The Challenge of Risk Society and the Future of East Asia Searching for Participatory Risk Governance

March 16, 2015
The Challenge of Risk Society and the Future of East Asia Searching for Participatory Risk Governance

March 16, 2015

Host: The Seoul Institute, Joongmin Foundation, Europe-Asia Research Network (EARN)
Sponsors: Korean Sociological Association, Korean Society for Social Theory
In cooperation with: ERC <Cosmo-climate> Project, <LIBEAC> EU Project,
Institute for Social Development and Policy Research
# The Challenge of Risk Society and the Future of East Asia Searching for Participatory Risk Governance

**March 16, 2015 | The Seoul Institute Seminar Room**  
Host: The Seoul Institute, Joongmin Foundation, Europe-Asia Research Network (EARN)  
Sponsors: Korean Sociological Association, Korean Society for Social Theory  
In cooperation with: ERC-Cosmo-Climate Project, LibreECO Project, Institute for Social Development and Policy Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 09:00 – 09:30 | Opening Ceremony | - Soo-hyun Kim (President, The Seoul Institute, Korea)  
- Moo-Kyung Kim (President, Korean Sociological Association, Korea)  
- Sang Jun Kim (President, Korean Society for Social Theory, Korea)  
- Sabine Selchow (ERC-Cosmo-Climate Project, England)  
- Gilles Kamps (LibreECO Project, France) |
| 09:30 – 10:40 | Session 1 | **Bringing Ulrich Beck under Empirical Test**  
Chair | Sabine Selchow (London School of Economics and Political Science, England)  
Presentations  
1. Young-Hee Shin (Hanyang University, Korea)  
2. Emancipatory Catastrophism and Cosmopolitan Solidarity in East Asia  
3. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)  
Who are Cosmopolitan Actors in East Asia? A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and the Issue of Nuclear Power Plant  
Discussant | Sun-Jin Yun (Seoul National University, Korea) |
| 10:40 – 10:50 | Coffee Break | |
| 10:50 – 12:00 | Session 2 | **The Future of East Asia in the Context of Global Risks**  
Chair | Young-Hee Shin (Hanyang University, Korea)  
Presentations  
1. Daniel Ball (Tsinghua University, China)  
2. Confucianism and Political Meritocracy: Implications for Democracy in China  
3. Gilles Kamps (CNRS-Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Aix-Marseille University, France)  
*Individuals in the face of risk: 'playing' risks to overcome disasters*  
Discussant | Sang-Jun Kim (Kyunghee University, Korea) |
| 12:00 – 13:30 | Luncheon | |
| 13:30 – 14:40 | Session 3 | **Seoul City in Comparative Perspective**  
Chair | Miree Byun (The Seoul Institute, Korea)  
Presentations  
1. Anders Blok (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)  
2. Seoul City from the perspective of climate risk politics and greening world cities  
3. Young-Hee Shin (The Seoul Institute, Korea)  
Urban Risk and Policy Agenda for Safe City: The Case of Metropolitan Seoul  
Discussant | Kwonpuchang Cho (The Seoul Institute, Korea) |
| 14:40 – 15:00 | Coffee Break | |
| 15:00 – 18:00 | Session 4 | **Participatory Risk Governance and its Possible Indicators**  
Chair | Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)  
Presentations and Discussions  
1. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)  
*Introductory Note: What do we mean by Participatory Risk Governance?*  
2. Dukjin Chang (Seoul National University, Korea)  
*Disaster Mapping and SNS*  
3. Sabine Selchow (London School of Economics and Political Science, England)  
Participatory Risk Governance in a Cosmopolitan World  
*What is it and how might it look?*  
4. Zhang Lu (Tsinghua University, China)  
*From the Chinese Experience of Social Governance*  
5. Sue-Bock Moon (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)  
Crowdsourcing as a Key Enabling Technology to Participatory Governance: Risks and Possibilities |
Session 1. Bringing Ulrich Beck under Empirical Test

Chair: Sabine Selchow (London School of Economics and Political Science, England)

Presentations

1. Young-Hee Shim (Hanyang University, Korea) .................................................. 7
   “Emancipatory Catastrophism and Cosmopolitan Solidarity in East Asia”

2. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea) ................................................. 23
   “Who are Cosmopolitan Actors in East Asia? A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and the Issue of Nuclear Power Plant”

Discussant: Sun-Jin Yun (Seoul National University, Korea)

Session 2. The Future of East Asia in the Context of Global Risks

Chair: Young-Hee Shim (Hanyang University, Korea)

Presentations

1. Daniel Bell (Tsinghua University, China) ............................................................ 41
   “Confucianism and Political Meritocracy: Implications for Democracy in China”

2. Gilles Campagnolo (CNRS-Aix Marseilles School of Economics, Aix-Marseille University, France) .......................... 129
   “Individuals in the face of risk: ‘playing’ risks to overcome disasters”

Discussant: Sang-Jun Kim (Kyounghee University, Korea)

Session 3. Seoul City in Comparative Perspective

Chair: Miree Byun (The Seoul Institute, Korea)

Presentations

1. Anders Blok (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) ......................................... 141
   “Seoul City from the perspective of climate risk politics and greening world cities”

2. Sang-Young Shin (The Seoul Institute, Korea) ................................................. 181
   “Urban Risk and Policy Agenda for Safe City: The Case of Metropolitan Seoul”

Discussant: Kwonjoong Choh (The Seoul Institute, Korea)
Session 4. Participatory Risk Governance and its Possible Indicators

Chair: Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)

Presentations and Discussions

1. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)
   "Introductory Note: What do we mean by Participatory Risk Governance?"

2. Dukjin Chang (Seoul National University, Korea)
   "Disaster Mapping and SNS"

3. Sabine Selchow (London School of Economics and Political Science, England)
   Participatory Risk Governance in a Cosmopolitan World: What is it and how might it look?

4. Zheng Lu (Tsinghua University, China)
   "From the Chinese Experience of Social Governance"

5. Sue-Bock Moon (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)
   "Crowdsourcing as a Key Enabling Technology to Participatory Governance: Risks and Possibilities"
Session 1.

Bringing Ulrich Beck under Empirical Test

1. Young-Hee Shim (Hanyang University, Korea)
   “Emancipatory Catastrophism and Cosmopolitan Solidarity in East Asia”

2. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)
   “Who are Cosmopolitan Actors in East Asia?
   A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and the Issue of Nuclear Power Plant”
Emancipatory Catastrophism and Cosmopolitan Solidarity in East Asia: An Empirical Test of Beck’s Theory

Young-Hee Shim
(Hanyang University, Korea)
Abstract
This article attempts an empirical test of Ulrich Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis. The basic research question is: does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods? More specifically, we asked two research questions: 1) does anthropological shock or risk perception work as push factors for catharsis? 2) does social catharsis work as pull factors for actions and social movements? The first is about to the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and social catharsis, and the second is about the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement. The findings are as follows:
First, as to the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and social catharsis, most of risk perceptions are positively related with the need of international cooperation on the international level as expected. More specifically, the higher the risk perception, the more strongly citizens agree to the need of international cooperation in case of earthquakes, radiation accidents, nuclear power plant, and climate change, supporting Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism. On the national level, however, risk perceptions are negatively related with social catharsis. That is, the higher the risk perception, the more negative the evaluation of government risk management. This is so, particularly in the case of safety of nuclear power plant, and seriousness of climate change. This result also supports Beck’s theory.
Second, as to the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement, we expected that they are different according to whether they are direct or indirect participation. Particularly it was expected that people who participated or were willing to participate would show more positive attitude to the need of international cooperation, and the results turned out that way. On the other hand, we expected that those who participated or were willing to participate would be more critical of government risk management. However, it turned out the other way, both showing positive relationships That is, the positive score of government’s risk management as well as the positive score of the need of international cooperation were higher among those who directly participated in civil movements. This is also the case with more indirect likelihood of civil government. This is against our expectation. Particularly, the positive relationship between government’s risk management and likelihood of civil movement was against our expectation.
In sum, Beck’s main hypothesis of emancipatory catastrophism, that is, that the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods, is supported, even if there are some minor unexpected outcomes.

1. Introduction
This article attempts an empirical test of Ulrich Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis by identifying the forces which interact when a social transformation takes place. In his public lecture at the 2014 Seoul Conference (the text of which was published in Current Sociology), Beck (2015) explains emancipatory catastrophism through three conceptual lenses: the violation of sacred norms of human existence, anthropological shock, and social catharsis. This article seeks to systematize the driving force of emancipatory catastrophism as consisting of push and pull factors and to apply this analytic scheme to the concrete case of risk action which involves both the catastrophic push factor and an emancipatory pull factor.

The research question is: Does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods? In other words, we ask: Is there any relationship between violation of shared norms of human existence/anthropological shock and social catharsis? More specifically, is the experience and/or anticipation of violation of shared norms and anthropological shock such as climate change or radiation leakage related to citizens’ positive attitudes towards doing something to change the situation? It is expected that the more serious the violation of shared norms and anthropological shock, the more positive the risk actors’ attitudes and action toward civil movement.
Why do I do this work? Beck’s theory focuses not on order but on change, particularly macro-change, and thus is very difficult to apply to an empirical study. Thus there is not much empirical study (such as a survey research study) based on Beck’s theory. Particularly, it is more so in the case of his theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis, because it is not only quite recently developed and published, but also quite complex and dynamic and hard to be operationalized empirically.

Thus there is a need to clarify Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis, our conceptual scheme of analysis, and operationalization process before we present research questions.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Beck’s Theory of Emancipatory Catastrophism and Metamorphosis

What Beck calls metamorphosis (Verwandlung) is a double process unfolding. The two processes include the production and distribution of goods on the one hand and the production and distribution of bads on the other. “First, there is the process of modernization, which is about progress. It is targeted at innovation and the production and distribution of goods. Second, there is the process of the production and the distribution of bads” (Beck 2015: 78). According to Beck, “both processes unfold and push in opposite directions, but they are interlocked”. The point is that this interlinkage is not produced through the failure of the process of modernization or through crises but through its very success. Beck says that “the more successful it is, the more bads are produced. The more the production of bads are overlooked and dismissed as collateral damage of the process of modernization, the greater and more powerful the bads become” (Beck 2015: 78).

Thus metamorphosis is not social change, not evolution, not revolution, not crisis, not war. According to Beck, “it is a mode of changing the mode of change. It signifies the age of side effects. It challenges the way of being in the world, thinking about the world and imagining and doing politics”. And it calls for “a scientific revolution from ‘methodological nationalism’ to ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’” (Beck 2015: 78). The metamorphosis of the world is about the hidden emancipatory side effect of global risk.

Then what is emancipatory catastrophism? Emancipatory catastrophism, according to Beck, is not about the negative side effects of goods but the positive side effects of bads. They are producing normative horizons of common goods.

The driving force here is global risk. Global risk may be destructive nationally (‘working institutions fail’) but creating opportunities globally (‘new normative horizons’ and the emergence of unwritten but imperative norms) (Beck 2015 77-78). Beck emphasized that in the cosmopolitan turn the common sense of problem, the historical rationality, is constituted and transformed by global risk (Beck 2015: 85). And what keeps the cosmopolitized fragmented generation together is “the reflexivity and reflection produced by global risk”. This reflexivity and reflection in the face of global risk, i.e. in the face of the existential threat to humanity, stands for what Mannheim calls ‘entelechy’ (Beck 2015: 85), which can be translated as social catharsis or paradigm shift, the essence of emancipatory catastrophism.

Furthermore, Beck made a decisive attempt to move into the action-theoretical arena by addressing Hurricane Katrina, which swept the coast of Louisiana, USA in August 2005. In this context he suggested three conceptual lenses: sacred (unwritten) norms of human survival, anthropological shock, and social catharsis (Beck 2015: 75). Han (2015: 117) formulated an empirical proposition from this: ‘the more deeply shocked by a disaster destroying the norm of human survival and justice, the greater energy for cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity’. In other words, it can be said that anthropological shock is a driving force, pushing toward social catharsis changing the negative energy into a positive one, while social catharsis is a pull factor for action and movements. Han claims that in this way Beck defends ‘an empirical analysis of the normative horizon of the self-critical world risk society’ which differs from all normative approaches in terms of conviction and value judgment.

Important concepts concerned here are: violation of sacred norms of human existence, anthropological shock, social catharsis and actions and movements. Emancipatory catastrophism is comprised of violation of sacred norms, anthropological shock, and social catharsis, while metamorphosis is comprised of all the four variables.

I tried to grasp the above argument in the following figure 2-1.
2.2 Research Question based on the Operationalization of the Concept

In order to test Beck’s theory with empirical data, it is needed to operationalize the key concepts. Violation of sacred norms of human existence can be operationalized into occurrence of a catastrophe such as the Fukushima incident. This kind of catastrophe brings forth an anthropological shock which can be interpreted as global risk. Global risk is here operationalized as risk perception of catastrophe. Particularly risk perceptions of earthquakes, radiation accidents, nuclear power plants, and climate change as well as people’s risk perception in general were dealt with.

This global risk or risk perception is a strong push factor for emancipatory catastrophism. It is a bad thing, but it can bring forth a good thing such as energy for positive action. Social catharsis is such a paradigm shift. When a big catastrophe occurs, people at first are shocked, but later think that it should occur ‘no more’ and thus their way of being, of thinking, and of acting are also changed. Particularly, cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity arises. Here two aspects: on the national and on the international level, since Beck mentioned that global risk may be “destructive nationally but create opportunities globally”. That is, it could give rise to critical and negative evaluations of government risk management, but could give rise to positive attitude towards the need of international cooperation. Here we can interpret that the social catharsis on the international level could be more directly related with cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, while that on the national level could be a sort of “no more” or a moment of paradigm shift.

The actions and movements can rise based on cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. The actions could be direct or indirect. We can consider directly whether people participate or are willing to participate in actions or social movements. Or we can consider indirectly what people think about the likeliness of such a civil movement. The above description on operationalization is shown in the following table 2-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Concept</th>
<th>Operationalized Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Sacred Norms</td>
<td>Global risk, Catastrophe (e.g. Fukushima accident)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropological Shock</td>
<td>Risk Perception of Catastrophes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Catharsis</td>
<td>Paradigm Shift, “No More,” Criticism on government risk management, Cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, (e.g. Change in evaluation and/or need for national and international countermeasures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions/movements</td>
<td>Actions by Risk Actors based on Cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the above discussion, the research question “Does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods?” can be rephrased as follows using the operationalized variables: 1) does risk perception work as push factors for social catharsis? 2) does social catharsis work as pull factors for actions and movements? More specifically, the hypothesis will be: 1) the higher the risk perception, the stronger the social catharsis and 2) the stronger the social catharsis, the stronger the actions/movements based on cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. In order to answer the question, we will raise some sub-questions. For example, what is the extent of anthropological shock or risk perception? How is risk perception related with evaluation and need of national and international countermeasures? How is way of thinking related with way of thinking?

3. Data and Method

Questionnaire surveys were distributed to 1,609 people, and the breakdown was roughly around 500 people each in of the three cities of Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo in 2012. In order to discuss emancipatory catastrophism, we tried to measure the violation of shared norms of human existence/anthropological shock, social catharsis/cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, and metamorphosis. Here the violation of shared norms of human existence/anthropological shock is considered as an independent variable, and social catharsis/cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity and metamorphosis are considered as dependent variables which are supposed to be interrelated. Based on the above-mentioned operationalization of concepts, we measured the variables as follows:

First, in relation with violation of human norms/anthropological shock which is an important aspect of the emancipatory catastrophism we asked the several questions regarding perceptions of various risk factors. More specifically, we asked questions on two levels: one on risk perception in general and the other on risk perception about specific risk factors. The question on risk perception in general is as follows: Overall, what do you think about the current level of citizens' concerns? The responses were measured on a Likert scale (from 1 very high level, 2 generally high level, 3 generally low level, 4 very low level).

In relation with perception of the specific risk factors, we asked questions about various risks such as earthquake, nuclear waste/radiation accidents, safety of nuclear plant, and climate change. As to earthquake and nuclear waste/radiation accidents, two question to each risk were asked: 1) “If the risk factors in the following occurred, to what extent do you expect the associated damages and harms to be? Please indicate which of the expected extents of damage is closest to your opinion.” And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 no damage at all, 2 minor damage, 3 average, 4 quite serious damage, 5 significant major damage). 2) “To what extent do you believe that the actual occurrence of the risk factors in the following table is possible in your country? Please indicate which of the expected extents of possibility of occurrence is closest to your opinion.” And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 impossible to occur, 2 unlikely to occur, 3 average, 4 quite likely to occur, 5 very likely to occur).

The question about climate change and safety of nuclear plant was asked in a different way: “What do you think about the seriousness of climate change as a new risk faced by humanity?” and “What do you think about the level of safety of the nuclear power plants in your country?” respectively. And the responses were measured on a Likert scale (from 1 “very serious” to 4 “not serious at all” for climate change and from 1 very safe to 4 not safe at all for safety of nuclear plant) respectively.

Second, in relation with social catharsis or ‘no more’ and turn to cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, which is another important aspect of emancipatory catastrophe, questions on responses to countermeasures were also asked: One is on the national level and the other is international level. The question on the national level is: Overall, what do you think about the government’s management of risks? And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 very well, 2 quite well, 3 not that well, 4 not well at all). The question on the international level is as follows: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the opinion that cooperation among nations is

---

1 The surveys were conducted by Professor Li Qiang of Tsinghua University in China, by Professor Han Sang-Jin of Seoul National University in Korea, and by Professor Li Tingjiang of Chuo University in Japan respectively. The survey in Seoul was carried out as an online survey by Hankook Research based on its master sample. The surveys in Beijing and Tokyo were carried out as one-to-one interviews by trained interviewers majoring in sociology and were based on stratified random sampling.
necessary in order to combat climate change since it is a worldwide risk?” And the responses were measured on a Likert scale (from 1 completely agree, 2 generally agree, 3 generally disagree, 4 completely disagree).

Third, in order to measure actions and/or movements of risk actors based on the cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, we asked participants two questions: one is rather direct and the other is rather indirect. The more direct and contextualized question is as follows: When earthquake and tsunami occurred in Fukushima, Japan in March, 2011, there rose some voluntary civil movement to help those victimized in neighboring countries such as Korea and China. Did you participate in these movements? If not, are you willing to participate in such a movement if similar situation occurs? They were also measured in Likert scale (from 1 “I participated,” 2 “I did not but I am willing to participate in the future,” 3 “I am not willing to participate in the future too.”), we asked the following question: “How strong a civil movement to help those victimized in other countries do you feel will arise in our country when a big catastrophe happened in a neighboring country?” They were also measured in Likert scale (from 1 “very strong” to 4 “not strong at all”).

In addition, we asked a more indirect question in a more general setting: “How likely do you think a civil movement to help those victimized in other countries will arise in our country when a big catastrophe happened in a neighboring country?” They were also measured in Likert scale (from 1 “very likely” to 4 “not likely at all”).

Fourth, in addition, socio-demographic factors were also measured. They were measured as follows: middle school graduation and under, high school graduation, and college students and over in the case of education; low, middle and high in the case of subjective stratification. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are as follows: in terms of gender, there are more men in Beijing than in Seoul and Tokyo, while the gender balance is similar in Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of age, there are more young people (in their twenties) in Beijing, while there are more elderly people (over sixties) in Seoul².

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-1</th>
<th>Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(unit: total frequency)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenties</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirties</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forties</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifties</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over sixties</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School &amp; lower</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College &amp; higher</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard of living</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce/Separation</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Distribution of Anthropological Shock and Other Key Variables

4-1 Anthropological Shock or Risk Perceptions of Catastrophes

As to people’s risk perception, we asked questions on two levels: one more general, and the other more specific. As to risk perception in general, Beijing is highest with 52.9 points, Tokyo is next with 43.5, and Seoul is lowest with 36.9. Here we have to consider that the question is an indirect one which asks the current level of citizens’

² The sample in each city was adjusted to better fit the population. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are shown in the following table (Table F1).

<Table F1 here>
risk awareness. An answer of “very high” could mean a positive evaluation that citizens are highly aware and thus the situation is not so serious, which can be interpreted as not being reflexive or critical of the situation.

Risk perceptions on specific risk factors support this interpretation. Thus, let us see each risk factor one by one. In relation with risk perception of earthquakes, Tokyo is highest with 90.2 points and Seoul and Beijing is relatively lower with 60 points or so. In relation with risk perception of radiation accidents, Tokyo is highest with 80.0 points and Seoul also shows relatively high with 77.6 points. Beijing is lowest with 59.4 points. In relation with safety of nuclear power plant, Tokyo again shows the highest risk perception with 70.7 points, Seoul next with 48.4 points, and Beijing lowest with 29.3 points. In relation with climate change, Seoul shows highest risk perception with 85.1 points, Tokyo next with 83.5 and Beijing lowest with 72.2.

As to the four specific risk factors, despite some variations, all three cities show relatively high level of risk perception showing more than 50 points except safe of nuclear power plant in Beijing. When we compare the risk perception of three cities, Tokyo shows the highest level, Seoul is second, and Beijing shows the lowest risk perception.

![Figure 4-1 Perceptions of Various Risk Factors (Measurement of Anthropological Shock)]

4.2 Social Catharsis: Paradigm Shift or Extent of Cosmopolitan Sympathy and Solidarity

As mentioned above, social catharsis is a paradigm shift in which the anthropological shock changes into a positive energy for cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. Beck says global risk may be destructive nationally (working institutions fail) but creating opportunities globally (new normative horizons). Thus we asked question both on the national and on the international levels. As mentioned above, social catharsis on the international level could be more directly related with cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, while that on the national level could be a sort of “no more” or a moment of paradigm shift. The findings are as follows:

---

3 To better show the graph’s trend for the “Unsafeness of Nuclear Plant” item, “Safety of Nuclear Plant” was coded in the reverse order.
As to citizens’ evaluation of government’s risk management, Beijing is highest with 66.6 points, and Seoul and Tokyo are similarly lower with 30 points or so. This means that Beijing is most positive in evaluation of government risk management. This is in line with the general tendency that usually Beijing shows the most positive response to the government in comparison with Seoul and Tokyo (Shim et al, 2014; Han 2014). In relation with the need of international cooperation, all the three cities show high scores above 80. (Figure 4-2).

![Figure 4-2 Paradigm Shift or Extent of Cosmopolitan Sympathy and Solidarity) Measures on the National and International Level](image)

**4.3 Extent of Actions by Risk Actors (Measurement of Metamorphosis)**

Social catharsis or paradigm shift is still at the level of thinking and we need to know whether these changes in the thinking is related with actions and movements. The questions are asked at the two levels: one more direct and the other more indirect:

As to the direct participation in civil movement to help disaster-stricken neighboring countries, only Seoul and Beijing data are available, and Tokyo data is unavailable, since the example of the question was about the Fukushima accident and the movement to help by neighboring countries. The findings are shown in figure 4-3. In this relation, Seoul is slightly higher than Beijing in both “participated” and “willing to participate” categories, even though both cities show similar levels. When we add up the categories of “participated” and “willing to participate”, Seoul is 73.8 points and Beijing is 67.0 points.

As to the likelihood of civil movements to help disaster-stricken neighboring countries, all three cities show relatively high levels, though with some variations: Tokyo shows highest level, Beijing next, and Seoul lowest. More specifically, when we add up the categories of “very strong” and “strong”, Tokyo is highest with 90.3 points, Beijing is next with 81.1 points, and Seoul is lowest with 73.1 points.
5. Risk Perception as Push Factors Influencing Cosmopolitan Sympathy and Solidarity

In the above we have seen the distribution of key variables of emancipatory catastrophism. Now it is time to see how emancipatory catastrophism operates. That is, how anthropological shock is related to social catharsis. More specifically, whether and how risk perception influences people’s way of thinking on the national and international levels as push factors. More specifically, we assume that if the risk perceptions work as push factors, they will show a negative influence or relationship on the government level, but positive influence on the international level. The findings as shown in table 5-1 and table 5-2.

5.1 Influence of Risk Perception on the Evaluation of Government’s Risk Management
First let us see the influence of risk perception on national level, that is, evaluation of government’s risk management.

As shown in table 5-1, among the four particular risk perceptions, safety of nuclear power plant turned out to be negatively related with social catharsis. That is, the higher the risk perception, the more negative the evaluation of government’s risk management. This might be so because safety of nuclear power plant depends more on the government policy and control compared with other risks. Seriousness of climate change, turned out to be significant only in Seoul. As to the influence of people’s risk perception in general, it turned out to positively related against our expectation. This might be due to the fact that it is not a direct measure of the people’s risk perception in general, but citizens’ evaluation of peoples’ risk perception. More specifically, the higher the citizens think people’s risk perception could mean that they are not reflexive or critical enough, and the lower the citizens think people’s risk perception could mean that they are more critical and reflexive of the risk perception. Among the socio-demographic variables, education is negatively related with evaluation of government’s risk management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Seoul b(s.e)</th>
<th>Beijing b(s.e)</th>
<th>Tokyo b(s.e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Demographic Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.032 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.053)*</td>
<td>-0.083 (0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.038 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.074 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.043 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.127 (0.051)**</td>
<td>-0.169 (0.037)**</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratification</td>
<td>0.081 (0.045)*</td>
<td>0.051 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>0.058 (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.035 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Accidents</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Plant</td>
<td>-0.391 (0.037)**</td>
<td>-0.280 (0.046)**</td>
<td>-0.128 (0.044)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness of Climate Change</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.041)**</td>
<td>0.064 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on People’s Risk</td>
<td>0.174 (0.038)**</td>
<td>0.272 (0.035)**</td>
<td>0.326 (0.039)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F test</td>
<td>21.913***</td>
<td>24.337***</td>
<td>9.487***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Influence of Risk Perception on the Need of International Cooperation

As to the influence of risk perception on the need of international cooperation, which is the essence of emancipatory catastrophism, most of the particular risk perceptions are positively related with the need of international cooperation, changing the negative energy into a positive one. More specifically, it turned out that
the higher the risk perception, the more strongly citizens agree to the need on international cooperation in the case of earthquakes (in Beijing), radiation accidents (in Seoul), nuclear power plant (in Seoul and Tokyo), and seriousness of climate change (in all three cities). Thus it can be said that Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism is supported.”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Seoul b(s.e)</th>
<th>Beijing b(s.e)</th>
<th>Tokyo b(s.e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Demographic Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.030 (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.019 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.021 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.090 (0.035)*</td>
<td>0.006 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratification</td>
<td>0.019 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.049)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.015)***</td>
<td>0.050 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Accidents</td>
<td>0.141 (0.019)**</td>
<td>-0.049 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.050 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of Nuclear Plant</td>
<td>0.082 (0.032)*</td>
<td>0.082 (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.029)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness of Climate Change</td>
<td>0.509 (0.035)***</td>
<td>0.298 (0.038)***</td>
<td>0.458 (0.037)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on People’s Risk Perception</td>
<td>-0.062 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F test</td>
<td>26.857***</td>
<td>9.904***</td>
<td>15.260***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Social Catharsis as Pull Factors for Risk Actions/Movements

As mentioned above, the level of actions and movements are different from the level of thinking. While social catharsis or paradigm shift is still at the level of thinking, actions by risk actors are at the level of actions and movements. Thus we have asked actions by risk actors. The questions here are: does the social catharsis work as pull factors? In order for the social catharsis to work as pull factors, it should show a positive influence. The questions are asked at the two levels: one more direct and specific and the other more indirect and general.

