this piece is to formulate three critiques of the Just City model. Two critiques draw from the two other broad approaches to urban justice, and aspects of these arguments can be discerned in existing literature (see, for example, Harvey and Potter [2009] and Forester [2009]). The third critique addresses Fainstein’s strategy for transformation, and it is original to this paper.
1. Communicative Theory Critique

The first critique comes from communicative planning. Writers in this tradition, like John Forester (1989) and Patsy Healey (1997), who draw heavily on the work of Habermas (1970; 1984), argue that imbalances of power in the decision making process lead to unjust outcomes that reflect powerful stakeholders’ interests. Though these scholars agree with Fainstein that power imbalances perpetuate injustice, the argument from their perspective would be that Fainstein ceases her analysis too soon, that she fails to explore how these power imbalances can be addressed, that she fails to analyze process thoroughly. Instead, Fainstein relies on an unanalyzed raft of social movements to push for reforms that will steadily increase the power of the disadvantaged.

The solution for the communicative theorists is to develop planning processes that minimize if not eliminate the distortions in decision making introduced by such imbalances. Thus, planners should act as mediators who can develop full recognition of other stakeholders’ interests and concerns, for instance by providing additional assistance to disadvantaged groups and creating open and honest communication environments. The communicative approach claims that establishing just processes—on the basis of robust democratic decision making in which information is fully available and all stakeholders’ voices are valued—will lead to just outcomes.

The communicative theorists’ critiques could be seen as undermining Fainstein’s approach, but they should rather be seen as extending it. As stated above, Fainstein places great importance on the role of democracy and the communicative theorists offer means for strengthening those processes. Her argument is rather that just processes alone are insufficient, which leaves ample room for incorporating communicative principles.

2. Political Economic Critique

While the communicative approach emphasizes the justice of process, the political economy approach concerns itself primarily with the justice of outcomes. This approach is perhaps most clearly delineated in Harvey’s Social Justice and the City (1975)(but see also Castells [1977] and Marcuse [2009]). Reacting to John Rawls’ liberal political theory of justice, Harvey argues that injustice is tied to capitalism’s reliance on the uneven development of urban space to generate rent and profit. This view goes further to argue that capitalism as a mode of production that generates rent and profit is inherently unjust, as it is predicated upon diverting a portion of the value created through labor into the private pockets of those who own the means of production. Also, uneven development is utilized to push workers’ wages downward by threatening them with the loss of their jobs as ready replacements are available in less developed regions.
But Fainstein (2009) argues that planners have no choice but to work within the contours of the global capitalist economy and thus offers no genuine alternative to capitalism: she advocates only for improved conditions for the least advantaged. She states that her objective is “to lay out principles that can move cities closer to justice” (Fainstein, 2010, emph. added) and offers lists of policies “in furtherance of” equity, democracy, and diversity (Fainstein, 2010). But she does not suggest what a just city would be, except, as mentioned above, a place of equitable outcomes. At best, she expects that the pressure for justice “would add to overall pressure for restructuring capitalism into a more humane system” (Fainstein, 2010, emph. added). She is not advocating that capitalism be transformed into a genuinely humane system but simply reformed into a less bad system. Thus, because Fainstein accepts capitalist social organization, the basic political economy approach argues that because the Just City is not about social transformation, there is no way that the Just City can be truly just.

3. Critique of Strategy

Though the main political economic critique concentrates on Fainstein’s acceptance of unjust outcomes, it also offers a critique of Fainstein’s strategy for creating more just cities. As mentioned above, Fainstein expects planners to contribute to bringing about more just cities by working with citizen activists in promoting and implementing incremental reforms that improve the lives of the most disadvantaged. This incremental approach of ratcheting up pressure is informed by the strategy of “nonreformist reforms”. The term originally comes from André Gorz’s Strategy for Labor (1967), but is adopted by Fainstein from Nancy Fraser, who was in turn directed to Gorz’s work by Erik Olin Wright (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In this convoluted genealogy, the fuller version and implications of Gorz’s strategy were lost. And this is to the detriment of the Just City concept.

Both Fainstein and Gorz are engaging the long debate over whether advocates of socialism should embrace social reforms or wait for contradictions within capitalism to inevitably generate conditions for a revolutionary moment. Advocates of the first position generally argue that current conditions cannot be ignored and insist that socialists take direct action to mitigate them, while the second position claims that this will simply prolong capitalism’s life and delay socialism’s arrival (Berman, 2003). Writing in the late 1960s, Gorz—like Fainstein—sees little immediate hope of transforming the social and economic organization of the capitalist states of Europe and North America. Instead, he develops a third approach, a simple core strategy he calls “nonreformist reforms”: by struggling together for carefully selected reforms that increase the power of labor, workers will build their strength and hence ability to achieve subsequent reforms. Abstracting from Gorz’s focus on labor to incorporate all socially disadvantaged groups,
Fainstein defines nonreformist reforms as strategically selected reforms that will not only improve social conditions immediately but also build a foundation for further reforms in the future. These reforms are intended to redistribute material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy to society’s disadvantaged populations (Fainstein, 2010). Though she does not specify the mechanism, in accordance with her definition of nonreformist reforms, increased resources will presumably enhance these groups’ ability to push for additional reforms and perpetuate the virtuous circle. In this regard, the superficial structure of Fainstein’s approach parallels Gorz’s. The deeper thrust of Gorz’s strategy, however, suggests a radically different approach.