6.1 Influence of Social Catharsis on Direct Participation in Civil Movements

As to factors influencing more direct and specific question of the likelihood of civil movement, the result is quite different from the answers to questions of indirect and more general questions.

The two levels of social catharsis, that is the national and the international levels, turned out to be related with the direct participation in civil movement. It is understandable that people who participated or are willing to participate would show more positive attitude to the need of international cooperation, and the results turned out that way. On the other hand, we expected that those who participated or were willing to participate would be more critical of government risk management. However, it turned out the other way. That is, the positive score of government’s risk management as well as the positive score of the need of international cooperation were higher among those who directly participated in civil movements. This is also against our expectation. We expected the direction for national and international level would be different.

In addition, when we consider the risk perception, some contradictory results were found. In the case of climate change, it turned out that the risk perception was higher among those who participated or are willing to participate in civil movements both in Beijing and Seoul. However, in the case of nuclear waste/radiation accidents, particularly in Beijing, the risk perception score is lower among those who directly participated in civil movements. This shows that the direct participation could be quite different according to which kinds of risk perception are concerned. We can interpret that this may be because people are worried about the effect on their physical conditions and thus not willing to participate, when the radiation accidents are concerned. This is an unexpected finding.
### Risk Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Perception</th>
<th>city</th>
<th>Not willing to participate</th>
<th>Did not, but willing to participate</th>
<th>Participated</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>f-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquakes</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>1.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>2.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Waste/ Radiation Accidents</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>3.560*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>2.972*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of Nuclear Plant</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>2.910*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>4.367*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness of Climate Change</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>3.883*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>5.582**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Risk Perception</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>0.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government’s Risk Management</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>7.479***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>9.395***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need of International Cooperation</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>4.184*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>3.159*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
a. 0.05<p<0.10

### 6.2 Influence of Social Catharsis on the Likelihood of Civil Movement

As to factors influencing more indirect and general question of likelihood of civil movement, the two levels of social catharsis, that is the national and the international levels, are also related with the likelihood of civil movement. As to the relationship between the need of international cooperation and likelihood of civil movement, a positive relationship can be easily expected. In fact, the score of the need of international cooperation turned out to be higher among those who responded with “very likely” responses.

In the case of governments’ risk management, it would be different. Usually, those who are not satisfied with or criticize the government risk management will expect more likelihood of civil movement. However it did not turn out that way; rather, it turned out that both are positively related with the likelihood of civil movements. That is, the score of both government risk management and need of international cooperation was higher among those who responded with “very likely” responses. This is against our expectation. Particularly, the positive relationship between government’s risk management and likelihood of civil movement was against our expectation.

In addition, with regard to the risk perceptions, it turned out that the risk perception was higher among those who responded with “very likely” responses, particularly in the cases of nuclear power plants, climate change and people’s risk perception in general.
7. Conclusion

In this paper I tried to empirically test Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis. The basic research question was: does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods? More specifically, we asked two research questions: 1) Does anthropological shock or risk perception work as push factors for catharsis? 2) Does social catharsis work as pull factors for actions and social movements? The first is about the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and social catharsis, and the second is about the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement. The findings are as follows:

First, as to the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and social catharsis, most of risk perceptions are positively related with the need of international cooperation on the international level as expected. More specifically, the higher the risk perception, the more strongly citizens agree to the need of international cooperation in case of earthquakes, radiation accidents, nuclear power plant and climate change, supporting Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism. On the national level, however, risk perceptions are negatively related with social catharsis. That is, the higher the risk perception, the more negative the evaluation of government risk management. This result also supports Beck’s theory.

Second, as to the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement, we expected that they are different
according to whether they are direct or indirect participation. Particularly it was expected that people who participated or are willing to participate would show more positive attitude to the need of international cooperation, and the results turned out that way. On the other hand, we expected that those who participated or were willing to participate would be more critical of government risk management. However, it turned out the other way, both showing positive relationships. That is, the positive score of government’s risk management as well as the positive score of the need of international cooperation were higher among those who directly participated in civil movements. This is also against our expectation. This is also the case with more indirect likelihood of civil government. Those who are not satisfied with or criticize the government risk management will expect more likelihood of civil movement. However it did not turn out that way; rather, it turned out that both are positively related with the likelihood of civil movements. That is, the score of both government risk management and need of international cooperation was higher among those who responded with “very likely” responses. This is against our expectation. Particularly, the positive relationship between government’s risk management and likelihood of civil movement was against our expectation.

Third, when we consider the influence of risk perception on direct or indirect participation in civil movement, some contradictory results were found. In the case of direct participation, it turned out that the risk perception was higher among those who participated or are willing to participate in civil movements both in Beijing and Seoul in the case of climate change. However, in the case of nuclear waste/radiation accidents, particularly in Beijing, the risk perception score is lower among those who directly participated in civil movements. This shows that the direct participation could be quite different according to which kinds of risk perception are concerned. In addition, with regard to indirect participation, it turned out that the risk perception was higher among those who responded with “very likely” responses, particularly in the cases of nuclear power plants, climate change and people’s risk perception in general.

In sum, Beck’s main hypothesis of emancipatory catastrophism, that is, that the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods, is supported, even if there are some unexpected outcomes.

References


Who are Cosmopolitan Actors in East Asia? A Look at the Fukushima Disaster and the Issue of Nuclear Power Plant

Sang-Jin Han
(Seoul National University, Korea)
“Who are Cosmopolitan Actors in East Asia?  
A Look at the Fukushima Disaster  
and the Issue of Nuclear Power Plant”

Han, Sang-Jin  
Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University, Korea  
Visiting Professor, Beijing University, China

This paper is an attempt to test Beck’s concepts of cosmopolitan community of global risk and cosmopolitan actors by investigating the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of Japan as a particular instance of global risks. Conceptual clarification will be made to show where the driving force of cosmopolitan transformation comes from. Empirically, the survey data of citizens collected from Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo in 2012 will be used to define and measure the influence of social identities and morality upon the issue of nuclear power plant. I want to explore in this way whether a cosmopolitan community of risks emerges in East Asia and, if so, where the moral energy for such transformation comes from, and how it differs from a technocratic approach to risk governance. Based on these analyses, I want to conclusively show who the cosmopolitan actors in East Asia are, with respect to the specific issue under examination.

Push and Pull Factors for Cosmopolitan Transformation

One of the best keys to Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology can be found in the concept of cosmopolitan community of global risks. Imaginative and challenging, this concept originates from Benedict Anderson’s concept of nation as an imagined community.

The key concept of cosmopolitan risk communities is extended from the famous work of Benedict Anderson (1983) on the rise of nation-states as ‘imagined communities’. As Anderson has shown convincingly, the conscious recognition of the fact that one is living through similar experiences and events, and is affected in common with others, formed the original basis of nationalism as a powerful social force. Most citizens of nation-states will never meet face-to-face; nevertheless, they come to share freedoms and responsibilities, past memories and future destinies. Anderson reserved the notion of ‘imagined communities’ for national constructs. My concern in this project, however, is with the following question: how can we turn the concept of ‘imagined cosmopolitan risk communities’ into a strong explanatory tool for the social, economic and political consequences of climate change? (Beck,)

The concept of community, like that of organization of any kind, exhibits the dual aspects of boundaries maintenance between inside and outside, or between inclusion and exclusion, by which the social relationship among its members is formed. A community protects its
members from external threats of various kinds while providing them with cohesion and solidarity. Usually, a community is also exclusive in that it pushes aside strangers or outsiders from its proper attention. The excluded remains marginalized and often even invisible. Nation is a good example. Citizens are incorporated into the system of rights and duties by laws and conventions. Whether one holds citizenship crucially determines not only one’s legal status but also social relationships. Nation provides the sense of belonging nurtured by the common language, the mass media, history textbooks and cultural tradition. At the symbolic level, a community functions via a densely interwoven network of memories which include how its members worked hard to struggle against external hardship, repression, misrecognition and discrimination, as well as how they were united to realize the common goals. In particular, the modern nation state is full of commemoration ceremonies to revitalize citizens’ collective memories of war, revolution, tragedy as well as victory.

Beck wants to extend this concept of imagined community of nation into a cosmopolitan community of global risks. Given the fact that we are now living in the age of global risks, Beck’s project is indeed challenging and innovative. Granted that, however, it is necessary to formulate an action-theoretical proposition to clarify where the energy for cosmopolitan transformation may come from. According to Beck, “we are confronted with risks that disregard the borders of the nation-state,” as exemplified by climate change that affects everyone around the globe and by the long-term effects of nuclear radiation that escape traditional routines of risk management. He observes that “in the social dimension, the attribution of responsibility and legal liability for potential threats has become more problematic than ever.” Indeed, no one can deny the claim that “national institutions alone are unable to cope with the comprehensive challenges of responding to new global risks.” From an action-theoretical perspective, one can distinguish two factors from this observation. One is the driving force that pushes people to a cosmopolitan community driven by dangers and threats they face. A cosmopolitan community can be imagined as if it could better protect its members from such dangers than now. Another is the driving force that provides people with a new vision of the future in terms of morality, conviction, and solidarity. To make use of the classical conceptual distinctions, the push factor is linked to “because- of” motive and the pull factor is linked to “in-order-to” motive.

More specifically, push factor refers to the motivating energy which operates when one becomes highly frustrated or disappointed of the dangers and risks they face and thus forces them to exit. Push factor is often ‘negative,’ so to speak, in that it unleashes or dis-embeds citizens from the current system. Threat and danger pushes citizens to escape from the society in which they live. In contrast, pull factor invites citizens to a new hope, dream or vision by offering cultural and motivational energy for action toward a better future, that is, a cosmopolitan community. This factor is ‘active’ and ‘enabling’ in that it reconnects or re-embeds citizens into a new community via new hope and vision.

In the case of Beck’s discourse, identifying pull factor tends to be more problematic than identifying push factor. More often than not, his discourse is full of catastrophic consequences of global risks like climate change, radiation leakage, and global financial crises. However, this description of fear alone can hardly explain a cosmopolitan transformation at the level of human action. Beck seems to be aware of this when he makes a
decisive shift of focus recently from a fearsome apocalyptic perspective of climate change to a perspective of ‘emancipatory catastrophism.’

“We are faced with questions too big to fail and too big to answer. Most discussions on climate change are blocked, they are caught by catastrophism circulating in the horizon of the problem: what is climate change bad for? From a sociological point of view, because climate change is a threat to humanity, we can and should turn the question upside down and ask: what is climate change good for? The amazing thing is, if you firmly believe that climate change is a fundamental threat to all of humanity, then it might bring a transformative, cosmopolitan turn into our contemporary life and the world might be changed to the better. This is what I call ‘emancipatory catastrophism’.” (Beck, 2014 p.1)

Beck went further to work out empirical propositions which can be used to test his thesis of emancipatory catastrophism. The empirical test of this kind will be attempted by Prof. Shim Young-Hee in this conference. What I want to do instead is to work out a conceptual framework of push and pull factors as a basis for my study of the 2011 Fukushima disaster of radiation leakage in Japan as a concrete case of global risks.

Social Identities and Cosmopolitan Actor

Another key to Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology lies in his concept of global cities as a cosmopolitan actor. In a manuscript he prepared for the Paris Workshop held in December 2014, Beck declares:

In the face of global and cosmopolitan risks states remain locked in the fiction of egoistic sovereignty and fail. Cities, however, are not locked into the fiction of the national container. On the contrary, historically they often held an autonomous position. Faced with global risks they are more open for cooperative
cosmopolitan politics. As a consequence, the relationship between states and cities reverses. Cities turn into pioneers, which take up the challenge of cosmopolitan modernity as an experiment to find answers to the world at risk. Hence, the framing of cities as cosmopolitan actors sheds light on the metamorphosis of international relations and as well as international law-making.

This conceptual framework treats cities, not nation states, as unit of analysis. It can shed a new light to how cities act as independent actors in formulating policies, regional or international networks of cooperation. The concrete relationship between state and cities may differ from one country to another. Yet it is true that cities in general and global cities in particular, are interested in developing their own identities and can significantly increase influence and power resources to employ. From an action-theoretical perspective, however, cities actually mean political leadership representing the authority of city government which depends on the electoral choice by citizens. The cosmopolitan capacity of cities, which Beck emphasizes, may be sustainable when it is well backed up by the collective will of citizens. Therefore, I want to argue that we need to examine the dynamics of citizen actions to see where cities are moving forward and how they transform themselves, rather than treating cities as an autonomous actor.

In other words, I want to take up a bottom-up (citizen-oriented) approach to cosmopolitan transformation. The main question to be asked is how citizens see the problem at hand and why they act in the way they choose, not the other way around. The idea of cosmopolitan community can become meaningful when it is backed up by citizens’ initiatives. This strategy of research differs from the conventional ones taking a top-down approach, assuming government or political elites to be the main actor. The political procedures (and mechanisms) of consultation often require a close transnational cooperation. The top-down approach is inherently state-centered or city-centered. Distinguished from this, a bottom-up approach treats citizens as the main actor or agency with their own ability of cognitive assessment, moral reasoning, and participatory involvement. More specifically, based on the 2012 survey data, this paper attempts to show how citizens in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo see the problem of radiation leakage as epitomized by the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, and how they react to the government policy on nuclear power plant. In this way, we can bring out the issue of morality as an important condition for the possibility of a cosmopolitan community of risks.

To be more specific, concerning the issue of nuclear power plant, we can distinguish cosmological morality with high sensitivity to radiation danger from a technological preoccupation with safety issues of nuclear power plant and energy security.

Comparison by cities or by countries is addressed to an aggregate totality, thus not concrete enough to capture the actors in support of cosmopolitan community of risks. There are good reasons to go beyond this. Experience tells us that such conventional categories as social class and strata have often turned out to be lacking explanatory power over socio-political issues in East Asia. Because of this difficulty, the question of how to grasp the actors in support for cosmopolitan transformation requires a conceptually innovative approach.

In this respect, I want to draw attention to social identity which is neither objective as income nor subjective as intention but is shaped through the process of communication. Social
identity can be understood as a combined effect of socio-economic status and socio-political position which citizens accept they belong to. To put it more clearly, the formation of social identities can be explained by the combination of two axes in East Asia.

The first refers to the socio-economic status one holds within the context of the rapid increase of the middle class. The key point is whether citizens accept that they belong to this status or not. An important point is that there is no clear-cut objective determinant of this identity. On the contrary, the formation of identity is subject to the process of social construction. Consequently, the image of the middle class may vary from one period to another depending on many factors. When a country is growing economically, for instance, people tend to regard themselves as part of the increasing middle class while keeping a low threshold to it. When they face deprivation and frustration, in contrast, people become sensitive to the tendency of polarization between rich and poor and they tend to consider themselves as closer to the low class. The profile of the middle class is shaped by the force of social construction.

The second refers to the socio-political dimension of social identities. Here the issue is the relationship between citizens and the state. It is well known that in East Asia the state has operated as the principal coordinator of modernization. The trajectories of economic development, class formation, and political institutionalization have all been shaped to a great extent by the leading role of the authoritarian state and the political elites who have controlled it. This process of state-centered development has brought about two contradictory consequences. One is the remarkable success in economic growth. Another is the dark side of development or by-products of the record-breaking economic success, that is, complex risks that citizens face today. For this reason, it has become ambivalent how citizens assess the role of the state as pace-maker of societal development. Some may continue to support it while others turn away from it. Thus the key point is whether citizens hold a political position like the government-first attitude or a different position which may be called the citizen-first attitude, when they face the situation in which conflict emerges between these two positions over public policy affecting citizens’ life.

The combination of these two axes offers four different types of social identities, as <Figure 2> shows. They are “State Citizens,” “Public Citizens,” “Collective Citizens,” and “Dependent Citizens.” The first ‘State Citizen” refers to those who identify themselves as part of the middle class combined with the government-oriented positioning. More often than not, they represent the mainstream of the society, shaping official discourses in support for government policies while prioritizing stability to change. For this reason, in China, they are often described as “Stabilizer” as the main beneficiary of economic development in a close affiliation with state power. I want to call them “State Citizens” aptly capturing their deep mentality of placing the state at the center of historical change.

The second ‘Public Citizen’ refers to those who consider themselves as part of the middle class combined with the citizen-oriented positioning. In the modern history in East Asia, particularly in China and Korea, they have represented the national and popular conscience resisting against the misuse of power by emperor (king), the corrupted bureaucrats as well as the invasion of foreign armies. They have yielded significant influences on public opinion by raising national issues such as justice, independence,
liberation, and people’s rights. In other words, they have advocated the interests of popular class and the grassroots people in line with the normative tradition of politics in East Asia. I want to call these ‘Public Citizen’ since it touches upon this tradition still alive with appealing force in East Asia.

The third ‘Collective Citizen’ refers to those who identify themselves as part of the low class combined with the citizens-oriented positioning. They have been less benefited from economic development than the middle class and thus feel deprivation. The citizen-oriented position that they hold tends to lead them to a bottom-up challenge to the status quo. They are more inclined to collective action than public debate, the type of action of which Public Citizens are more capable. This tendency can be confirmed from many instances of collective behaviors represented by organized labor, farmers, and urban poor.

The last ‘Dependent Citizen’ refers to those who consider themselves as part of the low class combined with the government-oriented positioning. The overall characteristics of this type of identity include that they are poor, but do not trust social movement. And thus they differ from Collective Citizens. They also differ from ‘State Citizens’ because of their low socio-economic status but they rely on government policy, and in this sense converge with State Citizens by sharing the deep mentality of placing the state at the center of all developments.

![Figure 2] Construction of social identities

![Table 1] Classification of Social Identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-political Position</th>
<th>Citizen-oriented</th>
<th>Government-oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (MC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low class (LC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Socio-economic Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Public Citizens</th>
<th>State Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Class</td>
<td>Collective Citizens</td>
<td>Dependent Citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that Public Citizens and State Citizens, despite their shared socio-economic status, are assumed to differ in their socio-political attitudes due to their different socio-political positions. In the same way, Collective Citizens and Dependent Citizens, despite the fact that they belong to the same socio-economic status, are assumed to show similar tendencies as above. Likewise, the similarities and differences between Public Citizens and Collective Citizens and between State citizens and Dependent citizens are in need of close attention.

This conceptual framework will be used in this paper to test Beck’s concept of global cities as cosmopolitan actor in a sociologically more meaningful and concrete way. These identity variables will be put into testing together with such conventional demographic factors as age, education, gender, occupation in order to find out the actors who are more capable of understanding and supporting the transformation towards a cosmopolitan community of global risks.

Fukushima Disaster, Cosmopolitan Solidarity and Nuclear Power Plant

The Fukushima nuclear radiation disaster on March 11, 2011 is the second largest nuclear power plant accident after the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. The incident has several characteristics. First, it is the first severe accident of a nuclear power station, the complex disaster being triggered by a large earthquake and tsunami. Second, the four reactors were simultaneously endangered. Third, the uncontrolled situation of the melted-down reactors has continued for more than 9 months. Fourth, it is the first severe accident of a nuclear power plant on the coast. Scientists are worried about serious contamination of seawater and damages to the ecosystem. More specifically, meltdown and explosions occurred because of the hydrogen released from the damaged core. A large amount of radioactive materials has been released. Many people, around 150,000, left home to be evacuated by government order or by their own choice (Hasegawa 2012).

Although the disaster was set off by natural disasters (earthquake followed by tsunami), the Fukushima disaster itself is a manmade calamity, as can be seen in the technological and systematic failures that led to the disaster (FUNABASHI 2012). This accident is a human disaster which an electric company and the national government are very much responsible for due to a series of “underestimates,” such as that of the height of a possible tsunami, the possibility of a “station. A lot of confusing and misleading information, along with the deliberate concealment of information and delay in information disclosure occurred. Located in the background of all of this is the “Atomic Circle,” a closed relationship between politicians, government, academics, industry and the media. (Hasegawa 2012).
According to the Japanese Police Agency the number of the missing and the dead after the 3.11 accident amounts to 18,000 (E-News Today, March 20, 2011), which is the greatest since the War. More specifically, 7,197 people died, and 10,905 missing. And many of the missing are believed to have died (E-News Today, March 20, 2011). The official number of the dead of this earthquake is the greatest since the war, outnumbering the number of the dead in Kobe earthquake of 1995 (6,434 people). And the Japanese government estimated the direct damage as 16,900 billion Yen (about 226 billion US $) without including the damage from the nuclear power plant accident (Chung Chan 2011. 6, 24.). And the people evacuated from the site of disaster still suffer from refuge life and from such aftermath as depression, alcoholism, and suicide increase (Kang, Sunghyun, 2014; Lee Habin, 2014).

One of the painstaking questions about the Fukushima disaster is the relation between atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and the construction of nuclear power plants that Japan has decisively pursued. Despite the Hiroshima nightmare, in Japan, nuclear budget was passed in the lower house in 1954, de-factor authorizing the official development of nuclear research and industry. Nuclear Committee was formed in the Cabinet in 1957 and Ministry of Science and Technology was established in 1957 as a political push towards nuclear industry. An ironical consensus achieved in Japan since 1960s was that nuclear energy can be used to promote peace. This consensus seemed to be broken by the Fukushima disaster. As the atom bombs disaster in 1945 resulted in huge innocent victims, the 2011 Fukushima catastrophe brought about huge sufferings via radiation exposure and environment contamination. In the first case, Japan did not choose atom bomb dropped. In the latter case, however, Japan has deliberately chose the road to build nuclear energy plant. Consequently, a burning question was: “Why did we achieve victims’ status again?” Sensitized by danger of atom bomb, Japan pledged not to make a mistake again in the monument in Hiroshima. Nevertheless, why has Japan taken the pathway towards nuclearization of the country?

Nomiya Dai offers an explanation why and how the Japanese discourses on nuclear issue has been transformed from a negative to a positive frame. In late 1940s, the social construction of nuclear issue was framed by fear and untouchable, but it began to change from the mid-1950s by reinterpreting nuclear research as a legitimate and justifiable policy. Nuclear development began to be seen as a source of happiness, comfortable life, and progress. Tour programs to nuclear power plant began to be organized in 19691 with ten thousand visitors every month. Uranium and radium was presented as healthy materials as exemplified by such advertisements as uranium vegetables, uranium drink, uranium bath, radium hot spring, and radium wine, etc. However, the 2011 Fukushima disaster destroyed this mentality, forcing the public to reconsider the hidden connection of atom bomb and nuclear energy from the perspective of global risks.

The 2011 Fukushima catastrophe offers a good example to investigate the influence and relevance of Beck’s theory of global risks as well as cosmopolitan community and actor. It has been well known (Ito & Suzuki, 2014) that Beck first gained recognition in Japan with the translation of his book Risk Society coincided with increasing social awareness about environmental risks in Japan. Later on, his concept of individualization became increasingly popular since the early 2000s. Beck became particularly prominent in the Japanese public
after he gave an interview to the *Asahi Shimbun* which was titled as “Truth of the Nuclear Accident” and published on May 13, 2011. He elaborated on the nature of risk, but also urged Japanese citizens to get involved and to “not let industry and professionals monopolize decisions”. Shortly after the publication of Beck’s interview, the Japanese translation of *Risk Society* “[was sold] like hotcakes” (Ito & Suzuki, 2014).

Two empirical questions deserve careful attention from Beck’s theory. First, how can we prove the possibility of cosmopolitan community of global risks? Second, how can we define cosmopolitan actor in the case of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster?

Perhaps, the minimal condition for cosmopolitan community lies in expressing humanitarian concern over the pains and sacrifices caused by disasters. Wherever such disaster takes place, and however remote victims live, we are linked by a cosmopolitan solidarity if, and to the extent to which we hold the view that we all confront the harsh reality of global risks and, therefore, we should help victims to provide the minimal conditions for their human life. One step further, citizens can become more active if they express humanitarian concern by joining in a civic campaign designed to offer relief fund or voluntary emergency service. In the case of the Fukushima disaster, considerable citizens of Seoul and Beijing, for instance, joined in humanitarian activities of a cosmopolitan kind and showed willingness to join it in the future too.¹

However, I am more interested in the proactive dimension of morality as an element of cosmopolitan solidarity as well as cosmopolitan community of global risks. As to the Fukushima catastrophe, proactive means that citizens are not only reactive to the disaster by helping those who suffer from accidents, but attempt to prevent its reoccurrence by addressing to the root causes of the problem, namely nuclear power plant. In this respect, two contrasting approaches are conceivable with different foci and impacts. One is a technocratic approach to risk management. Backed up by science and technology, this approach argues that all man-made disasters like the Fukushima catastrophe can be prevented by upgrading risk management systems and increasing the capacity of technical prediction and control. The key to this option lies in the technical (systemic) competence and the code of conduct for experts and scientists. Geoengineering science and morality may provide a radical solution to risk management. In contrast, another may be called an ecological approach to sustainable development and co-existence. This approach differs from technocratic geoengineering since it does not rely on the role of experts but argues that citizens should be engaged in risk definition and management. Cosmo-morality differs from techno-morality because the former is keenly addressed to the ecological sustainability of a nuclear power plant whereas the latter is more concerned with how to secure energy as an indispensable condition for economic development. We can reasonably expect that Beck’s concept of cosmopolitan community of risks and cosmopolitan actor, as contextualized in the Fukushima disaster, may grow, above all, in the cities where cosmo-morality is influential and, particularly, among those groups who possess this morality. Cosmopolitan in this sense is related to the value judgment that to save the globe and humanity it is morally desirable (and also practically viable) not to construct nuclear power plant any further and to shut down the existing plants in the near

¹ “Fukushima brings together Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing” was a report by AtomInfo.Ru on August 11, 2013.
future based on social consensus.

Empirical Research

An empirical question is then how strong this proactive morality in its dual aspects is in East Asia, that is, in the global cities of Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. Furthermore, we can ask which social groups are more capable of developing risk-sensitive cosmo-morality which differs radically from energy-sensitive techno-morality. To answer to this question, this paper examines two factors of proactive morality involved in the issue of Nuclear Energy Plant (NEP). One factor is the extent of safety of NEP and another is the policy option whether NEP should be increased or not. The combination of these two axes yields 4 positions that citizens can take, that is, energy-sensitive strong techno-morality, energy-sensitive moderate techno-morality, risk-sensitive moderate cosmo-morality, and risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Safety of Nuclear Energy Plant (NEP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increase of NEP</td>
<td>energy-sensitive strong techno-morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk-sensitive moderate cosmo-morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data analysis shows that energy-sensitive strong techno-morality occupies 41.0 percentages of the citizens of Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. This position is particularly large in Beijing where it occupies as much as 76.9 percentages whereas it does only 12.7 percentages in Tokyo. As opposed to this, risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality occupies 37.6 percentages of the citizens of three capital cities. This position is particularly large in Tokyo where it occupies as much as 68.5 percentages whereas it is only about 5.7 percentages in Beijing. The citizens of Beijing and Tokyo are so contrasting that social support to the NEP construction is incomparably strong in Beijing while almost negligible in Tokyo. Beijing citizens tend to accept both the safety and construction of NEP by absolute majority (90.2 percentages and 81.0 percentages respectively). These figures significant differ from Seoul where the rate of acceptance is 51.4 percentages and 42.2 percentages respectively, and also from Tokyo where the figure is only about 26.0 percentages and 18.2 percentages respectively. This implies that the terrain of proactive morality with respect to NEP construction is remarkably different from one country to another in East Asia. To state more clearly, we can assume that proactive dimension of cosmopolitan morality increases as we move from strong techno-morality to strong cosmo-morality. Based on analysis, we can say that with respect to nuclear energy plant the potential energy for cosmopolitan action and transformation is the greatest in Tokyo, the middle in Seoul, and the lowest in Beijing. And it is not difficult to understand why this must be so.
What is interesting in our investigation is the close relationship between cosmopolitan orientation and social identities defined above cutting across national boundaries. To begin with, Responses to the safety and construction of NEP show remarkable difference not only among the three capital cities but also among social identities defined above. In all of three capital cities, State Citizens show far more willingness to accept both the safety and construction of NEP than Public Citizens. Dependent Citizens show the same tendency compared with Collective Citizens in whichever cities they live.

<Table 10> demonstrates that State Citizens and Dependent Citizens are equipped with energy-sensitive strong techno-morality, whereas Public Citizens and Collective Citizens possess risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality. This shows that together with cities, social identities have an important explanatory power over the issue of nuclear energy plant and the possibility of cosmopolitan transformation.
We can confirm here that regardless of cities, Public Citizens and Collective Citizens possess far greater cosmo-morality whereas State Citizens and Dependent Citizens possess far greater techno-morality. Difference by social identities is most remarkable in Seoul. For instance, risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality is incomparably high among Public Citizens (44.4 percentages) and Collective Citizens (51.7 percentages) compared with State Citizens (16.7 percentages) and Dependent Citizens (15.8 percentages). Difference by social identities in Beijing and Tokyo is also significant but not as remarkable as in Seoul.

The implications of these findings are as follows. First, Tokyo goes ahead of Seoul and Beijing in the direction of cosmopolitan transformation, measured by the issues of nuclear energy plant. Second, concerning the social groups in support of cosmopolitan change, Public Citizens go far ahead of Dependent Citizens throughout East Asia cutting across national boundaries. Third, as to the potential of Public Citizens and Collective Citizens, Seoul goes ahead of Tokyo and Beijing. Furthermore, among Seoul citizens, risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality is found to be most influential in the cohort groups of the 30’s and the 40’s, where the younger generation like the 20’s is more inclined toward moderate cosmo-morality. In contrast, the aged cohort groups of the 50’s and above are equipped with energy-sensitive strong techno-morality.

The characteristics of Tokyo citizens in terms of cohort groups look quite different. The young generation like the 20’s appears to be significantly more inclined to strong or moderate techno-morality, which is very different from Seoul. The old generation like the 50’s and above tends to support risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality. The cohort groups of the 30’s and 40’s are inclined to moderate cosmo-morality.

Finally, the following is the result of ordinal logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is risk-sensitive proactive cosmo-morality. This research takes energy-sensitive strong techno-morality and risk-sensitive strong cosmo-morality and attempts to test the latter against the former in terms of the employed independent variables which are suggested in <table 15>. In the case of independent variables with ordinal scale, table specifies which category is chosen as reference.

The outcomes are as follows:

1) As to gender, risk-sensitive proactive cosmo-morality is twice stronger among female than men: This is pretty reliable.
2) As to age, cohort groups have no independent influence on this particular cosmo-morality. However, regression analysis by city may result in different outcomes as <table 8> indicates.
3) As to education, it has been proven that the level of education has no independent
influence on this issue.

4) As to the status of employment, as compared with unemployed and no job, those with regular job and irregular job show far stronger cosmo-morality (more than three times). Yet reliability is relatively low.

5) As to occupation, compared with the manual workers and others, the listed categories of occupation such as professional, managers, the white colors, sales, services, etc. show far less cosmo-morality. Yet reliability is relatively low.

6) As to social identities, Public Citizens and Collective Citizens are far stronger than their counterparts in holding risk-sensitive cosmo-morality. This outcome is very reliable.

7) As to push factor-1, it has been proven that the higher the perceived danger of transnational risks is, the slightly stronger cosmo-morality is. This outcome is very reliable.

8) As to push factor-1, the perceived danger of risks in the future compared with the present has no independent influence on the issue.

9) As to pull factor-1, those with unconditional care show twice stronger risk-sensitive cosmo-morality compared with those with hard-line justice. This result is pretty reliable.

10) As to pull factor-2, the variable of participation has no independent influence on the issue.

<Table 5> Ordinal logistic regression analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Risk-sensitive cosmo-morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>S.E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female as reference)</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate school(ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school and below</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional college</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment &amp; etc.(ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular job</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular job</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial-professional (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar, technical job</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales, services</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC-Stabilizer(ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC-Grassroots</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC-Stabilizer</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC-Grassroots</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push factor-1</td>
<td>perceived risk index</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push factor-2</td>
<td>Perceived future risk</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pull factor-1</td>
<td>Hard-line justice(ref.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

The above findings suggest that Beck’s concept of cosmopolitan actor and cosmopolitan transformation can be supported by such global cities as Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo by significantly different degree. Within the context of the nuclear radiation disaster epitomized by the Fukushima catastrophe, Tokyo goes in the forefront, Seoul in the middle, and Beijing in the behind of cosmopolitan transformation. Thus, the capacity of these global cities as cosmopolitan actor may vary. At the same time, the findings strongly imply that cosmopolitan actor has something crucial to do with social groups who possess different identities and proactive moralities. Independent of cities, Public Citizens and Collective Citizens are found to possess far greater risk-sensitive cosmopolitan morality than their counterparts and, hence, far greater potential for cosmopolitan act and solidarity. These finding may serve to further concretization of Beck’s theory of cosmopolitan community of global risks in East Asia.

These findings also lead us to ask about social identities in more detail since ordinal logistic regression analysis clearly showed that the independent influence of social identities is clear with high reliability. First of all, the size of social identities varies significantly depending on cities. Public Citizens are the largest in Tokyo occupying as much as 65.2 percentages of city population, with Seoul in the middle (43.0 percentages) followed by Beijing (22.1 percentages). This can be interpreted as reflecting the stage of modernization. In contrast, State Citizens are the largest in Beijing occupying 26.8 percentages, with Seoul in the middle (16.4 percentages) followed by Tokyo (12.9 percentages).

The demographic profile of social identifies also deserve attention. Overall, Public Citizens tend to increase as age becomes younger and the level of education becomes higher. Yet the situation seems to vary from one city to another. This tendency is most distinctive in Seoul with respect to age and in Beijing with respect to education. In Beijing, Public Citizens and Collective Citizens are found more among regular jobs whereas Dependent Citizens are found more among irregular or part jobs.

More interesting is the fact that throughout Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo Public Citizens and Collective Citizens, particularly the latter, show a consistent and clear-cut tendency of expressing frustration, and thus becoming more critical of, the various aspects of social injustice built into the systems of status quo. The formative process of this identify is not uniform, though. In Korea, this identify has grown sharply since 1980’s when the country went through the process of political democratization. In China, considerable attention has been drawn to rapid increase of the middle class along the process of economic development. Yet it remains to be seen what role they will play in shaping the future of China.
Concluding Remarks

Beck’s theory of cosmopolitan sociology is full of new vision and imagination. This paper is an attempt to put his concept of cosmopolitan actor and transformation into empirical testing by way of introducing an action-theoretical perspective and the issue of moral energy as pull factor for cosmopolitan change. I have examined the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi radiation disaster from this angle while analyzing the survey data of 2012 on the citizens of Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. In this way, I have attempted to substantiate Beck’s concept of cosmopolitan actor not simply by repeating global cities as cosmopolitan actor, but by grasping the citizen identity groups who are properly cosmopolitan.

Nevertheless, this paper leaves a few key questions untouched and open for further analysis. First, it remains to be investigated how different types of morality are linked to cosmopolitan actor and community. A more careful and rigorous conceptualization and data analysis is required to shed a new light on this important area of study. Second, based on the analysis and demographic profiles of social identities investigated in this paper, further efforts are necessary to grasp the process and mechanism of cosmopolitan transformation more fully in East Asia.

Granted that, I would like to conclude with a few final observations about where East Asia stands today. The majority of the citizens of the three capital cities (67.9 percentages) agree that East Asia represents the region in the world where a catch-up modernization has taken place most successfully. These citizens are as large as 84.2 percentages in Seoul, 61.1 percentages in Beijing, and 59.4 percentages in Tokyo. On the other hand, the absolute majority of the citizens of the three cities think that as a consequence of rapid development they face today complex risks and side-effects threatening their everyday life. As a whole, this opinion occupies as much as 88.8 percentages. This figure is particularly high in Seoul (93.0 percentages).

The combination of these two axes result in four self-understandings of East Asian concerning the types of society in which they live today: 1) fully developed risk society, 2) less fully developed risk society, 3) fully developed safe society, and 4) less fully developed safe society. As a whole, the first occupies 61.7 percentages and the second 27.1 percentages, with other twos 6.2 percentages and 5.0 percentages respectively. The first type of self-understanding is strongest in Seoul (79.9 percentages) and the second one strongest in Beijing (35.5 percentages). Overall, the public perception of risk society is very high and distinctive in East Asia. Furthermore, concerning the future of East Asia, the absolute majority of citizens of the three capital cities (91.5 percentages) replied that they agree with the statement “East Asia should pursue its own model of development from now on rather than following the West.”

This strongly suggests that East Asian citizens began to recover their identity while being confronted with complex risks and dangers as unintended consequences of rush-to modernization. Recovering identity may help open a new space for dialogue and it is an inspiring question how East Asia would develop their own vision of cosmopolitan solidarity and transformation backed up by their own tradition and thereby lead dialogue with the West actively initiated by Beck so far.
Session 2.

The Future of East Asia in the Context of Global Risks

1. Daniel Bell (Tsinghua University, China)
   “Confucianism and Political Meritocracy: Implications for Democracy in China”

2. Gilles Campagnolo (CNRS-Aix Marseilles School of Economics, Aix-Marseille University, France)
   “Individuals in the face of risk: ‘playing’ risks to overcome disasters”
Confucianism and Political Meritocracy: Implications for Democracy in China

Daniel Bell
(Tsinghua University, China)
On the Selection of Good Leaders in a Political Meritocracy

In the early 1990s, several Asian officials and their supporters put forward the idea of “Asian values” to assert that Asian societies should not adopt liberal democratic political values and practices. As Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it, “Asians have little doubt that a society where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America.”

Such claims attracted international attention primarily because East Asian leaders seemed to be presiding over what a United Nations human development report called “the most sustained development miracle of the twentieth century, perhaps all history.”

The debate over “Asian values” was led by political leaders with questionable motives, but the views of Lee and his colleagues did have some traction in Asian societies: it prompted critical intellectuals in the East Asian region to reflect on how they can locate themselves in a debate on human rights in which they had not previously played a substantial part. In the 1990s, the debate focused mainly on human rights. How “universal” is a human rights regime that draws only (or mainly) on the moral aspirations and political practices found in Western liberal democratic societies? If Asian cultures are less individualist than Western ones, then perhaps

---

3 See, e.g., Joanne Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
certain forms of governance and policies are more suitable to Asian societies that are
different from the human rights standards typically endorsed by liberal theorists,
Western governments, and international human rights documents formulated without
substantial input from East Asia? How can “Asian values” and cultural traditions
enrich the “international” human rights regime so that it truly becomes an
international order based on universally accepted human rights? Asian critics of
“Western-style” human rights criticized liberals both for not respecting nonliberal
moralties in Asia that might justify deviations from a “Western” human rights regime,
and for failing to do what must be done to make human rights a truly universal ideal.

In 1997-98, however, the East Asian miracle seemed to have collapsed. And the
debate over “Asian values” was one casualty of the crisis. For many, the end came not
a minute too late because the whole debate seemed to rest on faulty theoretical
premises. Most obviously, Asia is a huge and exceptionally diverse landmass,
encompassing much of the world’s population. It hosts a number of religions, such as
Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Buddhism, as well as myriad races,
ethnicities, customs, and languages. The assumption that Asia has its own cultural
essence fundamentally different from that of the West is, to say the least, dubious.
And Asian politicians such as South Korea’s former President Kim Dae Jung openly
questioned the idea of “Asian values” defended by Lee Kuan Yew, arguing that liberal
democratic political values and practices are both universal and appropriate for his
country. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that “Asian values” were really “Singaporean values” as interpreted by that country’s political leaders!

Ironically, few paid attention to the really innovative Singaporean contribution to the debate on political values: the official discourse from Singapore has theoretical and practical interest not so much because it challenges the universality of human rights, but more because it challenges the universality of democracy. Singapore’s leaders reject the dichotomy between “good” democratic and “bad” authoritarian regimes. Rather, they argue that the concept of meritocracy best describes Singapore’s political system: given Singapore’s small population and limited resource base, the country should be led by people with the greatest talent and best characters, chosen according to merit. But what does it mean to select political leaders according to merit? Which abilities and which virtues matter for political leaders? For Singapore’s leaders, intellectual ability matters most, as measured by superior academic performance. In terms of political virtues, Singaporean leaders emphasize clean government, meaning lack of corruption. Leaders are not selected so much on the basis of positive virtues, but they are deselected if they are shown to be corrupt. In short, Singaporean leaders argue for the need to institutionalize selection and promotion mechanisms for

---


5 The Singapore government does invoke the need for more positive virtues such as the willingness to serve, but there is no attempt to systematically measure and evaluate government officials according to such criteria (“Zhiding jizhi tigao zhengfu jigou chengxin,”[Promulgate mechanisms to improve the integrity of the government] *Lianhe zaobao*, Oct. 2, 2013).

choosing non-corrupt and highly intelligent leaders with the power to decide on a wide range of issues affecting the political community, even if it means constraints on the democratic process.

Since the country’s independence in 1965, Singapore’s leaders gained the trust of the population by presiding over stunning economic growth. Over the past few years, however, the Singapore government has struggled to retain the trust and respect of the population. Hence, it has changed its old ways. In response to widespread aspirations for more political participation, the government has loosened controls on political speech and no longer relies on harsh retaliation against political opponents. In response to high income inequality and less social mobility, the government has provided more benefits for the disadvantaged and the middle class. The government still emphasizes that meritocratically-selected leaders should take the long view beyond the next electoral cycle, but it recognizes the need for political leaders with a more caring outlook. The new outlook has been termed “compassionate meritocracy.”

Such debates over political merit have a long history in China. The idea of “elevating the worthy” emerged in the wake of the disintegration of the pedigree-based order of the Spring and Autumn period (770-453 BCE) and proliferated rapidly throughout the Warring States period (453-221 BCE), being shared by every major intellectual current. As Yuri Pines shows, there was wide disagreement over what

---

counts as “worth” or merit.” For Confucius and his followers, “worthiness” is primarily related to one’s morality. For pragmatic statesmen known as “Legalists,” morality cannot be objectively measured and they warned that unless precisely defined, “worthiness” can be manipulated by hypocrites and one’s partisans rather than used as a criterion for selecting truly capable public servants. Imperial China’s great contribution to the debate on political meritocracy is of course the public service examination system: for over 1300 years, public officials were largely selected by means of competitive examinations. Here too, political thinkers debated about what constitutes political merit (and whether exams are appropriate mechanisms for selecting political leaders with merit), but the idea that political theorizing should be concerned with the question of how to select political leaders with superior abilities and virtues was rarely questioned.

Of course, the ideal of political meritocracy is not foreign to Western political theory and practice. Plato famously defended a meritocratic political ideal in The Republic: the best political regime is composed of political leaders selected on the basis of their superior ability to make morally informed political judgments and the power to rule over the community. Meritocracy was influential throughout subsequent history, although thinkers from Aristotle onwards rarely defended a pure form of political meritocracy. U.S. founding fathers were committed to some form of democracy, but they also agreed that the political system should be designed with the

---

aim of selecting rulers with superior ability and virtue: as Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to John Adams in 1813: “I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents … There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society … May we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?”

In the same vein, nineteenth century “liberal elitists” such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville put forward political ideas that tried to combine meritocracy and democracy. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, such debates in Western political theory (and in the discourse of political leaders) largely came to an end. The key reason is the almost universal consensus (in Western societies) that political leaders with the power to exercise political judgments in a wide range of domains should be selected by means of one person, one vote. Liberal democracies do empower experts selected because of their abilities in administrative and judicial posts, but those experts must be accountable, if only in an

---


10 Similarly, such debates came to an end in South Korea since the adoption of electoral democracy in the form of one person, one vote: few if any articles or books (in either English or Korea) about political meritocracy in Korea have been published over the last three decades, notwithstanding the importance of political meritocracy in Korean political culture. Doh Chull Shin’s book *Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) discusses the topic but in the context of debates on democratization.
indirect way, to democratically elected leaders. They are not meant to exercise power beyond the limited mandate endorsed and given to them by democratically elected leaders. It is fine to discuss, say, what ought to be the desirable character traits of democratically-elected leaders with the aim of influencing voters, the leaders themselves, and/or the democratic process,\textsuperscript{11} but those leaders should be chosen by the voters, not by an alternative mechanism explicitly designed to maximize the likelihood that leaders will have those character traits. The question of how to institutionalize non-electoral mechanisms for choosing political leaders with superior abilities and virtues that have the power to decide on a wide range of issues affecting the political community has come to be regarded as irrelevant to political theorizing, if not beyond the moral pale.

In contemporary China, it’s a different story. After the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders realized the need to implement a system for the selection and promotion of high quality leaders appropriate for a period of peaceful economic development. Inspired by China’s history of selecting officials by examination and recommendation\textsuperscript{12} and (to a lesser extent) by the Singapore model (see chapter 1, section 1), they devised a sophisticated and comprehensive system of selecting and promoting political officials, involving decades of training and a battery

\textsuperscript{11} For discussion of the desirable qualities of various kinds of actors in the American political system – qualities meant above all to strengthen the democratic process – see Andrew Sabl, \textit{Ruling Passions: Political Offices and Democratic Ethics} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

of exams at different stages of their career. Yet the system is still in its early stages and plagued by imperfections: officials are selected and promoted not just on the basis of ability and morality, but also (if not more so) on the basis of political loyalty, social connections, and family background (see section 3). The political system is notoriously corrupt and the practice of buying selling posts at lower levels of government in poor areas has yet to be completely eradicated. More serious (from a theoretical point of view), the ideal itself is not so clear: which abilities and virtues should set the standard for the selection and promotion of government officials so that the Chinese political system can be improved? And what sorts of mechanisms and institutions can increase the likelihood that officials are selected and promoted on the basis of those abilities and virtues? Given the centrality of these questions to China’s political future, the absence of systematic research is striking (and disappointing). Hence, any answer is somewhat speculative and needs to be put to the test of social scientific research. This chapter, I say without any false modesty, is the beginning of the sketch of an answer. The first section will discuss the context for the relevant kind of leadership: how does political leadership differ from other forms of leadership, and what does it mean to be a leader in a modernizing, relatively peaceful society such as China that aims to be governed by meritocratically-selected leaders? The next three sections will put forward ideas of what ought to be the key qualities (intellectual
abilities, social skills, and virtues) of political leaders and suggest mechanisms that increase the likelihood that leaders will be selected and promoted on the basis of those qualities. This chapter is written with the Chinese context in mind, but each section begins with more general considerations that may apply to considerations of political leadership in other societies.

1. Leadership in Context

According to one estimate, there are over 250 books on leadership per year published in the English language.\(^1\) I confess I haven’t read all them, but the ones I did read often share a common trait: they describe the qualities of good leaders as though the same qualities apply regardless of context. Perhaps all leaders of large organizations in the modern world do share some qualities. But it is hard to describe those qualities without resorting to general platitudes -- leaders should make sound decisions and implement them effectively, manage individuals as they move through the organization, appropriately disburse funds, meet certain outcomes, be responsive to the needs of the stakeholders, etc. -- that do not really deepen understanding, not to mention serve as concrete guides for action. If the aim to think about the qualities of political leaders and to specify mechanisms that can increase the likelihood such leaders are recruited and promoted, it is important to be more sensitive to context.

Surely different organizations have different requirements, meaning that may need

different kinds of leaders with different abilities, skills and virtues. And surely the
same organization may have different requirements at different times, meaning that
they may need different kinds of leaders at different times with different kinds of
qualities. So what are the qualities required of political leaders? To be more specific,
what are the qualities required of leaders in the upper echelons of the Chinese
Communist Party?

In August 2013, Singapore’s former foreign minister George Yeo published a
thought-provoking article titled “China and the Catholic Church.”

Yeo argues that
the newly installed leaders of the Catholic Church and the Chinese Communist Party
face similar challenges. Both head organizations responsible for about a fifth of
humanity. Neither was elected by the entire citizenry or congregation and in both
cases “the idea of direct election to the top leadership would have been thought
absurd.” Despite centralized bureaucratic governance, there is much regional and
local diversity in both organizations. With the social media revolution, the hierarchical
structures of both organizations are coming under attack and leaders once protected
by ritual and distance and sometimes hypocrisy and ignorance now seem more human.
Corruption and sexual misdeeds have been widely reported in both organizations, not
necessarily because they have become more common but because they are harder to
cover up. And the leaders of both organizations have responded to the new challenges
in similar ways. Both President Xi and Pope Francis have made efforts to seem more

16 George Yeo, China and the Catholic Church, The Globalist, Aug 1, 2013.
http://www.theglobalist.com/china-and-the-catholic-church/
authentic and close to the people than their predecessors. Both leaders took symbolic actions signaling that leaders with power should be humble and lead modest lifestyles.

In short, even organizations that seem strikingly different (the CCP is officially atheist!) require similar abilities and virtues of its top leaders.¹⁷

Still, it must also be recognized there are also organization-specific leadership skills. Consider the sixth-century Book of Pastoral Rule by St. Gregory the Great, a Christian classic that details the qualities required of those who come to a position of spiritual leadership. Some qualities seem applicable to leaders of different sorts of organizations, e.g. “He must set such a positive example for others that he has nothing for which he should ever be ashamed.” But other qualities seem specific to the Catholic Church, e.g., “He must be dead to the passions of the flesh and live a spiritual life.”¹⁸ Ascetic experience may be a prerequisite for leadership in the Catholic Church, but a political leader need not be entirely dead to the passions to serve the public, nor should he or she spend too much time living a spiritual life if it interferes with, say, communicating with the public and reading up on current events. Moreover, it might be true that “the spiritual director in his zeal should not desire to please others, but should focus on what ought to please them,”¹⁹ but a political leader should be at least partly concerned with pleasing others, not simply with trying to implement a vision of the common good that owes nothing to what people actually

¹⁷ It is worth noting that the main point of George Yeo’s article is to urge rapprochement between the two organizations.