Gorz strategy is for achieving an explicitly socialist transformation of society. Gorz argues that capitalist forces have become adept at absorbing workers’ straightforward quantitative demands, like higher wages and fewer hours, and are therefore able to arrest the dynamism of the socialist movement, forestalling more substantive change (Gorz, 1968). To counter this tendency, Gorz argues that socialism must thus be presented as a desirable goal in and of itself (Gorz, 1968). Fainstein endorses this perspective: “Transformational movements aimed at a more egalitarian society must find a rationale based in human motivation rather than historical inevitability” (Fainstein, 2010). But for Gorz, simple calls like Fainstein’s for “more” or “better” are insufficient. Rather, such calls must be made in the context of a “global alternative” to capitalism (Gorz, 1968). He provides at least two reasons for this. First, these limited and unimaginative relative improvements are unlikely to inspire workers to accept the sacrifices that must be made to achieve deeper social transformation. Situating the concrete achievements of social movements within the context of the struggle for a qualitatively different society raises workers’ awareness and understanding of their social situation and builds the resolution required by that struggle (Gorz, 1968: 123–124). Second, as mentioned above, these quantitative demands can be readily reabsorbed by capitalism by, for example, passing on the cost of higher wages back to the workers in the form of higher prices. Worse, these gains can be “whittled down, denatured, absorbed and emptied of all or part of their content” if the disruptive momentum of social movements is not sustained (Gorz, 1968: 120).

Moreover, Gorz (1967) writes, “No partial conquest nor the sum of such conquests will ever lead to a miraculous ‘qualitative leap,’ nor will they ever make capitalism tilt toward socialism as a drop of water makes a vase overflow. If the strategy of intermediate goals is trapped by this illusion, it will fully deserve the labels of reformist and social-democrat which its critics give it.” From Gorz’s perspective, Fainstein is trapped by this illusion. By “realistically” accepting capitalism as a constraint and pushing for a better distribution
of the material and nonmaterial benefits of public policy under a more humane capitalism rather than offering a global and qualitative alternative. Fainstein reduces the Just City’s long-term political appeal and hence its capacity for transforming society. “If the overall perspective is lacking,” Gorz (1967) continues, “then the sum of all reforms, however advanced they may be, will be reabsorbed by capitalism, resulting in a ‘mixed economy’ of the Scandinavian type in which the power of capital and alienated labor survive while ‘welfare’ is given to all.”

This leaves the reader with two possible conclusions. First, Fainstein is seeking social transformation and has elaborated a faulty mechanism for achieving that transformation. Or second, Fainstein is seeking social reform and has identified an ideal mechanism for achieving that reform. Evidence from her body of work points to the latter, as a “mixed economy” of the Scandinavian type appears to be precisely Fainstein’s goal. She has for a number of years held Amsterdam up as a concrete model for the Just City (Fainstein, 1999, 2000, 2005) and continues to do so in The Just City (Fainstein, 2010). Amsterdam is, of course, an excellent model of a city that embodies the Scandinavian type of mixed economy and combines it with participatory democratic practices and deep-rooted tolerance of diversity. Therefore, even though Fainstein may have incompletely adopted Gorz’s original conception, this is still consistent with her long term vision for cities in the contemporary global economy. The critique ultimately reinforces Fainstein’s strategy.

IV. Applications to Maeulmandeulgi

Susan Fainstein’s concept of the Just City can and should be applied to the whole spectrum of urban planning, particularly urban redevelopment. However, since Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon announced in 2012 that the municipal government would promote citizen participation in urban planning by implementing the Maeulmandeulgi process in ten neighborhoods of Seoul and local laws and ordinances for Maeulmandeulgi are being adopted by many local governments (태윤재ㆍ박소현, 2010), it seems appropriate to employ this development as an example for extending the theoretical implications of the Just City concept to practice. The Maeulmandeulgi approach is part of an effort to improve planning outcomes through stronger democratic processes that combine expert and citizen knowledge, increase transparency, and clearly reflect citizen interests (신중진ㆍ송승현, 2010; 신중진ㆍ신효진, 2010; 태윤재ㆍ박소현, 2010). Similar to the Japanese practice of machizukuri, Maeulmandeulgi brings local residents more directly into the planning process through a variety of processes, like workshops, charrettes, and surveys, that allow them to express their own vision for their neighborhoods. These ideas are developed with professional planners and implemented through
a combination of government and community action. Though the process in Korea is increasingly government-led, these Asian approaches to community planning are solidly in line with Western planning efforts to enhance communicative planning in the interest of more equitable and just outcomes. And though Mayor Park is adopting Mæulmandeulgi as a direct counter to President Park’s top-down, “bulldozer” approach to urban planning, he must still implement this policy in the context of the Just Society.