¹⁹ Ibid, p. 74.
want. Clearly leaders of religious organizations are concerned first and foremost with a spiritual mission that may require qualities different from those required of political leaders.20

Today, it is more common to compare leadership skills required in business and those required in politics. In January 2012, I was lucky enough to participate in the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland. At a luncheon meeting with CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, I asked the CEOs if they think the qualities required of leaders in large business organizations differed in any way from the qualities required of political leaders. To my surprise, the whole panel of CEOs agreed that there were no differences. To press the point, I then asked a CEO on the panel, “Is there anything that you do that you think leaders of government should NOT do?” Again, he responded, no, leadership is leadership.

In fact, such views are not uncommon. Most books on leadership are written for the business world and few distinguish between the qualities required of business leaders and the qualities required of political leaders. One particularly insightful (and entertaining) book on leadership is titled The 100-Mile Walk. A father and son team separated by generational differences and political outlooks discuss the qualities of leadership during the course of long walks over several days. Contrary to expectations, they settle on common ideas about leadership. Effective leaders must be able to

---

20 This is not meant to be a critique of George Yeo’s role on a special commission to advise the Vatican (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/george-yeo-appointed-to/750222.html): his task is to advise in matters of administration and governance, not to serve as a leader of the Catholic Church concerned with spiritual formation of the flock.
inspire, nor simply direct or compel followers. Other traits include having sufficient self-esteem to recruit and reward intelligent people and to accept criticism from them. Leaders also need a sense of purpose and passion. Leaders should continuously work at their craft. Such traits do indeed seem like general traits of all effective leaders. But some traits clearly seem confined to the business world. For example, the elder Flaum says that leaders should be paranoid (similar to combat fighter pilots) and do what is necessary to keep a competitive edge and not be copied by others. But for political leaders, paranoia may be a vice rather than a virtue (President Nixon is a famous case) and it is not necessarily a problem if good policies are being copied by other political leaders. The book also praises a former New York City fire commissioner for relating better to low status people than to wealthy elites; a sound practice for a public servant, perhaps, but not necessarily a desirable trait for a CEO. Yet not once in the book is there any attempt to distinguish between the different requirements of leadership in politics and business. The leadership qualities of public officials such as John Glenn are praised along the same lines as the leadership qualities of senior leaders of PepsiCo and Johnson and Johnson, as though the same types of leaders are meant to serve the same types of organizations.  

To the extent business leaders do recognize that there are differences between politics and business, the point is often that government can and should learn from business. Some of the world’s business leaders, including Jack Welch, have suggested

---

21 John Glenn wrote a supportive foreword for the book on the grounds that it can “help inspire young people to get involved in public service leadership positions” on the apparent assumption that what works in business will also work in government.
that government should be run more like a business.\textsuperscript{22} Over the last few decades, government has become more business-like in the management of its affairs: government reliance on advisors and services provided by the corporate sector has hastened the advance of business-like approaches in government, with a substantial increase in the use of modern management tools and principles, such as business strategy, key performance indicators, professional procurement, and operational efficiency. Hence, it should not be surprising that aspirants to political leadership such as Mitt Romney and Donald Trump often tout their business experience as evidence of their ability to more effectively manage the affairs of their country.\textsuperscript{23}

While some business leaders have made relatively successful transitions to the political world (Michael Bloomberg is a good example), the experience with bringing business models into government is not so positive: highly polarizing cases such as Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy may be more typical than success. Similarly, political leaders often fail when they venture into business. The Chinese government has acknowledged the concern among many economists that China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are an unsustainable drag on the country’s economy and that the government’s overwhelming role in appointing the top leaders of SOEs promotes not just corruption but inefficiency. Hence, China’s leaders


\textsuperscript{23} Sek-loong Tan, “Realizing Political Meritocracy: Lessons from Business,” paper prepared for the Center for International and Comparative Political Philosophy, Tsinghua University, July 20, 2011. Sek-loong Tan is a business consultant who advises both private and public entities on governance issues.
launched pilot schemes to improve corporate governance, including measures allowing SOEs’ boards of directors to appoint senior management and set performance metrics regardless of the policy orientations of the state.\textsuperscript{24} The aim of the reforms is to open recruitment at state firms for senior management jobs and increase the likelihood that key personnel are selected on commercial rather than political grounds.\textsuperscript{25} While there may be a there may be a good case for the CCP’s Organization Department (responsible for the selection and promotion of party members) to promote some form of “leadership training” in state firms given the importance of economic considerations in shaping political decisions, the idea that the government should use purely political criteria to select leaders for top posts in SOEs is just as controversial as the idea that political leaders should govern the polity strictly according to the same criteria used to run a business.

An important reason that business models do not translate so well into politics, and vice versa, is that public and private organizations have different aims.\textsuperscript{26} For better or worse, few business leaders would deny that the primary purpose of business is the maximization of profit. There are different views about whether it should be in the short term or the long-term, but the business leaders cannot lose sight of the fact that business is ultimately about making a profit. In contrast, the task of government is

\textsuperscript{25} “Will a new round of reforms shake up state firms?”, \textit{Week in China} (HSBC weekly newsletter), July 25, 2014.
not so clear. Most political thinkers, whatever their orientation, agree that government leaders are supposed to serve the people. But what is the government supposed to do for the people? Provide security, combat poverty, protect individual liberty, increase happiness, reduce inequality, promote social harmony, protect a country’s historical heritage, or all of the above in different proportions? What constitutes performance within government “is more complicated, pluralistic, value laden, and controversial than is true with the performance of private firms … Unlike private firms for which profits and returns on investment provide widely accepted measures of success, for public organizations the criteria of success are many and controversial … There is also a significant symbolic component to the actions of government, consisting of the language and the images to describe what is taking place and the public’s reactions to those messages. Appearances matter almost as much as reality.” 27 Given the different aims of business and government, leaders often need different qualities. In business, the key stakeholders are relatively clear: the owners and (to a lesser extent) employees. In government, the stakeholders are more comprehensive and diverse. Who are political leaders supposed to serve? All those affected by the policies of government, the people in the country’s territory, future generations, ancestors, or all of the above in different proportions? How to distribute desired goods among the relevant group of people and who is supposed to pay for them? Whatever the political leader’s own views, she should be willing to revise her views in response to input from the diverse set of stakeholders. Hence, a government official should be willing to listen to diverse

27 Paul Thomas, Performance Management, Reporting, Obstacles, and Accountability, pp. 9, 19.
and often conflicting perspectives, and to balance different goals, values, and interests, and to shape her aims at least partly in response to such widespread engagements. A business leader needs to incorporate the views of other people, but only in so far as it contributes to the bottom line. A CEO such as Jack Welch can use methods such as “criticizing, demeaning, ridiculing, humiliating”\textsuperscript{28} that are unlikely to be effective in a political world that relies more on cooperation, “giving face,” and strategic ambiguity to get things done.\textsuperscript{29} And different sectors of society in a modern political community will evaluate and criticize the performance of political leaders; in business, there is less need for public scrutiny. Hence, political leaders need to be more willing to accept and respond to criticisms from diverse sectors of society.

The focus on profit also means that business leaders need to reward high performers, meaning those who contribute to the profitability of the firm. Regarding underachievers, the business leader should “be direct and honest … when employees fall short, you have to have the courage to walk your talk, to confront the issue and make the change … Just as you have to have the courage to take out your weak players, you must take care of your great achievers no matter what, because if you don’t, they’ll walk.”\textsuperscript{30} For example, Metlife asks managers to use a lifeboat ranking for their team, and the bottom 20% are either placed on probation or lose their jobs.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} Flaum and Flaum, \textit{The 100-Mile Walk}, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p. 103.
contrast, political leaders need not be as concerned with high economic achievers; defenders of the free market will say successful economic actors are best left alone, social democrats will say that high achievers should pay a relatively high share of taxes, but both sides agree that political leaders need not devote all (or most) of their time to consider the interests of successful and high status members of the political community. Nor should political leaders “take out” the weak members of the political community on account that they do not contribute to the overall good of the state. Quite the opposite: political thinkers from Mencius to Rawls argue that political leaders need to be particularly concerned with the plight of the disadvantaged.32

Finally, innovation is more important for business: in a cut-throat capitalist world, most businesses must innovate to compete; in government, innovation may not be the number one priority, and the state won’t go “out of business” if it doesn’t innovate.

Another key difference is that business leaders need not be overly concerned with the well-being of the society in which they operate, nor need they be overly concerned with respecting its traditions and historical heritage. To the extent social responsibility is part of a business enterprise, it should not interfere with its core profit-making mission. Hence, most corporations today maintain a clear dichotomy between profit-making and social responsibility functions, which are managed separately. Moreover, it is common for corporate social responsibility functions to be aligned as much as

32 Another reason that political leaders might need to be more compassionate than business leaders is that they can use – hence misuse – the coercive apparatus of the state. If a political leader decides to “take out” the weak members of the political community, the implications are much more ominous.
possible with initiatives to further maximize profit. For example, a bank may sponsor an international sporting event to increase brand recognition among the public, or a mining company may invest in social infrastructure for remote communities to facilitate access to nearby mineral resources.\(^{33}\)

Corporate social responsibility need not always serve commercial interests, but when the good of the company conflicts with the wider social good, the former has priority. If a bank can increase its profit at some cost to the social whole, it will normally be expected to do so. It is the task of government regulators, not CEOs, to try to minimize damage to the overall society. If a company can make substantially more profit by moving its operations abroad or by being taken over by a foreign company, it can do so. Business leaders need to be concerned with the greater social good if it affects the profitability of the firm, but they need not otherwise be patriotic or attached to a particular society.\(^{34}\) Hence, it is not uncommon to appoint foreigners to head large companies, even in supposedly xenophobic societies such as Japan. In contrast, the leader of a political community, no matter what the form of government, needs to be from that community. In the past, colonial powers appointed overlords to rule over foreign lands, but it would not be acceptable today. At minimum, a political leader must be seen to be a patriotic member of the political community.


\(^{34}\) I do not mean to imply that leaders of multi-national corporations are indifferent to moral concerns, but they are more likely to appeal to universal moral considerations that trump the national good in cases of conflict (see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/memo-from-davos_b_1232758.html).
Max Weber’s “Politics as Vocation”

In short, political leaders face quite distinct challenges that require distinct abilities and virtues. So what exactly are the qualities of good political leaders? The most influential twentieth-century work on the qualities of political leadership is Max Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation,” first delivered as a lecture to the Free Students Union at University of Munich in 1919. He begins the essay with the famous definition of the state as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. He then invokes the equally famous distinction between traditional, charismatic, and legal sources of legitimacy (meaning the different ways that domination is seen to be morally justified by the ruled), and he specifies that his lecture is concerned with the qualities of leaders that dominate by charisma, that is, domination by virtue of the devotion of those who obey the purely personal charisma of the leader: “Devotion to the charisma of the prophet, or the leader in war, or to the great demagogue in the ecclesia or in parliament, means that the leader is personally recognized as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him. If he is more than an upstart of the moment, the leader lives for his cause and ‘strives for his work.’ The devotion of his disciples, his followers, his personal party friends is oriented to his person and to its qualities.”

But political leaders with the “inner charismatic qualities that make a leader” are a specific breed. A political leader must live ‘for’ politics and make politics his life, and not live only ‘off’ politics, meaning that politics is viewed primarily as a source of
income. Political officials can be transferred, dismissed, or at least temporarily withdrawn, in contrast to administrative officials in the bureaucracy who develop specialized expertise through long years of preparatory training. The political leader must take exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, in contrast to the civil servant who must execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, even if it appears wrong to him. The political leader enjoys the feeling of power: “the knowledge of influencing men, of participating in power over them, and above all, the feeling of holding in one’s hands a nerve fiber of historically important events.” But the good political leader will also ask “through what qualities can I hope to do justice to this power.”

Weber says that three pre-eminent qualities are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Passion matters not in the sense of emotional excitation, but devotion to a cause. The political leader must also make responsibility to this cause the guiding star of action. And a sense of proportion is needed to “let realities work upon him with inner concentration and calmness. Hence his distance to things and men.” The question for the good political leader, in short, “is simply how can warm passion and a cool sense of proportion be forged together in one and the same soul?” In the case of the bad political leader, “the striving for power ceases to be objective and becomes purely personal self-gratification, instead of

---

35 Philippe Schmitter argues that political leaders in democratic societies have come to be viewed as living ‘from’ politics rather than ‘for’ politics, thus contributing to a sharp decline in the prestige of and trust in politicians (see his article, “Reflections on Political Meritocracy: Its Manipulation and Transformation,” in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy).
exclusively entering the service of ‘the cause.’ For ultimately there are only two kinds of deadly sins in politics: lack of objectivity and – often but not identical with it – irresponsibility. Vanity, the need personally to stand in the foreground as much as possible, strongly tempts the politician to commit one or both of these sins.”

The good politician should be guided by an ‘ethic of responsibility,’ meaning he has to give an account of the foreseeable results of his actions, not simply by an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ that only values good intentions. An ethic of ultimate ends provides guidance as to which ends are right, but it cannot stand alone without consideration for results. The political leader must be prepared to use morally dubious means for good results: “the world is governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.” Whoever wants to engage in politics as a vocation has to realize these ethical paradoxes and accept responsibility for the results; “he who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own or of others, should not seek it along the path of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence.”

In short, politics is the art of compromise and decision-making based on social benefits and weighed against costs and backed up by the instruments of violence, so political action cannot solely be guided by convictions. Political leaders must take

into account of all that is at stake in making a political decision and accept responsibility for the outcomes. Political leaders most likely to satisfy these requirements will have both passion for politics driven primarily by moral conviction and a cool headed ability to consider diverse perspectives and make use of the instruments of violence for the sake of less-than-perfect political decisions.

Weber’s analysis helps us think further about how political leadership differs from other forms of leadership. But the requirements of political leadership will also vary according to different political contexts. It is hard to blame Weber for the general character of his account of the qualities of the good political leader (he was delivering a lecture, and only a few lines speak directly to the topic), but even his general remarks do not apply in certain contexts. Weber’s account of the charismatic political leader seems more applicable in times of warfare or violent civil strife. A war-time leader needs to be driven by conviction and to dominate people by the power of charisma. He also needs to solve problems by resorting to violence and take personal responsibility for the outcomes.

In the context of a modernizing, largely peaceful society characterized by collective leadership such as China, the desired traits of a leader are likely to be

---

37 Similarly, it is a mistake to think that all business organizations require the same types of leaders. Even within the same industry, different companies have different cultures and histories that require different abilities. For example, star analysts who switch from one Wall Street investment bank to another often suffer an immediate and lasting decline in performance because their earlier excellence depended heavily on their former firms' organizational cultures and networks (Boris Groysberg, *Chasing Stars: The Myth of Talent and the Portability of Performance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
different, perhaps closer to the characteristics of what Weber calls the “civil servant” with long periods of preparatory training and intellectual knowledge of different disciplines. Hence, when wartime heroes try to govern in peaceful times, from the First Emperor of Qin to Mao Zedong and Robert Mugabe, they often turn out to be disasters.

Weber’s distinction between the political leader who decides and the civil servant who implements is also context-specific. In imperial China (as Weber recognizes), there was no distinction between civil servants and political leaders: the successful examination candidates were put on the road to be political leaders with the power to decide on matters affecting the lives of millions of people (although they were still supposed to serve, in an ultimate sense, at the behest of the emperor). In contemporary China, the public service examinations (misleadingly translated as “civil service examinations”) are also stepping stones to political power; there are not separate tracks for political officials and civil servants. Nor does Weber distinguish between the qualities required of political leaders at different levels of government; in a huge country such as China, for example, superior intellectual ability (not mentioned by Weber) may be particularly important for central-level political leaders, which may not be the case for village leaders. In the Ming dynasty, for example,

38 In Singapore, the distinction is not so rigid: for example, the “Civil Service College” has the task (among others) to prepare reports that provide new ideas and influence policies, it is not simply meant to train “civil servants” that implement policies. Also, leading “civil servants” in Singapore often go into politics, which is rarely the case in the United Kingdom and Canada. That said, the Singaporean government is considering drawing a sharper distinction between the civil service and politics by, e.g., imposing a waiting period before civil servants can be given political appointments (I am grateful for discussions with officials at Singapore’s Civil Service College).
government officials in the capital had to meet more demanding evaluation requirements than those outside.  

Today, prospective officials for posts at higher levels of government in China are tested for different abilities than those at lower levels: the public service examinations for lower levels of government test for the ability to implement the goals of the organization and the ability to resolve problems (as well as reading comprehension and writing expression), but the exams for higher levels of government (sub-provincial and above) also test for the ability to “comprehensively analyze” (analyzing all parts of the contents, standpoints, or questions of the given information and to make reasonable inferences or evaluation) and the ability to “raise and resolve problems” (based on the understanding and analysis of the given information, use one’s own practical or living experience to find and define problems, provide evaluation or tradeoffs, and propose a solution plan or course of action). Upper level cadres are also typically expected to have a university education.

In short, context matters. If the aim is to discuss the abilities and virtues of a good leader, it is important not just to differentiate between leadership in politics and other spheres of social life, but also between different kinds of political leaders in

---


67
different places and times. So here’s the context I have in mind: the qualities required of political leaders selected by non-democratic mechanisms at higher levels of government in large, modernizing countries with relatively secure territorial boundaries. In reality, China is the only country that comes close to fitting that description, but there is a large gap between the meritocratic ideal described here and the reality in contemporary China; the point of discussing an ideal is to provide standards for reform.

Given the focus on political meritocracies, I will not discuss qualities that may be more appropriate for political leaders in democratic societies, such as a very thick skin, the ability to think quickly on one’s feet, the need to exaggerate differences with political opponents and to give the same partisan speech with the same apparent degree of enthusiasm during the campaign season, as well as the ability to switch to a more inclusive political discourse that seeks to explain and justify policies to the public after election victory. Nor will I discuss in any detail what those leaders should do because China is a large and complex country with different needs and priorities in different times and places, and any informed answer depends partly on what the Chinese people actually want. Hence, I will assume that leaders should seek

---

42 For discussion of the qualities required of the democratic leader, see John Kane and Haig Patapan, *The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers, and Limits Its Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). When political leaders openly promise to retain partisan biases if elected as leaders of the state – e.g., Turkish presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “I will not be an impartial president,” *Daily News*, July 9, 2014 – they leave themselves open to the critique that they have “authoritarian tendencies.”

43 For example, poverty reduction was the overriding goal in the early days of economic reform, and now more attention is paid to distributive issues and environmental sustainability, although China’s poorer regions still emphasize poverty reduction as the key priority.
to promote the well-being of the people, but beyond that my discussion of the qualities required of leaders in a political meritocracy is meant to be compatible with many different theories and views regarding the purposes of government (see section 4). In each section, I will begin by discussing general qualities of political leadership in political meritocracies, followed by a discussion of qualities that may be more China specific. I will also propose non-democratic mechanisms that increase the likelihood of selecting and promoting political leaders with those qualities.

2. On the Need for Intellectual Ability

Which abilities matter for public officials also depends on the context. In ancient times of incessant warfare, physical abilities are most important: for example, the Warring States thinker Shang Yang proposed that soldiers should be promoted based on the number of decapitated heads of enemy soldiers.44 In today’s world, intellectual abilities matter more.45 A political leader concerned needs to understand complex arguments and make decisions based on knowledge of latest developments in a number of interconnected disciplines that bear on the policy-making process: economics, science, international relations, psychology, and so on. In addition, sound decision-making requires a global outlook. Globalization and technological

45 Again, I have upper levels of government in mind as the relevant context. At lower levels, physical strength still matters, as I was reminded recently when I visited a village north of Beijing and the (physically imposing) party secretary had to literally force himself into a home to break up a fight. Such considerations also help to explain why there may be more open discrimination against female cadres at the local level.
innovation in the past few decades have made the world increasingly interconnected, with the result that financial, political, social, and environmental shocks spread faster and become more disruptive. To ensure social stability and sustained growth, political leaders need to be adaptable, agile and responsive to looming global risks.\(^{46}\) Hence, it is insufficient to rely on well-crafted national political institutions and laws: an ability to understand the world and respond to rapid changes in a risk-prone world in an informed and intelligent way is an essential requirement of what it means to be an effective political leader today, and arguably the qualities of political leaders matter more than ever before in human history.

Singapore, once again, has been ahead of the curve. Its leaders have long emphasized intellectual ability. As Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew put it, “I am sorry if I am constantly preoccupied with what the near-geniuses and the above average are going to do. But I am convinced that it is they who ultimately decide the shape of things to come.”\(^ {47}\) Lee himself graduated with a rare double first class honors degree from Cambridge University, and his son Lee Hsien Loong (the current prime minister) graduated from the same university by scoring 12 more alphas than his nearest competitor (which had never been seen in the history of Tripos at Cambridge). It should not be surprising that the Singapore has institutionalized a rigorous system for the recruitment of political talent that starts with the search for high academic achievers in the school system and followed by a battery of


examinations at key stages in the selection and promotion process. Almost all of Singapore’s key political decision makers have a stellar academic background which surely helps to explain why Singapore’s policy-making process is usually supported by social scientific research and knowledge of best practices abroad, perhaps more so than any other political community. China has been learning from Singapore in this respect, as well as looking to its own past as inspiration for meritocratic reform.

A Mechanism for Recruiting Political Officials with Intellectual Ability: The Imperial Examination System

The idea of using exams as a mechanism to search for political talent might seem odd to Westerners, but it has deep roots in Chinese political culture. As we saw, the principle of political meritocracy – the appointing of officials according to merit rather than their pedigree – was shared by every major intellectual current in the pre-Imperial period. Yet thinkers argued not just over the content of merit, but over the kinds of mechanisms necessary to identify political merit. The establishment and institutionalization of the examination system largely settled the latter debate in Imperial China, with even harsh critics of the examination system such as Zhu Xi (1130-1200) agreeing that the examinations were necessary for selecting political officials.48

48 To be more precise, Zhu Xi condemned examinations because they encourage an instrumental approach to learning, but he said that 30 percent of time can be given to study for examinations (Chu Hsi, Learning to be a Sage, trans. Daniel K. Gardner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 19). See also Hilde De Weerdt, Competition Over Content: Negotiating Standards for the
Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141-87 BCE) started an early form of the imperial examinations: local officials would select candidates to take part in an examination of the Confucian classics, from which he would select officials to serve by his side. There were other avenues for promotion, but examinations were specifically designed to broaden access to government service for the local elites. During the Eastern Han (25-220 CE), examinations for talent were used to screen candidates to ensure competence in specialized fields, such as flood control and foreign policy, and the Imperial University expanded to the point that it significantly influenced composition of the officialdom. But local magnates objected to competitive state-based examinations and argued in favor of promoting the people according to their moral behavior, as judged by neighbors and approved by local officials. Recruitment on the basis of local recommendations was adopted at the very end of the Han and continued to dominate the process of selecting officials for the next three hundred years or so. As power devolved to the local communities with the court rubberstamping local recommendations, the composition of the elite turned into a powerful hereditary aristocracy closed to outsiders, and examinations gradually lost their prestige.49

Examinations were revived and expanded during the during the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) dynasties with the aim of discontinuing aristocratic rule and reconfirming the right of the throne to have the final say in determining one’s rank.

---

Recruitment in the imperial government became to be considered an imperial prerogative rather than a duty to be performed by lower levels, and selection by recommendation was replaced by selection by examinations. The tests – the world’s first standardized tests based on merit -- were designed as objective measures to evaluate the educational attainment and merit of the examinees, as part of the process of final selections and appointments to political office. In the Tang period, examinations became a necessary condition for officialdom for the first time in Chinese (or human) history: candidates for political office took qualifying examinations, then underwent a selection process that evaluated moral character and determined the level of appointment.\(^{50}\) The examination system was consolidated under the Song dynasty, and examinations became the primary channel for entry into officialdom: all successful candidates examined in the capital were automatically appointed to government offices.\(^{51}\) Song rulers also implemented institutional reforms of the examination system that were to characterize the institutional form of the examinations for the next millennium, such as creating three levels of


\(^{51}\) In the 1300 year history of imperial examinations from the Sui onwards, the Song dynasty practice of directly appointing successful examination candidates to government posts is an exception to the rule that examination success needed to be followed by other tests and evaluations, but even a top score in the national-level examinations (*jinshi*) in the Song did not guarantee a good career because it was tacitly assumed that the literary skills of successful examinees did not automatically translate into the qualities required of top government officials.
examinations and establishing a triennial schedule for the examinations.52

The examination system was briefly interrupted at the beginning of the (Mongol) Yuan dynasty (1280-1368), but the dynasty belatedly renewed the examination system in 1313. The Yuan rulers incorporated aspects of aspects of Song dynasty “Learning of the Way” (or Neo-Confucianism) in the examination curriculum, though the examination system was still a minor avenue for entry into officialdom. The system matured under the Ming: for the first time, examination success at the provincial level opened the way to an official career. Neo-Confucian ideas about moral thought and classical statecraft served as important models for the examination curriculum (and intellectual orthodoxy more generally) during both the Ming and (Manchu) Qing dynasties.53 The examination system also spread to Korea and Vietnam as a means of drawing in (and maintaining a grip on) top national talent.54

While meritocratic idea of selecting officials by means of examinations was often flawed in practice, particularly towards the end of dynasties,55 the whole system was

---

53 Benjamin Elman, “A Society in Motion: Unexpected Consequences of Political Meritocracy in late Imperial China, 1400-1900,” in *The East Asian Challenge for Democracy*.
54 Japan also used the Chinese imperial examination system as a model in the Heian period (794-1185), but the influence affected only the minor nobility and was replaced by the hereditary system during the Samurai era (Liu Haifeng, “Influence of China's Imperial Examinations on Japan, Korea, and Vietnam,” *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, Oct. 2007, vo. 2, issue 4, pp. 493-512).
55 See, e.g., Lawrence Lok Cheung Zhang, “Power for a price: Office purchase, elite families, and status maintenance in Qing China,” Ph.D., Harvard University, 2010, 297 pages; 3435463. Zhang shows that about 25% of the time people gained access to official position by paying for it (even when they already had examination degrees), and this figure rose substantially towards the end of the dynasty, resulting in a debasement of the examination degree and contributing to wider political destabilization toward the end of the Qing period.
challenged as a result of humiliating military defeats at the hands of French, British, and Japanese powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. The main question become how to build up China’s national power by relying on popular mobilization for collective purposes, and Western-style education designed for mass mobilization rather than bureaucratic recruitment was seen as key for popular mobilization.56

Hence, the examination system was abolished in 1905 on the grounds that it was incompatible with the quest for national power. At the same moment, ironically, the Western world was beginning to embrace meritocratic examinations as a means of modernizing its political systems,57 but with one crucial difference: examinations were employed to select civil servants with the task of implementing the decisions of democratically-elected officials, not for selecting political officials with the power to decide on a wide range of matters affecting the political community.58

58 Again, there was no distinction between civil servants and political officials in Imperial China. Hence, I use the term “Imperial examinations” to translate “keju.” The usual translation in English – “civil examinations” – makes sense to experts in Chinese imperial history because “civil examinations” is meant to contrast with “military examinations” that were held to recruit army officers, but for most (Anglophone) readers “civil” brings up the misleading connotation of a civil servant who is supposed to implement the task of political officials (for a similar point, see Bai Tongdong, China: The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom (London: Zed Books, 2012), p. 167). For the same reason, I do not use the term “bureaucracy” to characterize imperial China’s political system, because it connotes the idea of specialized bureaucrats who implement the decisions of political officials. It is true, as Francis Fukuyama notes, that China’s political system shared some features of modern
The longevity and global influence of the examination system can be explained because of its social advantages. First, and most obvious, the imperial examination system was relatively fair and impartial as a method for selecting political officials with superior abilities compared to political systems that selected rulers on the basis of race, sex, family ties, or social connections. In the transformation from the Tang to the Song, the Chinese state established the examination system at least partly with the aim of challenging the educational and political monopoly held by aristocratic families. In the Song dynasty, the emperors expanded the examinations and the government school system to counter the influence of military aristocrats, quadrupling the number of those who passed the exams and broadening the social base of scholar-officials. As Song dynasty founder Emperor Taizu (r. 960-976) put it, “The country has fastened upon examinations to select scholars, choosing men to become officials. Since picking and ranking me in the public court is preferable to [receiving their] thanks for favors in private halls, this will serve to rectify customs that have been
To ensure fairness in the examination process, Song rulers instituted measures that are still used today, such as blind grading (papers were recopied in order not to allow biases by revealing the candidate by his calligraphy). In practice, the system was often plagued by cheating that undermined the claims of impartiality and fairness (especially in certain periods, such as the late Northern Song, the late Ming, and the late Qing), but in its better moments the imperial examination system (arguably) reduced the influence of arbitrary factors in the political talent selection process compared to other systems in other places at the same time. In contemporary China, examinations for political officials play a similar role. It is true that several top political leaders are the children (“princelings”) of leading political families from China’s revolutionary era, but they began their ascension to power before the establishment (or revival) of the examination process for selecting political officials in the 1990s. Given the ultra-competitive nature of university and public service examinations that are increasingly viewed as necessary stages for the political recruitment process, it is likely that there will be a declining percentage of “princelings” in the political system in two or three decades.

Second, the examination system allowed for more social mobility compared to less meritocratic systems. As the censor -- a political official with the task of criticizing mistaken government policies – Wang Ji put it in the tenth century, “If examination selection is not strict the powerful will struggle to be foremost and the

60 Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China, p. 14.
orphans and poor will have difficulty advancing.\textsuperscript{61} Records from the Song dynasty indicate the possibility of impressive upward mobility through imperial examinations: in 1148, for example, 330 people successfully passed the national examinations, and of the 279 graduates with family information on record, 157 had no forebears in the government.\textsuperscript{62} That said, the reality did not always (or even usually) match up to the myth of the poor peasant boy who makes it good on the basis of ability and hard work.\textsuperscript{63} Benjamin Elman argues that true social mobility was never the goal of state policy in late imperial China (1400-1900). Success at examinations had literary requirements, which effectively excluded most peasants, artisans, and clerks (women were formally excluded). The literary requirements meant that only the children of

\textsuperscript{61} Cited from Chaffee, \textit{The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China}, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{62} Hong Xiao and Chenyang Li, “China’s Meritocratic Examinations and the Ideal of Virtuous Talents,” in \textit{The East Asian Challenge for Democracy}, p. 343.

\textsuperscript{63} It could be argued that the Ottoman administrative system “was a model of meritocracy” and provided even more social mobility than the Chinese imperial examination system because slaves taken in the child levy from the empire’s Christian subjects – the main source of recruitment into imperial service between the fourteenth and late sixteenth centuries -- “had been selected for their physical grace, strength, and intelligence. During their training they underwent constant scrutiny. Only the most qualified were sent on to schools were they were trained to be officials and generals” (Justin McCarthy, \textit{The Ottoman Turks} (London and New York: Longman, 1997), p. 126; see also Colin Imber, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), esp. ch. 3). The “continual ability to draw the best men” may help to explain the longevity of the Ottoman empire (Karen Barkey, \textit{Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 19), but slavery should (needless to say) not be viewed as a morally desirable starting point when comparing social mobility in different meritocratic bureaucracies. Another important difference with imperial China is that physical abilities were given extra weight in the Ottoman administrative system because there was no clear distinction between civil government and military command (Imber, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, p. 330). And when late nineteenth century Ottoman empire reformers argued for more meritocracy and less nepotism, they proposed “recruitment based only on merit measured by objective and standardized examinations” (Dogan Gurpinar, \textit{Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy: A Political, Social and Cultural History} (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p.90).
wealthy families could compete for examination success, and social circulation was mainly an unexpected consequence of upward (and downward) movement between elites (gentry, merchants, and military men) and (upper) political elites with degrees. To the (limited) extent there was upward political mobility from lower classes, it was normally first via commercial wealth, then success at examinations, and the process normally took more than one generation.\textsuperscript{64} In contemporary China, examinations are theoretically open to all citizens and most people are literate, but class background still influences outcomes because the process of studying for examinations tends to be time-consuming and costly, requiring leisure and tutors that poor families cannot afford.\textsuperscript{65}

Third, the Imperial examination system provided an element of social and political stability. The state could capture the loyalty of local-level elites who succeeded at the exams, thus ensuring the integration of the Chinese state and countering tendencies toward regional autonomy and the breakup of the centralized system (in late imperial China, the examination system distributed its prizes according to provincial and prefectural quotas, which mean that imperial officials were recruited from the whole country, in numbers proportionally to each province’s population). While only a tiny percentage of those who entered the examination competition could realistically

\textsuperscript{64} See Benjamin A. Elman, “A Society in Motion: Unexpected Consequences of Political Meritocracy in late Imperial China, 1400-1900,” in \textit{The East Asian Challenge for Democracy}. The archives indicate that peasants, traders, and artisans, who make up 90 percent of the population, were not among the 50,000 Ming-Qing male palace graduates (Benjamin A. Elman, \textit{Civil Examination in Late Imperial China} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 320).

\textsuperscript{65} The second tier universities offer more opportunities to students from poorer backgrounds because they do not require high scores on the national university examinations.
expect to succeed to the top of the ladder, even a minor examination success allowed an individual to join the broad body of literati who were understood to be potential officials and thus were granted social privileges and high social status. As for the 95 percent who failed to become officials of any sort, the authority of the classical language necessary for examination preparation produced literates of high social status who engaged in professions such as medicine, teaching, astronomy, printing, and publishing. And even those who truly felt they were ‘failures’ could invest hopes in their children: the relative fairness of the examinations beginning in the Song dynasty meant that any elite male could expect that his offspring could earn the right to join the officialdom. The evolving regional and geographical penetration of the exams from the capital (in the Tang dynasty) to the provinces (in the Song dynasty) down to the 1500 counties (in the Ming-Qing dynasties) meant that local elites and ambitious would-be members of those elites across the whole of China learned and assimilated similar values. In short, the examination system gave both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ a stake in the system, notwithstanding a few famous cases of examination failures who became outlaws, rebels, and disenchanted poets.
Last but not least, the fact that through examinations the central government greatly favored literary studies and advanced civilians to important posts (including, from the Song dynasty onwards, to important military posts), meant that military officers with their concern for physical power were kept subordinate to civilians and helps to explain why there were few attempts by the military to take power (from the Song onwards) relative to other societies.\(^{70}\) The examination system was perhaps the key tool for the imperial system to consolidate its social, political, and cultural influence, and abolition of the examination system in 1905 had the unexpected consequence of accelerating the demise of the whole imperial system.\(^{71}\) Today, of course, the (re)establishment of an examination system for the selection of political officials has not been accompanied by other features of the imperial system (such as monarchy), and there are many other ways of making a mark in Chinese society, but the perceived fairness of the examination system (relative to feasible alternatives) can still help to provide an important element of legitimacy, and hence stability, to the political system.

Finally, the examination system served to limit abuses of political power. Pre-imperial thinkers, as noted, believed that political power should be distributed on the basis of ability and virtue. Yet they also believed in monarchy, and the monarch owed his position to birth rather than merit. That would not pose a problem in an ideal world by an all wise sage-king: as Xunzi put it, “The [True] Son of Heaven is the

---

\(^{70}\) Miyazaki, *China’s Examination Hell*, p. 127.

\(^{71}\) Benjamin Elman, “A Society in Motion: Unexpected Consequences of Political Meritocracy in late Imperial China, 1400-1900,” in *The East Asian Challenge for Democracy*. 81
most respectable in terms of his power and position and has no rivals in Heaven….

His morality is pure; his knowledge and kindness and extremely clear.” Yet it was only too obvious that actually-existing monarchs were mediocre in comparison; even Mencius, the most idealistic thinker of the era, said that the True Monarch only arrives once in five hundred years (and in his own day, Mencius noted they had already been waiting seven hundred years; 2B.13). So how to ensure that inept rulers would not cause irreparable damage to the state in the interim, i.e., most of the time. Xunzi proposed a seemingly ingenious solution: the sovereign, while ostensibly omnipotent, should relegate most of his everyday tasks to meritorious aides: “The ruler works hard in looking [for proper officials] and is at rest when employing them.” But Xunzi could not foresee the huge administrative apparatus required of a large imperial state, and the idea of one person appointing and selecting all meritorious officials was not practicable in imperial China. The imperial examination system solved this problem because it proved to be a relatively efficient mechanism for selecting political officials who exercised power (and deselecting the vast majority). Political officials could check the power of weak and incompetent rulers (and do the work that even the best

73 Confucian thinkers held similar views in imperial China: Song dynasty Neo-Confucians concluded that not a single emperor had met the appropriate moral standard, drawing the implication that the emperor and the court were not the final arbiters of how people should act and think (Peter K. Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 129-130).
74 Cited from Pines, The Everlasting Empire, p. 52.
75 To be more precise, Xunzi argued that the ruler should select a chancellor whose task is to select other officials, but he still seemed to assume one person could do all the work.
rulers could not do due to lack of time and expertise). While the Emperor had ultimate say over the examination system, in the long-term modifications were not possible without the elite’s consent. In contemporary China, national examinations limit the power of the political elite by limiting access to examination success; the university entrance examination system, regarded as a stepping stone for political success, is flawed in many ways but it is perhaps the least corrupt political institution in China.

Whatever the merits of the imperial examination system, it was far from perfect as a mechanism to select political rulers with ability and virtue. Critic after critic questioned the careerist approach to learning and asked whether examinations test for the right kind of intellectual ability required of informed and intelligent political decision-making. In the late 1060s, the radical reformer Wang Anshi removed the traditional poetry composition sections from the imperial examinations on the grounds of irrelevance to the official functions of government office. Wang argued for a more practical teaching curriculum that required changing the content of the exams and reforming the school system. But his opponents bitterly complained about unprecedented ideological control over the curriculum that was even less helpful for selecting talented public officials -- “Today in all prefectures and counties, there are

76 In fact, talented emperors felt disempowered by the system to their personal detriment: one famous case is Ming emperor Wanli, who received an excellent Confucian education taught by the best tutors of the land, but once he realized he was largely confined to symbolic duties (and literally confined to the Forbidden City), he become uncooperative and helped to bring about the end of the Ming dynasty (see Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Significance, the Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).  
77 Benjamin Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China, pp. 173-238.
no entrance examinations which test the student’s ability to write. The first thing the examiners look for is whether or not the candidate’s essays refer to subjects currently tabooed. If the language of the candidate’s subjects touches on such tabooed subjects, then no matter how well he has written, they are not to pass him.”

There were similar criticisms in later times. The eight-legged essay that had to be mastered to pass the imperial examinations during the Ming and Qing dynasties was formulated around a rigid artificial structure that tested, among other things, the examinees’ ability to insert classical allusions and idioms at the places deemed appropriate. Here too, the rigidity of the examination system was mercilessly skewered by critics: as the seventeenth century essayist Zhang Dai put it, the finest of scholars would “find no use for their arsenal of talents and knowledge” unless they joined the pack, “submissive in manner, limited in scope, state in words, poor in attire, with internal feeling rotted away … [Those who passed] were “either old men waiting for death, or naïve youth who understood nothing” (Zhang Dai himself never passed the provincial examinations that would have permitted him to set for the national examinations in Beijing; he plunged into depression and settled for a life as private scholar and aesthete). In short, it is far from obvious that the imperial examination system actually tested for high caliber political talent.

78 Cited from Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China, p. 79.
But is the problem with the examination system *per se*, or with the content and form of the imperial examination system? Today, examinations testing for government positions can and should be designed without aiming for ideological uniformity and rigid adherence to proper form. In fact, today’s public service examinations in China are more like IQ tests, designed to filter out those without superior analytical skills (it is highly unlikely that someone like Sarah Palin or Toronto’s mayor Rob Ford could pass such examinations). They also ask candidates to answer policy-related questions, with the aim of identifying candidates who can look at complex matters from different perspectives rather than through a rigid ideological lens.

This is not to deny that the public service exams can be improved. For one thing, there may be a need to test for the ability to make predictions: policy-makers at the highest levels of government need to wrestle with the complexities of the world and make plausible predictions about what will happen next. Social scientific research suggests that the art of making predictions depends less on expertise in a particular

---

81 For past examinations, see this link: [http://www.qigwy.org/qwykszt/ ("Quanguo gongwuyuan kaoshi wang")] [National Public Service Examinations Network]. The third and fourth parts of the *xingzheng nengli ceshi* [Administrative Ability Test] tests for math and reasoning, similar to IQ tests.

82 That said, lower level governments in the 1990s were authorized to provide public service employment for demobilized soldiers without going through a competitive selection process (John P Burns and Wang Xiaqi, "Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Service Behavior," *China Quarterly*, 2010, No. 201, pp. 67-68. But such public servants are unlikely to be promoted without participating in a competitive selection process.

83 Arguably, political leaders perceived to be relatively successful, such as Ronald Reagan, would not have made the cut on such exams. Any system has flaws, and the benefits of filtering those who lack good analytical skills and the ability to think about policy questions from diverse perspectives may be worth the cost.

84 The dissertation test (*shenlun*), especially the analytical writing part, requires thoughtful analysis.
field and toiling devotedly within one tradition and more on knowing many things from an eclectic array of traditions and accepting ambiguity and contradiction as inevitable features of life. Hence, exams should test for a wide range of knowledge in different disciplines and traditions, they should not simply be IQ tests. That said, some disciplines clearly bear on public policy -- economics, environmental science, and international relations – so it makes sense to give extra weight to basic knowledge of those disciplines. Testing for knowledge of the latest research on cognitive biases is helpful, so that leaders know how to exert effort designed to minimize biases in decision-making. Exams should also test for basic knowledge of history so that future leaders have knowledge of political decision-making in the past (both what worked and what didn’t) that may still be relevant today. There is evidence that bilinguals have a heightened ability to monitor the environment – a useful quality for political leaders – which may be a case for testing of a second language. Last but not least, basic knowledge of the Confucian classics would be particularly helpful in the Chinese context (and elsewhere too, but several of the key texts have not yet been translated): the classics are a rich repository of cultural knowledge about how to act

86 Given that so much scientific and academic material is written in English, perhaps exams should also test for reading knowledge in English. On the other hand, advisers of top political leaders can translate and provide summaries of key articles and books.
87 Song dynasty thinker Ye Shi advocated “utilitarian” knowledge, with emphasis on historical analysis of institutions in order to learn from past failures (Dieter Kuhn, *The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 105).
well in politics (and society more generally). In any case, the Confucian classics should be recommended over study of the Marxist classics that are singularly devoid of discussion about the good qualities of political rulers and what they ought to do.\footnote{I do not mean to imply that only Confucian classics offer insights into what ought to be the good qualities of leaders: the texts of Legalists, for example, offers relevant insights for times of warfare and Marxist classics may also be useful in the sense that they offer insights into the workings of capitalist economies that can be helpful for political leaders. Moreover, it may be necessary to revise what counts as a classic for political purposes in order to deemphasize works that easily lend themselves to misuses similar to, say, the Kangxi emperor’s use of Yijing divination to make decisions on matters relating to punishment and foreign policy (see Richard J. Smith, \textit{The I Ching: A Biography} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. 114-120). My argument is that there should be more systematic testing of the Confucian classics with historical and normative lessons for rulers today, not that testing should be confined to them.}

In sum, today’s world requires political leaders with superior intellectual abilities – analytical skills and knowledge of different disciplines and traditions – and an examination system can help to test for such abilities. Of course, the examination system is a flawed mechanism. It is hard to settle disputes about what should be the content of exams in non-controversial ways. The question of how to select the examiners may be controversial.\footnote{One way to minimize controversy would be to select examiners for high level political positions by means of random selection from among university professors in various disciplines.} But all political selection mechanisms are flawed (controversy cannot be avoided), and the aim is to maximize advantages and minimize disadvantages relative to other systems. Clearly there is a need for more social scientific research to shed further light on the question of how best to test for intellectual abilities required for political decision-making.\footnote{One reason why the examination system as a method for the selection of political talent has been under-researched is that political science departments in Western societies have focused so much
dispute the fact that, however imperfect, exams can at least filter out candidates who lack basic analytical abilities and knowledge of the world required for informed and morally justified political decision-making at the highest levels of government. In a large scale society, the examination system is the fairest and most efficient way of selecting public officials with above average intellectual ability.\(^{92}\) As we will see, however, examinations cannot do as well at filtering out candidates who lack the basic social skills and virtues that are also required of political decision-makers.

### 3. On the Need for Social Skills

Intellectual ability is important for political leaders, but it may not be the most important quality. The intellectual abilities required for serious academic research – the need to publicly engage with the best counter-arguments available, the willingness to challenge orthodoxy, to make mistakes if they help to push the boundaries of what we know, and to articulate original ideas even if they are misunderstood or underappreciated at the time they are made --- are not necessarily the abilities...
required of political leaders. We are familiar with the stereotype of the academic nerd – the semi-autistic physicist or economist with an IQ off the charts – who cannot deal with people in a ‘normal’ way. The academic nerd is not likely to be an effective political leader. Here too, Singapore’s political meritocracy is an instructive example. In the past, leaders were selected mainly according to high performance in disciplines such as economics and engineering. But the wooden and bookish manner of its political leaders alienates much of the population, especially the youth that has been energized and politicized by new social media. In response, a growing number of critics argue that the ruling party needs to expand its narrowly technical and academic notion of merit, in part to recognize the importance for political success of communicative talent and emotional intelligence.\(^9^3\)

Clearly a first class mind is not sufficient for political leadership. But it may not even be necessary. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said that Franklin D. Roosevelt had a second-class intellect but a first-class temperament.\(^9^4\) What mattered, as Bill Clinton writes, is that Roosevelt surrounded himself with brilliant people who knew more about particular subjects than he did, and allowed them to argue with one another – and with him – as they searched for the right policies.\(^9^5\) For political

---


\(^9^4\) Roy Jenkins made the same remark about Tony Blair, another relatively successful politician according to the judgment of Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff from 1994 to 2007 (see Powell, *The New Machiavelli*, p. 32).

\(^9^5\) Bill Clinton, “The Legacy of FDR,” *Time*, June 24, 2009, [http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1906802_1906838_1906981,00.html](http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1906802_1906838_1906981,00.html). Similar, Sander A. Flaum writes, “Among the people I would call true leaders…. there is consensus
success, in other words, it is not necessary to be able to produce and systematize original ideas (perhaps the most important characteristic of a first-class mind), but the leader must appoint talented advisers and be sufficiently intelligent to at least recognize what counts as a good argument for the purpose of policy-making. Even political leaders with what look like first-class minds, such as Lee Kuan Yew, recognize the importance of appointing talented advisors and encouraging them to do much of the thinking and arguing about the right policies.96

But what does it mean to have a “first-class temperament” necessary for political success? Again, the answer will differ from context to context, and the temperament required of a political leader in a state of war may be different from that required in a state of peace (although FDR was one of the few leaders to be successful in both contexts). But which social skills matter in times of peace? Writings about leadership in politics rarely draw on systematic research, but research in business studies can shed some light. As discussed in section 1, there are key differences between the qualities required for business and political leaders, but some qualities appropriate for leadership in business may be transferable to the world of politics.

96 Lee delegated much of the policy-oriented thinking to brilliant advisors such as Goh Keng Swee, who is often referred to as the architect of Singapore's economic and social success (see Tilak Doshi and Peter Coclanis, “The Economic Architect: Goh Keng Swee”, and Kian-Woon Kwok, “The Social Architect: Goh Keng Swee,” both in Peng Er Lam and Kevin Tan, eds., Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard, St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1999). My wife worked for a Singaporean think-tank headed by Goh Keng Swee in the early 1990s and I can personally testify to his brilliance. Even after Goh’s retirement from politics, Lee Kuan Yew met him once a week to bounce off ideas.
Daniel Goleman analyzed competency models from 188 companies and found that “the most effective leaders are alike in one crucial way: They all have a high degree of what has come to be known as emotional intelligence.” More specifically, a group of five skills enabled the best leaders to maximize their own and their followers’ performance: self-awareness (knowing one’s strengths, weaknesses, drives, values, and impact on others); self-regulation (controlling or redirecting disruptive impulses and moods); motivation (relishing achievement for its own sake); empathy (understanding other people’s emotional makeup); and social skill (building rapport with others to move them in desired directions). The more leaders had such skills, the better the performance of the companies. Cognitive skills such as big-picture thinking and long-term vision also matter, but emotional intelligence proved to be twice as important as IQ and technical skills. Moreover, “emotional intelligence played an increasingly important role at the highest level of the company, where differences in technical skills are of negligible importance. In other words, the higher the rank of a person considered to be a star performer, the more emotional intelligence capabilities showed up as the reason for his or her effectiveness.”

Such findings may not be directly applicable to the question of what makes an effective political leader, but there are relevant parallels: for example, the reasons why empathy is particularly important as a component of leadership in business – “the increasing use of teams; the rapid pace of globalization; and the growing need to
retain talent”97 – also apply to leadership in politics. To the extent there are differences between the requirements of leadership in the business and political worlds, they do not necessarily undermine, and may in fact reinforce, the case for emotional intelligence. For example, the fact that political leaders of large countries need to deal with an even larger and more comprehensive group of stakeholders than most business leaders means that social skills may be even more important in politics. A political leader needs not just to communicate, cooperate, and compromise with colleagues, but also inspire and persuade diverse sectors of society and (to a lesser extent) members of the international community.

Given that social skills matter for effective political leadership,98 the next question is what mechanisms can increase the likelihood of selecting political leaders with superior social skills? One advantage of democracy is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to be elected without superior social skills: the campaign process involves constant dealing with people, and voters tend to reward leaders with good social skills. In a political meritocracy without one person one vote to choose top leaders, the answer is less obvious. Exams can test for intellectual ability (if imperfectly), but it is harder to test for social skills. Exams can reward candidates who are persistent and work hard, but it doesn’t follow that exam takers can work well with other people to get thing done. Questions can ask to consider policy or ethical dilemmas issues from

98 Here I use the term "social skills" more broadly to refer to what Goleman calls "emotional intelligence."
different perspectives in order to filter out candidates congenitally unable to articulate plausible arguments from different points of view (Hitler could have been weeded out), but most intelligent people can answer such questions whether or not they can think well from other perspectives in real-world situations. In China, it may be particularly important for exams to test for knowledge of Chinese history — if there’s one way to describe literate Chinese, it’s the sense of being part of a great historical tradition, and so much of the Chinese language turns on the right invocation of the historical allusion or phrase in the right context, and a leading public official who is largely ignorant of Chinese history is unlikely to be able to persuade his or her colleagues, no matter how brilliant the policy proposal — but historical knowledge on exams cannot filter out the socially insensitive nerds from the political officials with social skills. Testing for another language might also help to determine the ability to think from another’s perspective (at least, many of the world’s monolingual tyrants could have been filtered out), but there is a need for social scientific research to show that those who speak more than one language have superior ability to think from the perspective of other people. Psychological exams that test for the traits of effective

99 A recent study found that people performed better on tests measuring empathy, social perception, and emotional intelligence after reading literary fiction (David Comer Kidd and Emanuele Castano, “Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind,” *Science*, Oct. 18, 2013, Vol. 342, n. 6156, pp. 377-380), which may be a case for testing for knowledge of literary fiction on public service exams.

100 At minimum, knowledge of another language is necessary to communicate with members of the minority groups who may not be fluent in the national language: hence, candidates for public service in Xinjiang are now required to be bilingual (“Xinjiang government job candidates required to be bilingual,” *Xinhua*, May 01, 2010).
leaders in the business world have fallen into disfavor. An intelligent person can learn the literature on social skills and score highly on exams without being able to practice those skills in the social world.