Fainstein’s practical recommendations in *The Just City* are too numerous to present them all in this context. However, I would like to identify three implications of the Just City concept for Mæulmandeulgi.

1. Citizen Participation Alone Insufficient

The first implication is that citizen participation is necessary to achieve just outcomes, but it alone is insufficient. While the framework for democratically incorporating citizen input into planning decisions is a vital component of building better cities, without proper precautions such processes may simply reinforce the interests of more powerful actors in those communities and ignore the genuine needs of those who lack the social, economic, or political resources to press forcefully for their interests (Purcell, 2009). Precautions must ensure that the balance of power is tipped toward those who currently inhabit the site in question. Such precautions may take many forms, but at a minimum all current residents and businesses, whether renting or owning, should retain the right to remain in their neighborhood at their current costs. Those owners and renters who are voluntarily displaced should “be given sufficient means to occupy an equivalent dwelling or business site, independent of the market value of the lost location” (Fainstein, 2010: 172).

2. Additional Resources for Low-Income Communities

Second, since citizen participation is time and resource intensive, the municipal government should provide differential, income-indexed subsidies for planning and for implementation. More powerful stakeholders often have the time necessary to participate in such processes because they often address those stakeholders’ bottom line (Forester, 1989). They are also more likely to be able to afford the cost of sending representatives to community meetings and making their voice heard. Local residents, especially low income residents, often work such strenuous jobs and long hours that they are unable to take active part in the time consuming democratic deliberations. Therefore, lower income communities should receive subsidies that enable residents to dedicate time and attention to their involvement in the Mæulmandeulgi process. Similarly, to the extent that the municipal government expects
such plans to be implemented, it should subsidize the costs of implementing lower income communities’ plans rather than limiting them to improvements within their meager local budgets. Such an approach will not only foster equitable outcomes across neighborhoods but also strengthen the democratic capacity of lower income residents to get involved in other decision making processes, thereby acting as a nonreformist reform.

3. Independent Expertise

Third, to ensure that local residents, businesses, and users are able to foster their own understanding of the planning process and issues of concern, they require independent technical assistance that they can access outside of the regular avenues of participation organized by the city government. Similar to the planners dispatched to Community Boards in New York City when they were first formed, the city should second planners to each community with the charge that they advocate for the community’s interests without risking their long term employment with the city should local interests conflict with citywide interests (cf. Davidoff[1965] and Bass and Potter[2004]). However, despite the possibility of establishing a formal regulation that protects planners who advocate local policies that run counter to central planning policies, in practice such activities may still jeopardize the planner’s career and discourage him or her from truly advocating on behalf of the community to which they are seconded. Thus, to ensure that independence can be maintained, communities should also be permitted to select their own representative in place of the city-designated representative at the city’s expense and at similar rates of compensation.

V. Conclusion

This paper has argued that Susan Fainstein’s concept of the Just City is highly relevant to contemporary Korean urban planning. Given President Lee’s declaration that Korea is to be a Just Society and ongoing public concern with social justice, planners must consider what just cities are like and how we can build them. Potential critiques from communicative planning and political economy provide on the one hand useful extensions of practice and on the other a fuller endorsement of her strategy of social reform.

The primary import of Fainstein’s work is to argue that processes and outcomes must be considered together but that outcomes take precedence. Thus, plans that increase the material and nonmaterial resources available to disadvantaged members of the community should take priority, because such outcomes embody “non-reformist reforms” that increase the ability of these groups to participate fully in democratic planning processes. In this way stronger democratic practices and social equity become mutually reinforcing. And it is from this
perspective that Mayor Park’s Maemulmandeulgi policy represents an important step forward.

But more democratic processes are only part of the solution. Since such processes are easily dominated by more powerful stakeholders, ensuring equitable outcomes requires strong safeguards on these processes and demands active, ethical, and political participation by planners. To this end, this paper makes several recommendations for the Maemulmandeulgi policy on the basis of the Just City concept. First, citizen participation must be provided with sufficient security that neither owners or renters will be forced out without genuinely equivalent compensation. Second, neighborhoods and households should be differentially subsidized on the basis of local residential incomes to ensure that they have the time and resources to participate fully in the planning process. Finally, local communities should have free access to high quality, independent planning council that is free to advocate sincerely in the community’s interests.

Korea has a long tradition of equity and sharing. Fainstein’s work argues that if the nation is to continue this venerable tradition, its planners must become actively involved in working with citizen groups to build more Just Cities.

References

신중진, 신효진, 2010, “마을 만들기 사업에서 주민의 역할 변화에 따른 지원방안 연구 - 서울 독산동 마을 만들기 사례를 중심으로”, 「대한건축학회논문집」, 26(10) : 233～244.
Just Cities in a Just Society  95


Harvey, D., 1975, Social Justice and the City, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


Purcell, M., 2009, "Resisting Neoliberalization: Communicative Planning or Counter-hegemonic Movements?", Planning Theory, (8)2: 140~165.


원고접수일: 2012년 11월 6일
1차심사완료일: 2013년 1월 7일
최종원고채택일: 2013년 1월 18일