So what can be done? One possibility is to require evidence of administrative competence as a qualification for examination candidates, since good performance at lower levels of government suggests that the potential leader has good social skills. The historian Qian Mu pointed to the advantages of political meritocracy in the Han dynasty: candidates for literary examinations mostly came from aristocratic families that provided them with adequate knowledge and familiarity with the rules of politics and ritual propriety, hence successful examination candidates were already fairly well equipped with the social and practical skills required for political success. As a consequence, the Han dynasty avoided the problem of overly scholastic successful examination candidates in later dynasties. But such qualifications for examinations undermine the ideal that all citizens should have an equal opportunity to participate in public service. The obvious solution is to require evidence of administrative (or political) competence after, not before exams. That is, examination success should not be a sufficient qualification for high political office: examination success needs to be

102 I do not mean to deny that good performance may also be indicative of other qualities required of good leaders in a modernizing and largely peaceful political meritocracy, such as intellectual ability and virtue, but perhaps the link is clearer in the case of emotional intelligence which is necessary to effectively cooperate with people and hence get things done.
followed by evidence of good performance at lower levels of government as a condition for further promotion up the chain of political command.\textsuperscript{104}

But how can we measure good performance of political leaders? In business, as mentioned, the answer is relatively straightforward: good performers contribute to the profitability of the company, and the more they contribute to profit, the better they perform.\textsuperscript{105} In government, what counts as good performance is intensely controversial, and the answer depends at least partly on what recipients of policies think, not just what government leaders regard as good performance. That said, it is possible to measure the performance of political leaders in relatively objective ways under certain conditions. Consider the case of China over the last three decades or so. The key priority of government – to reduce poverty – has been widely shared among both leaders and people. And since economic growth is an essential condition for the reduction of poverty, government officials were often promoted according to the level of economic growth in their district.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104} Again, the norm in Chinese imperial history, with the exception of \textit{jinshi} examinations in the Song dynasty, is that examination success needed to be followed by further evaluations for promotions to high government posts.

\textsuperscript{105} I say “relatively straightforward” because even good performance in business is not so clear. For example, an investment bank like Goldman Sachs tends to distribute its highest rewards to bankers and traders who contribute in measurable ways to the profitability of the firm, as one would expect. But its employees within the “Federation” – lawyers, accountants, and others who perform supportive but necessary functions for the bank – are rewarded on less tangible criteria, such as the ability to manage people in harmonious ways.

\textsuperscript{106} Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political Turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China,” \textit{Journal of Public Economics}, 89 (2005), 1743-1762. This article concludes that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, hence supporting “the hypothesis that the Chinese economy is run in such a way that provincial leaders act like middle managers of a large corporation” (pp. 1760-61).
mechanism, China has seen perhaps the single most impressive poverty alleviation achievement in human history: the World Bank estimates that the poverty rate fell from 85% to 15% between 1981 and 2005, equivalent to 600 million people being lifted out of poverty.

Needless to say, the personnel promotion system has not always worked according to the standard of good economic performance. At the local township level, promotion often depends upon personal relationships. The selection mechanism for posts at the central level is still somewhat opaque and may rely more on patronage.

---


109 Ouyang Jing, “Guanxi ruhe, Yuanhe yingxiang jiceng guangyuan jinsheng,” [How Personal Relations Influences the Promotion of Grassroots Officials in a Differentiated Model Association,” Gansu xingzheng xueyuan xueabao, 2012 (1), pp. 4-14. One can surmise that “drinking ability” (juliang) is a key mediating variable: good drinking ability is often viewed favorably by local officials (speaking from personal experience, local government officials often inquire about one’s drinking ability at meal time), which can improve relations with peers and superiors, which can positively influence prospects for promotion. This hypothesis – admittedly hard to test – could also help to explain why men, on the (arguable) assumption that they typically have superior drinking ability compared to women, find it easier to be get promoted at the local level (the discrimination affecting women at lower stages of their career does not continue once they reach the rank of mayor – see Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 108 – perhaps (at least partly) because higher ranking cadres do not have the time for long drinking sessions with colleagues.
than economic performance. According to a report issued by the CCP’s own Organization Department, nearly 25% of cadres see the official promotion procedures as “going through the motions” to mask the fact decisions have already been made at a high level. Overall, however, considerable evidence indicates that China’s officials are increasingly selected based on performance.

The more serious problem is that the appropriate standard for measuring performance has become more complex at higher levels of government – so it may not be a bad thing that promotion based on economic performance matters less at higher levels of government.

---

110 See Victor Shih, Christopher Adolf, and Mingxing Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancements of Central Committee Members in China,” *American Political Science Review*, 2012 Vol. 106 (Feb.), pp. 166-187 and Ma Liang, “Guanyuan jinsheng jili yu zhengfu jijiao mubiao shezhi: Zhongguo shengji mianban shuju de shizheng yanjiu” [Promotion Incentives of Government Officials and Government Performance Target-setting: An Empirical Analysis of Provincial Panel Data in China], *Gonggong guanli xuebao*, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 2013 and Ciqi Mei, “Bringing the Politics Back In: Political Incentives and Policy Distortion in China,” Ph.D dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, 2009, ch. 2, p.83. . At the very highest level, however – the Politburo Standing Committee – age and institutional rules had the greatest influence in deciding the appointment of leaders in 2012. Candidates' patron-client ties with senior leaders also played a role (but not always in a positive direction), and powerful family background either did not matter or had negative effects on the chances of being promoted to the highest level (Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 2013, No. 18, pp. 223-239). Moreover, the criteria for assessment of public officials tend to become more complex at higher levels – the case of the promotion of officials solely based on economic performance is even weaker at higher levels of government – so it may not be a bad thing that promotion based on economic performance matters less at higher levels of government.

111 Russell Leigh Moses, “China’s Big Challenge: Dissension in the Communist Party Ranks,” *The Wall Street Journal* (China real time blog), July 8, 2014. That said, democratic societies with a Confucian heritage fare even worse: results of a large-scale survey of civil servants in seven countries show that 55.9% of respondents in mainland China agreed their departments uphold merit principles in hiring as against only 35% in South Korea and 35.3% in Taiwan (Ora-orn Poocharoen and Alex Brillantes, "Meritocracy in Asia Pacific: Status, Issues, and Challenges," *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, April 2013, 33, p. 148). The culture of *guanxi* (relations) rather than the political system is perhaps a key underlying factor explaining lapses from meritocracy in the government.

performance needs to change. Now that hundreds of millions of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty, what should the government do for them? The task of government becomes more complex, with more diverse interests and values and greater demands for political participation, and the unqualified pursuit of economic growth is no longer the widely accepted criterion for good performance. And what counts as good performance can no longer just be determined from the top: what people want and think matters more than before in terms of shaping the government’s priorities. Moreover, the no-holds barred pursuit of economic growth is now often seen as actively harmful to the polity. Most obvious, China’s growth has come at the expense of the environment and people’s well-being.\textsuperscript{113} with pollution now leading land disputes as the leading cause for social unrest in China.\textsuperscript{114} And rewarding public officials almost exclusively on the basis of short-term economic growth has contributed to a chaotic urbanization process that has filled China with near empty “ghost cities.”\textsuperscript{115}

In response, academics have urged for a more holistic approach to measuring government performance that takes into account of multiple indicators that contribute


The Chinese government itself has allowed for experimentation – as party secretary of Jiangsu, for example, Li Yuanchao (now Vice-President) assessed local officials in terms of performance measured by social and environmental factors, as opposed to purely economic ones. The problem, however, is that the more holistic the standard, the more controversial it becomes. The government can and does make extensive use of polling data and relies on social media to stay well-informed about public opinion (see concluding thoughts, section 1), but what if different groups of people prioritize different needs and the majority’s priorities conflicts with expert views about the priorities of the government? An how to determine which factor counts more, in what proportion to other factors, and who gets to decide on the holistic standard? Even if the holistic standard is widely agreed upon by the government and the people affected by the policies, it is far more difficult to measure performance in areas such as environmental sustainability -- should government officials be penalized for failing to anticipate pollution problems that spill over from neighboring jurisdictions? – with the result that short term economic growth becomes the default way of measuring “successful” performance, regardless

of the social costs. In short, performance at lower levels of government is an important indicator of the social skills required for good performance at higher levels of government but it becomes more difficult to measure performance in non-controversial ways once the government’s priorities move beyond sole focus on poverty reduction as measured by economic growth. Hence, there is an increased need for more objective ways of measuring social skills required of top political leaders that can supplement the increasingly subjective attempts to measure performance at lower levels of government.

A Mechanism for Promoting Political Officials with Social Skills: Taking Traits Seriously

A company or organization that favors seniority is commonly thought to undermine a commitment to promotion on the basis of merit. But what if it turns out that the social skills required for leadership correlate with age? Then it makes sense to promote people who are older. From a Confucian standpoint, it seems obvious that such social skills as self-awareness, self-regulation, and empathy normally increase as our life experience deepens. As we age, we experience different roles (such as caring

---

117 Qiao Kunyuan, "Wo guo guanyuan jinsheng jinbiaosai jizhi de zai kaocha: Lai zi sheng, shi liang ji zhengfu de zhengju" [A Reexamination of the Mechanism for Competitive Promotion in China: Evidence from Provincial and Municipal Governments," Caijing yanjiu [Journal of Finance and Economics], p. 132. Li Yonggang and Guan Yue suggest replacing “competing for higher GDP” with “competition for harmony” as the standard for rewarding public officials, but without specifying how to measure harmony (Li Yonggang and Guan Yue, "Difang guanyuan jingzheng de zhengzhi jinbiaosai moxing ji qi youhua" [The model for competitive promotion of local officials and its optimization], Jiangsu xingzheng xueyuanbao [Journal of the Jiangsu Institute of Administration], 2011, No. 2 (56), pp. 73-78. For ideas about how to measure harmony, see appendix 1 of this book.
for elderly parents) and deepen our experience performing particular roles (a teacher with five years experience should be better than a brand new teacher) that increase our ability to understand and cooperate with different kinds of people for the purpose of achieving desired ends, so long as we maintain the quest for self-improvement and our desire for social interaction. As it turns out, scientific research largely bears out this Confucian insight: “one thing is certain: Emotional intelligence increases with age.”\textsuperscript{118} Fredda Blanchard Fields’ research compares the way young adults and older adults respond to situations of stress and “her results show that older adults are more socially astute than younger people when it comes to sizing up an emotionally conflicting situation. They are better able to make decisions that preserve an interpersonal relationship…. And she has found that as grow older, we grow more emotionally supple—we are able to adjust to changing situations on the basis of our emotional intelligence and prior experience, and therefore make better decisions (on average) than do young people.”\textsuperscript{119} Other research shows that older adults seem particularly good at quickly letting go of negative emotion because they value social relationships more than the ego satisfaction that comes from rupturing them.\textsuperscript{120}


\textsuperscript{120} Cited in ibid, p. 255. For more evidence that men (in the case of this study) become emotionally
older, in short, improves one’s chances of developing superior social skills.

The political implications for a meritocratic selection process should be obvious: it is best to promote older officials who are more likely to have superior social skills necessary to get things done.\[^{121}\] That said, older adults suffer from cognitive declines as they enter their sixties and seventies,\[^{122}\] so it also makes sense to have age limits for political leaders. Older adults may also suffer from declines in energy levels and physical health, hence a good case can be made for collective leadership at the highest level of government because the decline of any one leader would not be so problematic. The current Chinese system of collective leadership seems to have more or less struck the right balance between rewarding improvements in social skills while

\[\text{121}\] The implication that young people should be barred from high level political posts does not sound so reactionary if one is reminded of the fanaticism of youth-led political movements, from German and Italian fascists to the red guards of the Cultural Revolution. Such youth movements may have been manipulated by more elderly political leaders, but they were often led by young people: as Walter Laqueur notes, “In 1933, Adolf Hitler was in his forties, but his closest followers were all very young: Joseph Goebbels was 36; Heinrich Himmler, head of the terror machine, was 33; his deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, 29, and Adolf Eichmann, the engineer of the Holocaust, a mere 27 (Laqueur, “The Weimar Union: Europe, back to the 30s,” The New Republic, Aug. 2, 2012, p. 16).

\[\text{122}\] Stephen S. Hall, Wisdom, p. 228. Fluid intelligence, or the ability to solve novel, abstract problems that make relatively little use of real-world information, begins to decline in the early 20s and continues to decline thereafter (hence, mathematicians and others who work with symbolic, abstract materials for which they must invent novel solutions often do their best work before 30) (Richard E. Nisbett, Intelligence and How to Get It: Why Schools and Cultures Count (NY: Norton, 2009), pp. 7-10). But bilingualism has been shown to postpone dementia by approximately five years (Bialystok, E., Craik, F.I.M., Binns, M.A., Ossher, L., & Freedman, M. (in press). Effects of bilingualism on the age of onset and progression of MCI and AD: Evidence from executive function tests. Neuropsychology) so perhaps bilingual political leaders should be allowed to retire a few years later (other things being equal).
taking into account of cognitive and physical decline.\textsuperscript{123} seniority plays an important role in influencing selection to the ruling standing committee of the Politburo but there is an informal retirement age of 70, with the result that most members are in their mid-60s.\textsuperscript{124}

Of course, it is worth keeping in mind that there are many exceptions to the rule that social intelligence increases with age and age should be only one factor influencing the selection of political officials; a minority of spots can be reserved for innovative younger leaders (see chapter three, section two) and younger leaders can play an important role in an advisory capacity. But political selection mechanisms are necessarily imperfect, and social scientific research (as well as philosophical argumentation) can help to reduce imperfections: given the well-documented tendency to improve social skills as we age, a good case can be made that age should count in the evaluation process as a proxy for the social skills required of effective political decision-making.

Gender is another good proxy for social skills. CEOs interviewed about different leadership styles said women were more collaborative, better listeners, more

\textsuperscript{123} Arguably, the U.S. founding fathers also established a good model of setting age limits for political positions on the assumption wisdom improves with age: according to the U.S. constitution, a person must be at least 35 to be President or Vice-President (given shorter life expectancy in the 18th century, the equivalent today would be about 50), 30 to be a senator, and 25 to be a representative. The principle that age requirements should increase with the importance of the political position is a good one, though I surmise it would be difficult to argue for such requirements in contemporary American society given the dominance of a populist, anti-elitist ethos and the celebration of youthful ways of life.

\textsuperscript{124} Susan Shirk, "Age of China's New Leaders May Have Been Key to Their Selection," \textit{China File}, Nov. 15, 2012

\url{http://www.chinafile.com/age-chinas-new-leaders-may-have-been-key-their-selection}.
A revised version of this paper will be published in my forthcoming book, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton University Press, June 2015); please do not cite this version.

relationship oriented, and more empathetic and reasonable. In another study, researchers analyzed the 360-degree leadership evaluations of more than 7,280 executives, which had been filled out by their peers, bosses, and subordinates. The analysis revealed that at every management level, women were rated higher than men, and the higher the level, the wider the gap. Women rated higher on 12 of the 16 competencies that the researchers identified as most important to overall leadership effectiveness, including such social skills as “develops others,” “inspires and motivates others,” “builds relationships,” “collaboration and teamwork”, “communicates powerfully and prolifically,” and “connects the group to the outside world.” Yet the data also showed that the higher the level, the higher the proportion of men. In other words, the best people – women – are not being promoted. The researchers draw the implication that “by adding more women the overall effectiveness of the leadership team would go up. Organizations go outside to recruit effective leaders when in many cases they may well have internal people who could rise to fill the position that is vacant.”

125 Boris Groysberg and Katherine Connolly, “Great Leaders Who Make the Mix Work,” Harvard Business Review, Sept. 2013, p.72. Insights from brain research may help to explain gender differences in decision-making: “men’s brains have approximately 6.5 times more gray matter than women’s and women’s brains have approximately 10 times more white matter than men’s. Because gray matter characterizes information processing centers and white matter facilitates the connections among those centers, scientists theorize that those differences might explain why men tend to excel in tasks that depend on sheer processing while women show relative strength in tasks that call for assimilating and integrating disparate pieces of information. What’s more, the cord connecting the left and right lobes is 10% thicker, on average, in female brains. And women have wider peripheral vision than men do” (Cathy Benko and Bill Pelster, “How Women Decide,” in Ibid, p. 80).
Again, we need to be cautious about drawing direct implications from business to politics. But the same sorts of social skills needed for effective leadership in large companies are likely to be even more important for political leaders of large countries, given the greater importance of communication, cooperation, and compromise in politics. As one CEO interviewed about differences in leadership styles put it, “When you’ve got a complex project involving multiple layers, you need a leader who is collaborative, and more often than not I have found that leader to be a woman.” In government, the tasks are often more complex and require more collaboration. In short, there is a strong case for women in government: if the concern is to select political leaders with superior social skills, it is generally better to choose a woman. Yet most political leadership positions are occupied by men, especially at the higher levels. In China, the trend is going from bad to worse: as China’s most influential editor notes, “the percentage of women among the top leaders in the Chinese government, especially among members and alternate members of the


128 I do not know of any systematic comparisons between the performances of male and female political leaders, but studies in other fields bear on the question: Brad Barber and Terrance Odean gained access to the trading activity in over 35,000 households and found that men not only trade more than women but do so from a false faith in their own financial judgment (see Lewis, Boomerang, p. 37). Michael Lewis draws on this finding to note that “one of the distinctive traits of Iceland’s [financial] disaster....is how little women had to do with it” (Ibid). In 2009, the nearly all-male Independence Party was voted out of power and replaced by the mostly female Social Democrats, led by Johanna Sigurardottir, Iceland’s first female prime minister and the world’s first openly gay head of state (she is married to another woman).
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, shrank from 11.4 percent in 1977 to 7.6 percent in 2002. While women can be found serving as officials in more than 80 percent of the country’s provincial-level governments, only about 8 percent have a woman as head of the government.”  

So what should be done? First, we must be clear about the sources of discrimination so they can be corrected. The “motherhood penalty” – the assumption that mothers tend to be less competent and less committed – has been well documented and such biases almost certainly contribute to discrimination against women in politics. The “motherhood penalty” can be overcome if a performance review shows that a mother had demonstrated a heroic level of commitment to a previous job, but clearly women have a huge hurdle to overcome before they can be treated as men’s equals in the promotion process, not to mention given special


130 The same holds true, I regret to say, in Chinese academia. My female PhD students have a harder time finding academic jobs compared to my male students and male professors are often strikingly open that the “motherhood penalty” is the main reason. Given that most female professors are bound by law to have only one child (not to mention the fact that Chinese grandparents often help with child-rearing), the bias against female applicants makes even less sense than elsewhere.

privileges on account of their superior social skills. Hence, there may be a need for enforceable laws specifying goals that aim to increase the proportion of women in government: Nepal’s 2007 Constitution stipulated that at least 33 percent of candidates in parliamentary elections must be women, and as result the country has the highest proportion of women in government (30%) in the Asian region. In the case of China, preference should be given to women in the selection and promotion process for political leaders, other things being (roughly) equal. If China can substantially increase its proportion of women in government, the government will be more effective at doing what it’s supposed to do. But what exactly is the government supposed to do? At this point, our discussion of political leadership needs to take a more explicitly normative turn.

4. On the Need for Virtue

A leader with superior intellectual and social skills is potentially the worst kind of leader, because he or she can figure out the best way of realizing immoral purposes. Clearly any theory of leadership that leaves out ethics is deficient. Adolf Hitler’s

---


133 Again, the practice is often the opposite of what it’s supposed to be. For example, women are less likely to be recruited to the foreign ministry even if they score as well as men on written examinations because it is felt that men can do better at dealing with male diplomats and political leaders in patriarchal Arab and African countries. In other words, Chinese women are penalized because of patriarchal prejudices elsewhere.

134 An obvious point, perhaps, but it is striking how little of the (English language) literature on leadership has focused on ethics (Deborah L. Rhode, “Introduction,” in Moral Leadership: The Theory and Practice of Power, Judgment and Policy (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), p. 5). The very
singular skills as an orator set him above his National Socialist colleagues, and he could hold a crowd rapt for hours with his speeches.\textsuperscript{135} Had his oratorical skills been matched by intellectual brilliance, he might have figured out more effective war strategies and (God forbid) maybe even won the in the war. On a less-worrisome scale, sociopaths – those devoid of any conscience – can and do achieve social success by means of rational cost-benefit analysis of how to manipulate people for their own advantage. With superior ability to understand other people and to plan the likely consequences different paths of action, they can outmaneuver other people to get what they want. The problem is that sociopaths completely lack compassion and feeling for fellow human beings, and only rational calculation about their own interests stops them from harming other people. As a successful law professor put it, “Remorse is alien to me. I have a penchant for deceit. I am generally free of entangling and irrational emotions. I am strategic and canny, intelligent and confident…. Yet I am not motivated or constrained by the same things that most good people are…. [As a child], I envisioned the people in my life as robots that turned off when I wasn’t directly interacting with them… I have never killed anyone, but I have certainly wanted to. I may have a disorder, but I am not crazy. In a world filled with gloomy, mediocre

nothings populating a go-nowhere rat race, people are attracted to my exceptionalism like moths to a flame.\textsuperscript{136}

The Chinese “Legalist” thinker Han Fei (c. 280-233 BCE) argued that political leaders should act like rational sociopaths. He wrote a political handbook for power-hungry rulers, and argued that state power needed to be strengthened by means of harsh laws and punishments. His aim was nothing less than total state control, and he stressed over and over again that moral considerations should not get in the way.\textsuperscript{137}

The ruthless king of Qin ascended to the throne in 246 BCE and drew on Han Fei’s advice to conquer and rule all of China under the title of First Emperor of the Qin dynasty. This dynasty was short-lived, however, and the First Emperor became infamous in Chinese history for his excessive cruelty and megalomania and “Legalism” fell into disrepute. Less than a century later, the Han dynasty ruler Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BCE) officially endorsed (a reinterpreted version of) Confucianism as the reigning political philosophy, and Confucianism became the mainstream political tradition in subsequent imperial history.

Similar to debates in Western political theory, Confucians argue endlessly about which people (if any) matter most,\textsuperscript{138} what is meant by the good of the people,\textsuperscript{139} and

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{138} Some Confucian thinkers argue that the commitment to “tian xia” (the whole world) means that political rulers should be more concerned with the fate of the whole world than the fate of one country (e.g., Gan Chunsong, \textit{Chonghui Wangdao: Rujia yu shijie chengshu} [A Return to the Way of the Humane Authority: Confucianism and the World Order] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue
\end{flushleft}
how the government should seek the good of the people,\textsuperscript{140} but they share the assumption that power ought to be exercised in the interest of the ruled, not the rulers.\textsuperscript{141} The pragmatic ideas of “Legalist” thinkers influenced governance practices in imperial China (including, arguably, the examination system), but they were supposed to be used for the moral purpose of benefiting the people.\textsuperscript{142} In the

\textsuperscript{139} My own Confucian-inspired view is that the people have a fundamental interest in leading harmonious lives, and hence the government ought to prioritize social harmony (see appendix one). For another Confucian-inspired theory, see Ruiping Fan, “Confucian Meritocracy for Contemporary China,” in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy. But the broad idea that the purpose of government is to promote the good of the people is compatible with both views as well as many other more specific theories about the purposes of government (for a similar point, see Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, pp. 117-18).

\textsuperscript{140} In contrast to “Legalists,” Confucians argue that governments should lead first and foremost by virtue and ritual (or what many today call “soft power”), not harsh laws and punishments (see the Analects 2.3). But more pragmatic Confucian thinkers such as Xunzi argued (in contrast to more idealist Confucians such as Mengzi) that harsh punishments and immoral means are sometimes required in politics.

\textsuperscript{141} For a modern-day Confucian-inspired defense of the “service conception of political authority” – the point of political authority is to serve the ruled and the political rights attached to this authority are justified by the contribution they make to the betterment of people’s lives – see Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, ch. 1.

\textsuperscript{142} Although the well being of the governed was not a major concern for legalist thinkers, a charitable interpreter could argue that legalists stressed the need for laws that provide order because stability benefits the people (see Henrique Schneider, “Legalism: Chinese-Style Constitutionalism?”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, March 2011, Vol. 38, No. 1, esp. pp. 50-59).
“communist” era, Mao Zedong openly praised “Legalist”-style methods, but he also agreed that the government ought to serve the people. In short, the sine qua non of any theory of good government (in the Chinese context and, arguably, elsewhere) is that political leaders should use the power of the state to promote the good of the people rather than for personal benefit. Political rulers also need superior intellectual abilities and social skills, but they should use those skills to benefit the people. The question, then, is what sorts of mechanisms are most likely to produce political rulers with the motivation to promote the good of the people?

Immanuel Kant famously argued that “the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils.” So long as the institutions are designed to produce good outcomes, the self-seeking inclinations of individuals will be neutralized or eliminated. In contemporary democracies, however, it is widely recognized that the quality of citizens also matters. If voters are ignorant or narrowly-self interested, elections will not produce desirable outcomes (see chapter 1, section 1). It is also recognized the quality of political leaders matters, and the task of political candidates is to persuade voters of their commitment to work for the common good. Hence, candidates for political leadership must have the oratorical

---

143 As a first year student in middle school, Mao wrote an essay praising the harsh ruling system of legalism (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) and he (in)famously compared himself to Qin Shihuang in 1958 (Zhengyuan Fu, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 187).


skills to persuade voters that they will seek their good. The power of speaking has long roots in the history of Western civilization. In Greek antiquity, delivering speeches was a primary means to achieve legal and political goals, and politicians had to rely on oration to persuade each other and the people of their intentions and ambitions. Masters of oration from ancient Greece and Rome served as inspiration for later generations of political leaders, and delivering speeches has been an integral part of public life in the West. In contemporary democratic societies, oratorical skill is of utmost importance for running campaigns, directing movements, and managing crises in order to galvanize voters’ support.  

In East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage, by contrast, verbal fluency is not held in high regard. As Jin Li explains, the emphasis has been on action rather than words: verbal craftiness is viewed as an impediment to moral self-cultivation because “(1) a glib tongue divorces the mind from the heart, (2) flattering speech undermines sincerity, and (3) boastful speech lacks humility.” Hence, “we could

---

146 While studies show that highly extroverted U.S. presidents are perceived as more effective, a recent study (from the business world) suggests that in certain situations an introvert may make the better boss (Adam M. Grant, Francesca Gino, and David A. Hoffman, “The Hidden Advantages of Quiet Bosses,” Harvard Business Review, Dec. 2010, p. 28).

147 This is not to deny that there were also critics of verbal fluency in Western societies: Montaigne, for example, deliberately kept his speeches brief and his anecdotes concise on the grounds that slowness opened the way to wisdom and sound judgment, and his open admission of memory failings "was a direct challenge to the Renaissance ideal of oratory and rhetoric" (Sarah Bakewell, How to Live or A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer (New York: Other Press, 2010), p. 70). On the Renaissance ideal of the perfect orator, see Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Sir Thomas Hoby, introduction by Walter Raleigh (London: David Nutt, 1900, orig. pub. 1561), esp. pp. lxii, 368-377.

easily name a long list of great speakers in the West, but we could name none in East Asia, not even after an ardent search through the triumphant democracies of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan where eloquence of public speaking is supposed to matter. In short, the problem with electoral democracy in an East Asian context is not just that voters often lack knowledge and the motivation to the common good (similar to voters elsewhere; see chapter 1, section 1), but that there is a strong cultural bias against the main mechanism employed by political leaders in the West – eloquent speech – to try to persuade voters that they are motivated by the common good.

In a political meritocracy without democratic elections and without a tradition of eloquent speech, which mechanisms can increase the likelihood that political leaders will be motivated to seek the good of the people? Here too, debates in imperial China centered on the pros and cons of the examination system and what could be done with the power of the written word. Defenders of the examination system argued that it can help to select political officials with superior virtue. The key argument is that studying the Confucian classics improves the virtue of the learner. As the Tang

149 Ibid, p. 296. The military stratagist and statesman Zhuge Liang (181-234) may be an exception in ancient times (perhaps oratorical skills matter more for leaders who need to inspire the troops). Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew may be an exception in modern times, but he was educated in law at Cambridge and is eloquent primarily in English, and he also happens to be the leading political voice in favor of political meritocracy over democracy. In mainland China today, it is more common to see reports of political leaders (including very top leaders) assiduously taking down notes than giving speeches (think of the contrast with Western politicians!).

150 Albert Galvany argues that China’s cultural aversion to eloquent speech started during the Warring States period at the same time when this speech was a legitimate means of ensuring one’s promotion (Galvany, “Sly Mouths and Silver Tongues: The dynamics of psychological persuasion in ancient China,” Extreme-Orient, Extreme Occident, 34 (2012), pp. 15-41). This aversion focuses on eloquent speech as a means of self-marketing, which is precisely the main usage of eloquent speech in electoral democracies.
court put it:

Now the Classics are the subtle pointers of the most intelligent men and the affairs that were possible for the sages; with them, one can make heaven-and-earth constant, regulate yin and yang, rectify social norms, and promote morality. On the outside they show how to benefit everything in the world, yet on the inside they contain behaviors for being good as a person. Those who learn them will grow; those who do not learn will fall. When in the great enterprise of governing the ruler honors [these texts], he completes his imperial virtue….Thus it is said, “when one is compliant and sincere, it is thanks to the teaching of the Songs; when he sees the larger picture and can think ahead, it is thanks to the teaching of the Documents; when he is accommodating and harmonious it is thanks to the teaching of the Music; when he is reverent and respectful, it is thanks to the teaching of the Rites; and when he writes judgments and finds analogies between cases, it is thanks to the teaching of the Spring and Autumn Annals.”

Hence, by testing the Confucian classics, the examinations also test for the moral virtue of the candidates.

151 Cited in Peter K. Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 47-48. For a similar defense of the classics as the ultimate source of moral wisdom from the Song dynasty, see the passage cited in Chaffee, The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China, pp. 4-5. Another defense of the examination system as way of testing for morality is the argument that a person's handwriting reveals a person's moral quality (see, e.g., the Tang dynasty passage cited in Hong Xiao and Chenyang Li, "China's Meritocratic Examinations and the Ideal of Virtuous Talents," in The East Asian Challenge for Democracy, p. 344.). I leave aside this argument because it is somewhat out of date: today, many people use computers to write and it is no longer so common (unfortunately, perhaps) to express one's personality and feelings via writing style.
Critics argued otherwise. Most famously, the Song Dynasty Confucian scholar Zhu Xi argued exams test for the wrong kind of knowledge: they should test not just for knowledge of the classics, but also for knowledge of interpretations and the candidate’s own interpretation of the classics. Others argued the problem lies with the examination system per se: the Tang dynasty Confucian official Lu Zhi (754-805 CE) argued that “if examinations are used for selection, people will engage in crafty hypocrisy and as a result the righteous man of principle will seldom get promoted.” In other words, it is easy for intelligent candidates to fake virtue in examinations by making what appear to be ethically correct judgments and arguments, but it takes a leap of faith to think that successful candidates will be virtuous once they have political power.

In today’s China, there are similar doubts about the examination system as a mechanism to select political leaders committed to the public good. Success in the public service examinations means automatic appointment in government offices (these appointments are usually for office staff positions, unlike the Song practice where the top jinshi holders could immediately enter relatively high positions). Over the past few years, however, the moral quality of public servants appears to have deteriorated (see chapter three, section one), and the government recently proposed measures for ethical screening in the national examinations for public servants that


would take a candidate’s virtue into consideration: according to one report, “candidates who lack political integrity, a sense of responsibility, and a willingness to serve the public will not be allowed to become public servants.” But such criteria are vague and hard to measure, and formal policies have not yet been implemented for screening candidates’ moral character. One possibility (not being considered at the moment) would be to reintroduce more systematic testing of the Confucian classics with a rich discourse about virtuous political leaders. While such tests would likely be an improvement upon the status quo, even the most committed Confucians concede that examination of the classics is not a sufficient test for political virtue. So what are other possible mechanisms?

---


155 Tan Fuxian, “Xin xingshi xia jiaqiang ganbu de de kaohe pingjia wenti yanjiu” [Research on Strengthening Moral Evaluation in the Selection of Cadres under New Conditions], Xian dai rencai [Contemporary Talent], 2010.06 (http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-XDRC201006014.htm). The new regulations on the selection and appointment of cadres do specify that virtue should come before ability (Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong tiaoli [Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Cadres of the CCP], 2014-1-15, 2.2; and for regional experiments with the selection of young cadres with increased emphasis on virtue, see “Xuanba qingnian ganbu, yan le!” [On the more rigorous selection of young cadres], Zhongguo qingnian bao [China Youth Daily], Aug. 22, 2014), but it remains unclear how virtue is to be assessed and measured.

156 Plus, there is no reason to be bound by earlier definitions of what counts as the classics. Zhu Xi chose the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) as one of the four Confucian classics that were subsequently tested in the imperial examinations from the Yuan dynasty onwards, but he may have been motivated to select this relatively metaphysical text to counter the challenge of Buddhism. Today, it might more sense to select a text such as the Yueji (Record of Music) in the Liji (Book of Rites) that more directly discusses ways of achieving a harmonious society using the arts without extensive discussion of contestable metaphysical foundations.

If the aim is identify rulers willing to serve the community, a minimum condition is to deselect those who clearly harmed the community. Hence, candidates with a criminal record, especially with serious convictions such as murder and rape, should be banned from public office. In democratic countries such as India and Ukraine, many politicians do not even meet this minimal standard, but China’s political leaders could not hold political office if they are found guilty of such crimes. In China, it is widely assumed that being filial to one’s parents is a necessary step for learning about other-regarding behavior and extending morality outside the family, so it makes sense to bar candidates who have violated basic expectations of filial piety.

The selection process for public service officials has recently been reformed with this criterion in mind on an experimental basis in Qufu city. Most obvious, perhaps, officials accused of corruption should be deselected from the political system. Here

---

158 Criminals are attracted to elected office not just because it offers opportunities for corruption, but also because elected office provides immunity from protection (Collier, _Wars, Guns, & Votes_, p. 27). In India, 162 out of 543 members of the lower house have criminal records against them, although the Supreme Court recently ruled that sitting MPs will henceforth be disqualified upon conviction in serious criminal cases (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4ac6d8dc-e966-11e2-9f11-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22fP7IDZ3F). In Ukraine, the leader of the Meritocratic Party told me that part of his mission is to improve the quality of political leaders by disqualifying criminals from politics (Interview with Igor Shevchenko, World Economic Forum (Winter) meeting, Dalian, China, Sept. 2011).

159 Li, _Cultural Foundations of Learning_, p. 38.

160 Interview with Chu Fumei, Vice-Mayor of Qufu, June 21, 2014 (Qufu is known as the home of Confucian culture and the city has been selected by the central government as a special economic and cultural zone). In the Han dynasty, the overemphasis on filial piety as a prerequisite to office caused the explosion of faked filial behavior to the point of self-destruction (Etienne Balazs, _Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme_, Tr. H. M. Wright; Ed. Arthur F. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). But the idea today is more to deselect those who have clearly violated the minimal conditions of filial piety (e.g., if parents are asked about the virtue of their child during the candidate selection process and the parents have bad things to say, the candidate is deselected), not to reward public officials for exceptional filial behavior.
lies the biggest gap between the ideal and the practice, as the Chinese government itself recognizes (see chapter three, section one for further discussion).

A more positive way of assessing commitment to serve the people is to gauge the extent to which candidates have been willing to sacrifice their own interests on behalf of the country. In China’s revolutionary past, such candidates were fairly easy to identify: war heroes who put their lives at risk for the sake of serving the country clearly demonstrated commitment to public service. Today, however, it is harder to identify public spirited heroes. Arguably, political dissidents such as Liu Xiaobo who knowingly risk imprisonment for the sake of promoting political ideals come closest, but they are not likely to be given opportunities to serve as political rulers unless the whole political system collapses (not to mention the fact that they do not represent large constituencies even among independent intellectuals in comparison to, say, Nelson Mandela, Vaclav Havel, and Aung San Suu Kyi at the time they were imprisoned).161

One way of showing the willingness to experience harm for the sake of the public

161 Zhou Qi, “Political Systems, Rights, and Values” [Dialogue with Andrew J. Nathan], in Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 59-60. Such points are often made in informal conversations with Chinese intellectuals with full access to information about the facts of the case(s), but they are rarely articulated in public both because it is politically sensitive to openly argue with imprisoned dissidents and because fellow intellectuals find it distasteful to criticize dissidents who cannot defend themselves while they are in jail. One important reason that the views of dissidents do not resonate much with Chinese intellectuals is that dissidents often make highly controversial totalizing critiques of Chinese culture and CCP history all the while idealizing electoral democracies in the West. That said, many independent Chinese intellectuals think dissidents should be allowed to express their views, particularly if there is no attempt to organize an alternative to one-party rule.
is to do volunteer work in poor and remote rural areas for long periods.\textsuperscript{162} Among public officials, perhaps the clearest sign of a willingness to experience harm on behalf of the community is the willingness to stick to the one-child policy. While wealthy Chinese often pay fines so they can have more than one child, few if any top political leaders have violated the one child rule (how many politicians in the West would be willing to sacrifice their personal interests in this way!?). But the challenge now is to increase the population to maintain a sufficient proportion of productive citizens needed to support China’s rapidly ageing population and the one child policy is being loosened and will likely be abolished in the near future.\textsuperscript{163} Low salaries for public servants are justified on the grounds that Chinese officials should be willing to sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of serving the community; as Xi Jinping put it, “If you go into politics, it mustn’t be for money… you must give up any thought of personal advantage.”\textsuperscript{164} But given the extent of corruption in the political system (see chapter 3, section 1) and the fact many people join the party to get obtain

\textsuperscript{162} Tsinghua students in the party sometimes serve poor rural communities for a year after they graduate. Even if a mixture of motives may be at play (e.g., the desire to be seen to be good can help career prospects), the fact that they are willing to help disadvantaged people in uncomfortable conditions is a good thing, and being exposed to poverty and hardship can help to increase understanding and sympathy for the plight of the disadvantaged.


\textsuperscript{164} Xi Jinping interview in 2000, translated by Carsten Boyer Thogersen and Susanne Posborg (http://nias.ku.dk/news/interview-2000-china%E2%80%99s-vice-president-xi-jinping-translated-western-language-first-time). In March 2014, in the midst of one of Beijing’s notorious pollution alerts, President Xi made an “impromptu” visit to a local neighborhood in Beijing and talked to locals – without wearing a pollution mask, a clear symbol of his willingness to experience personal harm in order to show solidarity with suffering locals (!).
material benefits, few will argue that the system works as it’s supposed to. If such mechanisms designed to increase the likelihood of recruiting and promoting public officials committed to serving the public are far from sufficient, then what else is there?

A Mechanism for Selecting Political Officials with Virtue: Selection by Peers

Confucius, had he been aware of the possibility, would probably not have endorsed the examination system as a method for determining the moral character of a candidate. To assess a person, he says we must carefully observe his actions and motives: “The Master said: “See what a man does; watch his motives; examine what he is at ease with. How can a man conceal his character? How can a man conceal his character?” (2.10). The Tang dynasty official Lu Zhi (mentioned earlier) agrees with Confucius that the only way to assess a person is to get to know him for an extended period of time and from all angles. On this basis, he argues in favor of recommendation by elders and officials “as the method of selection and promotion. This method was adopted for many benefits: it verifies clearly the actual

---

165 See Bruce J. Dickson, “Who Wants to be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized Loyalty in China,” The China Quarterly, 2013, pp. 1-27 (published online: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9111483&jid=CQY&volumeid=-1&issueno=-1&aid=9111480&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=). But once they join, the process designed to improve other-regarding outlooks may not be entirely ineffective: Dickson also found that CCP members (compared to non-party members) are more likely to hold higher standards of citizenship, and are more likely to demonstrate their citizenship by donating time and money to various causes and by voting in local people’s congress elections. It is noteworthy that private entrepreneurs prefer to hire party members, all else being equal, because many employers reportedly see party membership as indicating an individual has already passed a screening process and will be a more dependable employee (Ibid).
political/administrative performance of the officials, extends the range of talent selection, encourages the cultivation of virtuous conduct and performance, and, lastly, puts the ambition due to pride to rest.”

The philosopher Joseph Chan defends a contemporary variant of Lu’s model. Chan argues for a house of government consisting of senior public servants selected by those who know them best: colleagues, senior secretarial staff, and experienced journalists who can evaluate the candidates’ public spiritedness, sense of responsibility, fairness, integrity, and civility. Chan’s proposal may be workable in the context of a small society like Hong Kong, where public officials are aware of each other’s moral character and the pool of selectors is relatively small. In the context of a huge and populous country such as China, however, the proposal is both too rigid and not rigid enough. It is too rigid in the sense that the group of selectors is closely tied to the Hong Kong context. As Chan recognizes, the “proposal was developed against the background of Hong Kong’s political institutions, including its statutory bodies and government advisory bodies, rather than those of China as a whole.”

In greater China, different combinations of subordinates, peers, and superiors at different levels of government will have different levels of exposure and different insights into the moral character of candidates, and it seems too rigid to confine the group of selectors to colleagues, senior secretarial staff, and experienced

---

journalists.\textsuperscript{169} On the other hand, Chan’s proposal is not rigid enough because it seems to favor certain groups over others in a way that would leave much room for abuse in a political context characterized by corruption and excessive reliance on human relations ("guanxi"). In mainland China, there is a need for a more rigorous and systematic way of assessing moral character that does not seem to arbitrarily favor certain groups (e.g., “experienced journalists”) over others.

So who should have a say in assessing the moral character of candidates, and in what proportion? The principle that moral character is best assessed via close acquaintance and careful observation over prolonged periods in different settings is a good starting point. In practice, the candidate’s peers – meaning public officials holding posts of the same level in the political hierarchy -- normally have had the most prolonged interaction with candidates, and hence should have the most say in assessing the moral character of the candidates.\textsuperscript{170} High peer ratings can and should be the most important factor in determining whether or not the candidate possesses the moral qualities necessary for further promotion up the chain of political

\textsuperscript{169} One might add that including senior journalists as the group of selectors makes less sense in mainland China if the aim is to empower selectors with personal knowledge of the moral character of candidates: unlike Hong Kong, journalists in mainland China rarely have prolonged interaction with political officials in different settings.

\textsuperscript{170} Even the moral character of children can be assessed by such means: the Cyrus Tang Compassionate Heart Scholarship is given to Chinese middle and high school students who demonstrate commitment to such virtues as filial piety and willingness to help others, and the scholarship recipients (one per class) are selected through anonymous voting by fellow students in each class (http://www.tangfoundation.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20&Itemid=39&site=CTF&sub=2).
command. But the views of subordinates and superiors should also be taken into account. Peers can be envious of talented colleagues, in which case the views of superiors (who have less reason to feel jealous) should be given some weight. And subordinates can be in a good position to observe features of moral character due to their position in the hierarchy: for example, they can notice if candidates are amiable and deferent to superiors and rude and unhelpful to subordinates, implying that the candidate cares more about personal ambition than about treating others well. Given the need for a more rigorous and systematic way of assessing moral character, it might be best to settle on something like a 60:20:20 ratio for assessment of moral character, with 60 percent of the weighting given to peers and 20 percent given to superiors and subordinates. While this ratio (or any ratio) is somewhat arbitrary and may be difficult to enforce to the letter (or the number), the advantage of a clear and transparent system of assessing moral character is that it reduces the possibilities of even more arbitrary assessments that characterize actually-existing political meritocracy in China.

To be fair, the peer rating system seems to work well at the very highest level of government in China. About 370 members and alternative members of the party’s

---

171 The Singaporean army works relatively well as a meritocratic institution because peer ratings are given the most weight in promotion decisions based (at least partly) on moral character (the U.S. army first implemented a rigorous peer rating system in 1918 designed to favor advancement by merit rather than by prejudice, family influence or political wire-pulling; see Joseph F. Kett, Merit, pp. 8-9). In politics, however, the Singapore government relies on the “helicopter” system borrowed from Shell corporation that gives most weight to the assessments of superiors (Interview with George Yeo at the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, Sept. 5, 2013).

172 To screen out fear of retaliation, assessments of moral character should be done anonymously.
Central Committee cast preferences for the party’s decision-making Politburo, currently a twenty-five member body, and the Politburo Standing Committee, its inner-most cabinet, currently with seven members. In the run-up to the 2012 selection process, outgoing President Hu Jintao favored Li Keqiang as his successor, but Xi Jinping was ranked highest in an internal survey of national senior leaders and thus Xi was selected as President. At lower levels of government, however, the views of superiors tend to have the most weight in promotion decisions, with the result that the system favors conservative and cautious candidates over risk-takers and candidates with new ideas that challenge the “normal” way of doing things as established by superiors. Hence, there may be unnecessary attachment to the status quo long after it has extended its practical utility. Even more worrisome, they

---

173 Cary Huang, Party polls 370 members on choice of top leaders, South China Morning Post, Jun. 8, 2012. [http://www.scmp.com/article/1003317/party-polls-370-members-choice-top-leaders](http://www.scmp.com/article/1003317/party-polls-370-members-choice-top-leaders). The practice of peer decision-making at the top is more comprehensive in the sense that there is no clear distinction between assessments of intellectual ability, social skills, and moral character (or virtue). In this chapter, I am arguing that peer ratings should be used as the main mode of assessment for moral character; ideally, assessments of intellectual ability and social skills should rely on other modes of assessment (see sections two and three), and the decision to promote or not should be based on a sum of the distinctive modes of assessment for each dimension.


175 See notes 111 and 112. For a fictitious (and hugely popular) book by a former public official that recounts (and satirizes) the culture of loyalty to superiors, see Wang Xiaofang, The Civil Servant’s Notebook, trans. Eric Abrahamsen (Melbourne: Viking, 2012).

176 To counteract unnecessary attachment to the status quo by national leaders, the government established the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong (Shanghai) that promotes innovation in managerial thinking and research to enable the party to meet the changing governance requirements of the market transition and economic globalization while preserving the party’s rule (Gregory T. Chin, “Innovation and Preservation: Remaking China’s National Leadership Training System,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 205, March 2011, pp. 18-39). But such institutions won’t
system may reward public officials who curry favor with their superiors by not-so-ethical means, and those who spend time serving the public rather than their superiors may be disadvantaged in the promotion process. Hence, there is a need to implement and rigorously enforce a promotion system that gives extra weighting to the assessment of peers rather than superiors. Such meritocratic reforms, arguably, would do more political good than the kinds of electoral reforms that have been the subject of countless articles and books in academic and journalistic writings on Chinese politics.

In sum, I have argued that high-level political leaders in large, peaceful, and modernizing meritocratic states need to be strong in terms of intellectual ability, social skills, and virtue. Note, however, that political leaders need not be at the top of the scale on any one dimension. Theoretical physicists are likely to be stronger in terms of intellectual ability, top business leaders stronger in terms of social skills, and religious leaders more self-sacrificing and virtuous. What makes political leaders distinctive, however, is that they should be above average on all three dimensions. That said, not all qualities matter equally. A degree of virtue is indispensable; without any desire to serve the public, a political leader can put his or her intelligence and social skills to disastrous effect. Next comes social skills, because a political leader

177 One way of dealing with this problem – implemented in imperial China, but not in today’s political system – is to penalize superiors who recommend public officials that turn out to be corrupt or ineffective.
needs to be able to persuade fellow leaders as well as members of the public. In last place comes intellectual ability: a certain degree of intelligence is necessary to process information and recognize what counts as a good argument, but policy suggestions and original thinking can come from a group of talented advisers and experts. The relative importance of each quality will also depend on the political priorities of the time. In the early days of China’s economic reform, GDP growth mattered most, hence it was most important to select and promote government officials with the right social skills to get things done. But now that corruption is widely viewed as a mortal threat to the political system (see chapter 3, section 1), more emphasis should be placed on the moral character of political officials. To repeat, a certain degree of virtue is always necessary, but now it matters even more than before.

This chapter, I freely confess, is not only a theoretical exercise about which qualities matter for leaders in political meritocracies and which mechanisms are most likely to select and promote leaders with such qualities. I had the Chinese context in mind and I tried to answer the question of how to improve China’s evolving meritocratic system. Hence, I developed an argument about a feasible and desirable political meritocracy in the context of a large, peaceful, and modernizing meritocratic state that was used as a standard for evaluating China’s actually-existing meritocratic system. My conclusion is that China can and should improve its meritocratic system, but it must do so within the system: a meritocratic system can be explicitly designed so as to increase the likelihood that political leaders have the motivation and ability to enact sound policies, and in that sense China has a clear advantage over electoral
democracies that leave the whole thing up to the whims of the people unconstrained by the lessons of philosophy, history, and social science.

But any defense of political meritocracy needs to address the question of how to minimize the disadvantages of the system, not just the question of how to maximize its advantages. The next chapter will discuss the main disadvantages of political meritocracy and suggest ways of minimizing them in a contemporary Chinese context.
Individuals in the face of risk: ‘playing’ risks to overcome disasters

Gilles Campagnolo
(CNRS-Aix Marseilles School of Economics, Aix-Marseilles University, France)
Introduction

Individual and risk, how the former deals with the latter, how the latter threatens, but also provides opportunities to the former, are at the core of contemporary societies. They also feature as major building elements of sociological theories, like regretted late Ulrich Beck in Germany, and/or philosophies, like Jean-Pierre Dupuy in France. In this paper, we shall make use of some notions put forth by the latter and investigate some conditions of individualistic exposure to risk, including in entrepreneurship activities, especially in the face of danger (the risk of loss) which may turn to catastrophes. Actually, one of the aspects of risky business is to avoid and/or to overcome major losses that may turn into disasters, and how to deal with then if, or when, they become unavoidable.

The idea of disaster indeed afflicts the mind to such an extent that it prevents us from believing what we in fact know, or would easily guess were we to analyze available data in an ‘objective’ (or even merely statistical) manner. For instance, Bergson knew World War was likely to occur well before the war actually broke out, yet he could not believe it. Similarly, nowadays, some of the future consequences of climatic change (global warming) are known thanks to the work of the International Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC). However, we still tend not to consider such changes possible, in the face of what we know, and this is what therefore contributes to prevent us from taking all the necessary measures to avoid it, before time runs out. This inability to believe in the possibility of catastrophes for the reason that they are outside of our actual experience is what partly explains our fecklessness. Meliora video, sed pejora sequor – were already saying the Romans: ‘I see what’s best, yet pursues what’s worse’. This is due to the fact that such disastrous events are at the same time very seldom experienced and they completely upset our existence: the example of the Great Tohoku Earthquake and ensuing Fukushima disaster on the Eastern Coastline of Japan is of this nature. By its very nature, it goes beyond the possibilities of the mind. Disaster becomes thinkable, and thus possible, only once it has occurred and has become unavoidable.

A tool primarily designed for fun, video games, has sometimes been turned into serious purposes, including this very one. There exists such video games that would expose the player, from a distance, to life conditions met in disastrous situations: this becomes altogether a training tool, whether played just ‘for the fun of gaming’ or seriously. This acquaintance with disasters may be a means to learn how to overcome them. The possibility of disaster would then become obvious, provided the game emphasized the warnings present all around us of what is going to happen if we

---

1 Gilles CAMPAGNOLO is a Full Research Professor at French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS, research-unit for Economics, GREQAM) in Philosophy and Economics and a Senior Member at Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE, Aix-Marseille University). Campagnolo works in philosophy of economics, on the Austrian and German schools and the theory of entrepreneurship and the analysis of divergent economic cultures (with regard to Eastern Asia in particular). Campagnolo has been several times invited assistant professor and professor at Eastern Asian institutions (Chinese and Japanese universities, including Tsinghua University, IRCIS, Nichibunken, Kyoto; Rikkyo U., Ikebukuro, Tokyo and Hokkaido University, Sapporo). He is fluent in Japanese. Interviews of Campagnolo were published in Chinese Social Sciences Today (2012, 2013, in Chinese).

Gilles Campagnolo is the global Network Coordinator of the European Commission SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME Marie Curie Actions ‘International Research Staff Exchange Scheme’ named by acronym LIBEAC (Title: Liberalism In Between Europe And China) in the Social & Human Sciences (Grant: PIRSES-GA-2012-317767)
do not take the indispensable and drastic measures to prevent it. It is useful to try to go beyond and uncover some basic concepts of such experience. We suggest some tools from _Lebensphilosophie_.

I. **Individuals and risk: what it means to face disaster**

Disaster is what we cannot imagine. And disastrous is the situation in which what could not be imagined has become effective. The loss of our relatives is of that kind. Our own death is not, since we arguably will not be ‘present’ to realize thereafter. Some consequences of that asymmetry relate to the origins (psychological and historical) of mythical and/or religious beliefs. Another consequence is that one may at times be tempted more by committing suicide rather than facing reality that has become unbearable for being too awful. So-called apocalyptic circumstances are of that kind: they shake us to the very depths and leave us disarmed and helpless in front of reality.

There is naturally a whole literature about that kind of state. To cite one example only, Michaël Ferrier, a French teacher at Tokyo French-Japanese Institute at Iidabashi, Tokyo, published such narratives of experiences after the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan: _Fukushima. Récit d’un désastre_. He was in Tokyo when earthquake and tsunami hit the Eastern Coastline of Japan. He describes the fear, the destroyed buildings and landscapes, narrates testimonies from the victims of this rough nature. He visited the prohibited area and came back with one quite strange impression: one can live in contaminated zones. Or rather one gets used to living in it and a part of the ruling institutions is putting the population in a dilemma so that to make them accept such kind of life. An undertaking that, through indifference or cowardice of the many others, says Ferrier, leads less to positively overcoming the disaster than to give in. The results are horrendous in terms of disease etc.: it is as if hibakusha (the people touched by the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were back, but the general word is “not to worry any longer”.

Community or collective reaction is thus not necessarily a positive reaction. Individual reaction may be to refer to the community. Yet, when the latter (or ruling managers in charge) fail, the only last resort is oneself. Emotions are not felt by anyone else than those who suffer from the consequences of the disaster. Communitarianism in such cases may evoke both solidarity and apparent solicitude, or, and often more deeply, a ‘couldn’t-care-less-attitude’ that pervades the rest of society. Naturally, this attitude gets criticized but only when it is denounced and often to no practical consequence. Not only a low-level of real attention and care, one reason, though, is perhaps that really serious disasters may be considered through both prospective and retrospective knowledge, and that yet they are nearly impossible to believe. The ‘this happens in reality’ feel that triggers positive thinking, reasoning and matter-of-fact dealing with issues is, on the contrary, made lower by the recurrence of images on all sorts of screens, from TV sets to computers all over.

Indeed there exists an industry of ‘disaster movies’, and in the world of video games, disaster is a prevalent theme in the so-called ‘post-apocalyptic’ genre. For example, in _Fallout 3_, the player moves through a Washington D.C devastated by nuclear war. What sets this game apart from other ‘post-apocalyptic’ productions – and is here of potential interest – is that it takes place in an existing town. This is therefore an essential dimension of disaster: the alteration of a world we know that in turn makes it unfamiliar. At the same time, we find traces of the world we are familiar with everywhere. Ferrier narrates how landscapes they knew well now seem “bizarre” to survivors, both familiar and yet confusing.

In order to identify why it is so intrinsically difficult to apprehend disaster, Jean-Pierre Dupuy points out, the difficulty lies in the fact that “one does not believe ‘the disaster’ is going to occur, even though one has every reason to know it actually will”. Disasters cannot be imagined. This is also why they were not foreseen, especially in a country where everything usually is, like Japan. Only non-Japanese are surprised by the way life goes on in Japan, since it is so different from their own origin places. But, for Japanese, all is set since childhood to make the untimely and

---

3 Game developed by ‘Bethesda Softworks’ and released 2008.
unusual merely unthinkable. A Japanese ideal is never to be surprised but by the mere beauty of some natural scene to be sketched in sumi-e or translated into a haiku. The rest should be orderly. Imagine the effect of the unthinkable! Walls high enough for tsunami happening every 500 years were built. Yet, this one was a tsunami like men see every 1000 years… Maybe it is because this unthinkable remains unthinkable that the disaster happened, and also because of that sudden surge of unthinkable in life, that precisely all the rest is cautiously organized. After all, no other people seems to be used to having disastrous natural events like the Japanese. Yet, this time the nuclear plant was a man-made artifact indeed…

Moreover, the inability to believe what may be known applies to impending disasters as well as past disasters. The imagination, as well as the historical account, cannot truly account for a past disaster. This is also why the ‘business as usual’ attitude is put on by authorities even in some contaminated areas around Fukushima – as if this nuclear-style catastrophe was not so different from the rest of the earthquake/tsunami thing. But it is: the terrible health threats that happen to people there are real. So, where does this difficulty come from?

Describing or imagining disaster⁹, whatever the form, creates an object in our thoughts. Yet, a real disaster affects and shatters our whole being. In this sense, it cannot fully be understood without experiencing the complete loss of one’s bearings, which it necessarily induces. Because disaster jeopardizes our survival, not only materially or biologically, but also morally, it cannot be understood without truly experiencing it. Thus, thoughts, descriptions and imagination can only misconstrue disaster as an object. Because it is impossible to fully understand disaster, even if it is anticipated, it is impossible to believe it. This impossibility indeed prevents us from conceiving it as possible. This explains Bergson’s feeling before World War I was declared: it seemed to him “at the same time likely and impossible: a complex and contradictory idea that persisted until the fatal outcome”⁶. After resisting the thought of disaster before it happens, a feeling of extraordinary simplicity arises once it has occurred: “Who would have believed that so terrific a possibility could materialize so easily? This impression of simplicity dominated everything”.⁷ The advent of disaster provokes a feeling that contrasts with the conviction that it was impossible before it occurred. The ‘impression of simplicity’ mentioned by Bergson lies in the fact that the new situation breaks with the impossibility of perceiving disaster, which prevailed before its advent. It exists in this contrast.

This ‘impression of simplicity’, while disaster is experienced, can also be explained from another angle. It constitutes a complete upheaval of the existence of the person facing a disaster, it implies a transformation in his way of life. This transformation is an answer to disaster and operates upon the plasticity of existence itself. In The organism,⁸ Goldstein described the body’s resources when faced by a situation that deeply alters its connection to its environment. When it becomes impossible to execute an operation in the usual way, an adjustment is induced. A beetle that loses its middle legs adopts a new form of locomotion. Walking is performed in a crossed manner, whereas the animal previously ambled along⁹. Disaster brings novelty. Not only the novelty of the new situation encountered, but also the novelty of a living being’s readjustment in order to cope with disaster. Hence, the living being exploits resources that, even though they are its own, remained perfectly unknown until this point. This readjustment is spontaneous, it is how a living being manages to adapt itself to disaster, defined by the situation in which the creature, whose existence is threatened, is externally manipulated by the environment¹⁰. Disaster does distinguish between how a living being experiences it and appropriates it, which is a condition for the continuation of its life.

---

³ This analysis and the following two paragraphs were developed by Ms Martine Robert, a PhD student of mine for her dissertation defended on October 13th, 2014 at Aix-Marseille University, under my supervisorship as main director and co-supervisorship by Ass. Prof. Franck Varene.
⁵ Ibid. Jean-Pierre Dupuy specifies in a note that Bergson refers to James’ feelings during the terrible 1906 San Francisco earthquake.
⁸ “The situation of the living demanded by the milieu from the outside is what Goldstein holds up as the prototype of a catastrophic situation.”, Canguilhem, The Living and Its Milieu, The MIT Press, Grey Room, No.3 (spring 2001) p. 21.
Hence the accompanying feeling of a ‘disturbing familiarity’.\(^\text{11}\)

In other words, what could be observed during and after the Fukushima earthquake is properly said an event similar to that inability to imagine disaster. Jean-Pierre Dupuy had published his *Pour un catastrophisme éclairé* years before Fukushima, openly having in mind how one should/could/would react to events like the 9/11 2001 terror-aerial attack on NY World Trade Center. But how could have one anticipated that? Now, the point is that, since one cannot believe in disaster, even *knowledge* of impending disasters does not make one able, to take the necessary measures to avoid it. Thus, the fact that disaster is unimaginable leads to inextricable difficulties in practice. And many other examples can be summoned: the disaster of global warming is leading to major impact on the world. It has been known for quite a long time (in terms of political events) now, even with a Nobel Peace Prize attributed to the IPCC. Yet this knowledge has not given rise to as many concrete measures as should be necessary to counter the phenomenon. Human beings tend to act as if they did not know. One reason may be that nobody *really* wants to believe in what one knows. Psychoanalytical vocabulary has a word for that: “transfer”, or rather in its absence, the “lack of transfer”. Only in retrospect, when a disaster already happened becomes that disaster ‘possible’ to the mind, and even then it tends to fade, which also means that it becomes possible to recover, but that we were not prepared to what has now become unavoidable and might not be for the next time either.

Because we can only comprehend disaster as it happens, it exists for us only when it is already too late is the motto of Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s book who refers to the original meaning that ‘actual’ bears: the opposite of potential. Now, if human beings could experience *without* bearing the effective risks when it happens to late, they would develop at least some routines. This quite banal story consists in training. This is where community found at times helpless comes in, and drills are organized in all Japanese schools for little children and throughout life. Partly a joke, even when done seriously, partly after all useful anyway, they help bringing awareness. Now, if a special artifact to make one *feel* about what disasters mean, would not that be a tool for ‘transfer’? Actually, this exists since literature tells stories, since movies show them. But if one may act in context of the *situation*, what could it be? This is where the idea of video-gaming comes in, quite paradoxically: having fun to overcome disasters. With its limits, but worth exploring.

II. **The example of a game intended to help to deal with catastrophes**

Here, let me give an example that the work of one of my PhD students put forth. I supervised her and she defended her PhD thesis last Fall\(^\text{12}\) on narratives in video-games and related forms of art wherein an action is required from the ‘player’. That is where the spectator is changed into an actor. She studied various cases of games, including the case of a video game intended to overcome limits in thinking in order to contemplate disaster. She saw the making of such a dedicated video game as a potential means to circumvent the existing mental impasse when one faces disaster, as was put forth in previous section I of this paper.

Such a game would allow to foresee coming disasters, for instance, but not exclusively ecological disasters like Fumushima. I am adding this case since Japan is paradoxically both a major place for video games and related industries, with a culture on such items deeply anchored in the population and a land that is used to getting more than her fair share of natural disasters. This could entail the chance of creating a field-work for such creative experience. The point is to give the chance for the player to face a situation where all elements involved would both be based on scientific knowledge and provide the shock that disastrous events arouse. Ecosystems are perfect

---

\(^{11}\) Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

\(^{12}\) Ms Martine Robert studied this example of video-game for her dissertation defended on October 13th, 2014 at Aix-Marseille University, under my supervisorship as main director and co-supervisorship by Franck Varenne, Assistant Professor at the University of Normandy (Rouen). The title was : « *Vivre le passé au présent : Dimension de la forme du jeu vidéo au regard de l’épistémologie de la connaissance historique et de la simulation informatique*».  

134
examples of complex systems whose processes can only be investigated through computer simulation and which, however, relate directly to deeply felt emotions.

We may think of cinema as such a means as well, but actually it cannot in any way put the “user” of the medium in an identical situation: when at the movies, like at the theater, if something like Aristotelian “catharsis” is at work, then that is it. Maybe already somehow efficient, but quite different from the experience of “getting inside the action”. Like my student put it: “only through a video game can the possibility of addressing disaster be considered”. Because of the nature of the game, on the one hand, and virtual reality, on the other hand, video games have what facilitates overcoming the aporias described by Jean-Pierre Dupuy, facing every attempt to avoid disaster.

This is where the specificity of a game like Fallout 3 comes in. This is a conventional role-playing game. The player moves through an environment and gains new abilities through overcoming challenges. The player earns ‘experience points’ after successful missions, and ‘evolution points’ at certain thresholds, which can then be distributed in Fallout 3 to different skills (force, perception, charisma, intelligence…) All of the game’s characters, players or not, have quantified characteristics. The results of their interactions, and specifically fights, are computed by applying a few rules to this numerical data. This mechanism drastically limits the forms of interaction possible: one can help a non-player character, get information from him and, as is commonly the case in a fighting game, kill him. The game’s conventional structure, as retraced here, masks its interest as a type of video game useful in comprehending disaster, or at least a certain kind of disaster. It is this aspect my student (with co-supervisor, Franck Varenne, Ass. prof. University of Normandy at Rouen) went on to explore on this track. For what results?

The interesting thing in the game examined here is that it provides a tool in order to comprehend a disaster that we know will arise without being able to believe it. To understand this phenomenon, we must determine the essential characteristics of virtual reality as well as the game itself. My student started from the expression ‘virtual reality’, where ‘virtual’ contrasts with the determination of the ‘virtual’ from the ‘potential’. Quoting a French essayist on this topic, she put forth that virtual is defined as ‘that which, without being real, has, with force and in a fully actual way (i.e. non potential), the qualities of something (the reflection in a mirror for instance)”.

This implies that ‘virtual reality’ allows the player to face, in a video game, a situation which, without being real or contemporary, is nevertheless actual. This being actual (actuality in the sense that was displayed by Jean-Pierre Dupuy, actually) remains linked to the player’s action as it takes place within the virtual reality, defined again as a

"combination of technologies used to build virtual worlds and provide an interface for a human being, giving him the impression that he perceives and acts naturally in that space.”

14

If it is useful to make use of such definitions, the reason is to point to virtual reality providing a specific way for the player to face a situation he/she cannot believe as long as it is not taking place. This is where we meet the actuality of disaster. It is suddenly evoked in front of the individual and makes its very possibility appear. In that sense, video games provide a medium that, under some conditions, could help one believe in the possibility of disaster, thus giving them the means to do what is necessary to avoid it and to overcome the determinism that inevitably leads to the disaster. I call attention upon that hypothesis made by the student, because this is for instance something one can discuss with regard to other esthetic forms:

For instance, contemporary art has made us aware and actually quite used to entertaining a relationship to the work of art that goes beyond contemplation, or conversely stops short of that state. This is why so many people face the exhibits of very modern art as a challenge to try to find out what to do in front of what is offered to them as the “work of art”. Many feel uneasy in front of such a challenge, and actually would rather avoid it (but for the snobbish tendency to “be in” and find “wonderful” even what they do not feel interested, or emotional about). Clearly, the artist tends to make intentional use of this feeling he/she knows too well that an unusual piece of art may create. In a sense, even more than the craftsmanship incorporated in the piece, this is the emotional

13 Berthier, Méditations sur le réel et le virtuel, (Meditations on real and virtual), 2004.

14 Ibid., p. 11.
uneasiness that becomes at stake. This is the very essence of what “performance” means in today’s art – and video game precisely ambitions to play such a role in the eyes of the masses.

The “gamer” is at the same time actually standing out of the world of the game (he/she is not physically present in a destroyed Washington D.C. in *Fallout 3*) and seeing virtually signs of a remote world somehow similar to his/her own. The video game presents that world and it also helps the player detect “within our actual world, the warning signs” (as my student, worried about nuclear power) that may make one begin to believe in the possibility of disaster, of what could happen. The opposite attitude, that is unawareness that something could happen prevails among most people for the reasons explained by Dupuy and recalled above. The game may help bridge the gap between the *real* and what *actual* there may be induced by virtual reality. Indirectly, the possibility of disaster being felt, a way to individually prepare oneself may at least be taken into consideration.

Naturally, all depends on the nature of the “belief” put at stake and its “incorporation” by the player of the game. The relevance of using games to comprehend what, as a disaster, cannot be comprehended, can only be derived from a potential linkage that the disaster and the game (the disaster in the game) may have with real life. As disaster was defined, that is a situation in which one is threatened and subjected to environmental disaster, this is a life-like experience – the German *Lebenserfahrung*, taken from the ‘philosophy of life’ (*Lebensphilosophie*) vocabulary is close to what we mean here. One may refer to concepts brought forth by Ulrich Beck, but I leave that to specialists. What Rudolf Eucken, the father of economist Walter Eucken and recipiendary of the 1908 Nobel Prize for literature reckoning his *Lebensphilosophie* scheme, may also be put forth here (Campagnolo, 2012).15

Game and disaster share a common quality of *Lebenserfahrung*, they actually also display it in a symmetrical form: the self is being surrounded during a disaster and the elements are being forced upon the individual, who thus loses flexibility in the possible response to the environment – while a game does the same only “as if...” and provides moves and replays that enable the person to regain autonomy versus this environment. The virtual space is created through means that give ability to vary: take off your ‘virtual googles’, be ‘back’ to ‘real’ life, replay the scene and now stay ‘alive’. Basically, mere training, but pushed to a new level and preparing to inner routines that may be enacted whether necessary. The cost of simulation is another dimension, since it diminishes heavily all risks and spendings: from the start, that was flight simulators main *rationale*, in dealing with a situation (flight) where risk of disasters is both high and should be avoided at all expense. The point is that gaming confers to gamers a spontaneously feeling of acting “as if...”. Moreover, it is less perceived as “work” than as freely experiencing “fun” and one’s own vital strength. Individuals enter the game if they will, and once in, may, at every moment, give up or continue. As my student said (with a sigh of relief) “this omnipotence counter-balances the feeling of complete submission to an exterior situation, which defines a disaster. And in this sense the game seems to be a relevant way, maybe the only way possible, to comprehend what, since it implies our annihilation, cannot be imagined”

III. A reference to *Lebensphilosophie* as a potential provider of adequate concepts

The reference to *Lebensphilosophie* is the aspect with which we shall close our reflection. It is suggesting because it gives access to a wealth of concepts, not only adapted to the Western civilizational context, but potentially transferable from West to East, or at least worth discussing between the two worlds: for a long time, one argument of liberal thinkers regarding China’s backwardness was that this had made the country more in need of the benefits of science than at risk from science’s evils16. Hu reported that, in a conference by Dewey, one participant raised a question (he deplored there was only one to do so) as that person bothered to ask Dewey to define what a

---

15 I mention this essay that also deals with Chinese/Eastern Asian modernization). Another track, followed by my student called upon psychoanalysis by Winicott in terms of “basic form of living”: “the essential feature of my communication is this, that playing is an experience […], a basic form of living”, *Playing and reality* (1971, p. 103).

‘scientific philosophy of life’ meant, if that meant a materialistic and mechanistic type of life – just the one Chinese readers of vitalist philosophers (like Eucken and Bergson) had targeted. In his answer, Dewey balanced the benefits and the risks of the use of science, what a new China needed and what the Chinese people were after: both the success of science and Dewey’s views, but also a possible ‘misreading of pragmatism’ (Gu, 2000) could derive from there.

It is a fact that both disasters and games are forms of life. Now, it is also a fact that the experience of a game is not an effective experience of disaster. For instance, in a game, there is (until now and in the kind of games we are talking about) the player does not experience body’s sensations similar to those he/she is faced with in situations that may destroy his whole life. But the tremor can be felt to some extent and the thrill comes from there.

In other words: some readjustments can only happen if one’s life is shattered: for instance, the player cannot, acting as if his/her right hand became unusable, develop his/her left hand’s capacity for substitution, which the body would initiate if a right hand truly became impossible to use. Such ability depends on a the complete upheaval of one’s existence, a rupture of the most fundamental movements and it cannot be experienced in a game. This example implies that thought experiments remain necessary beyond gaming or, conversely, that no ‘virtual’ experience is enough and obviously (as concluded our student) it would be a nonsense to claim that every disaster can be comprehended through and in a video game. Neither that it could be done arbitrarily.

This leaves us without any fully satisfactory solution. And with a practical issue: how to form a kind of video game that would be designed and modeled to the end of experiencing enough a situation to be able to react to it, by overcoming potential disasters? The answer is probably, just as in any king of engineering that there exists no solution. The seawall that was designed to protect the Fukushima nuclear plant had been conceived of to resist centennial tsunamis, and there was a millenial one coming in (it may as well be millenial and ten-millenial respectively, the almost impossible is never fully impossible...) If the issue is really to comprehend a disaster no one can believe in, in order to enact the drastic measures necessary to avoid it, one understands that “fear and trembling” may include yet other dimensions to consider when creating such a game.

To finish on gaming, and related further to Lebensphilosophie potential developments, globally, video games differ from other forms of games and of shows. Games are driven by imagination and they have rules, in which the player’s action is limited by a system of constraints, which are what video games also display in terms of limitations. They rely on Wletanschauungen (representations of a world) and as such provide some resistance to the players’ actions which makes this world appear as a self-consistent world. Let us point out that rules do not always need to be explicit to be enforced (as opposed to some games with rules like chess).

Eventually, rules may change during the game: this is what ‘evolutionary’ games are when they are of interest to economists. Video games provide their own world through sensory experiences but not all sensations may (fortunately!) be reproduced. Players wander, find one’s way, act within this world, making living conditions appear as the circumstances from which and to which the pending disaster may/will lead to. Even though playing this type of game cannot be assimilated with trials of living and enduring actual disasters, it would allow one to comprehend, indirectly, through a specific experience, what facing this kind of situation would be like. This is partly the conclusion that my student reached but it requires some more caveats, as follow, and which German Lebensphilosophie would give tools for pointing at in concluding this paper.

---

17 Tan Sor-Hoon reports that anecdote from the Preface by Hu Shih (Hu, 1997). Let us point to the interest of the view of comparing a Deweyan and a Confucian approach to Chinese modern reality starting from history. That would take us astray from the present discussion, but interested readers may refer both to Tan Hor-Soon (2003) and (2004).

18 Another issue has been raised by more erudite commentators: if Dewey spoke well about the positive sciences, did he know much of what he praised? Unfortunately, it seems that he was only rather vaguely informed, and his talk often limited to methodological issues. American philosopher Richard Rorty stressed that, although Dewey insisted on studying science, he did not apply that much to himself and though he emphasized the experimental method, Rorty judges that ‘Mr. Science’ was more ‘scientific’ than he was a true ‘scientist’ as he lacked erudition in those fields (Rorty, 1991, p. 63). Larry Hickman (1995) also questions Dewey’s views on the applicability of the scientific method, but he addresses Rorty’s criticism and somehow defends Dewey’s fame.
First, knowledge of what the subjective experience (Erfahrung) may be is focused on its subjective nature. Any objective approach would unavoidably partly miss it, in particular if led in the spirit of pure behaviorism. One interesting point in focusing on the player as such is that what the game offers has in general impact on each individual differently with results that one may always try to compute or take into methodical account, but that will always go beyond these results.

One may even try to “crack” the black box, for instance, with neuropsychical investigation (through scanner, MRI of the brain while the player is active etc.). The interest and the wealth of information provided make sense heuristically, but one may be warned that this is an infinite quest. The literature is abundant, and the point is not only that, like any field of research, there is no end: the point is that “subjective” means that one has to turn towards the subject and listen to “feedback” (or “debriefing”) after the experience has been lived. In other words, after a disaster, the study of trauma often implies psychological units. In that perspective, there is leeway for such introspective research after the gaming experience as well, and this goes beyond the game considered as such.

Secondly, the knowledge that is implied in building the game, before it can be played, is both larger in scope than one single viewpoint may encompass, and still therefore also limited in modelization. Like any computer simulation process, a game goes step by step, that is its progress depends upon the last step that has been made, not upon the bird eye’s view one may try to take upon it. Sometimes, it is even impossible to have a general algorithm for the whole experience, since it may involve different frames. These are made compatible only at each step and some frames may be invoked or utilized at some point and not at other moments, thus being altogether inconsistent as wholes but adapted and consistent at such and such step only of the progress. At the practical level, this is dealt with by encoders. At the theoretical level, it shows in the fact that some theorems of, say, physics have only experimental computer proofs, no mathematical overall demonstration. In fields like ecology where the data dealt with are immense, that happens even more frequently. Limitation here is like the asymptotical limit that further calculation power pushes forward all the time at an increasing speed with technologial progress.

Third, games illustrate that abilities trained by individuals through experience they acquire is not only knowledge-dependent, but emotionally dependent. There is here as well a whole literature on how emotions and rationality interact in reactions that individuals display when facing catastrophes and thus knowledge and “feelings” shape what permits one to believe what they are able/unable to believe. Very risky situations like pending disasters are a good example of experimental situations to test this.

These are only three aspects, each being a potential field for investigation with alternative tools such as the concepts of basic Lebensphilosophie parallel and alternative, or potentially mixed (but how) with the neuro-sciences and/or cognitive sciences that are in full bloom nowadays.

IV. Conclusion

The perspective offered in the previous pages does not aim at explaining what could be the perfect way for individuals to be ready to deal with disastrous situations, such as earthquakes, tsunami etc as well as catastrophes other than ecological make ever more threatening. We only pointed, with Dupuy, to some reasons why people tend not to realize what catastrophes could be even though they have conscious means of seeing them coming. A life-experience is needed to do so, and a substitute may to some extent be provided by shows and games. Yet, the specificity of video-games is that the player is acting and feeling to a large extent his/her own power in a ‘virtual’ situation. Simply what simulation offers. The issues becomes one of the phenomenology of such approach and tools provided by Lebensphilosophie, as was developed especially by German philosophers at the end of the nineteenth century (like Rudolf Eucken), may be called upon to help comprehend that aspect. Games should have knowledge as their grounds and provide the means to give ‘adequate’ emotions, not only knowledge in return. Although we know them not to be true, video games put players in given situations and enhances actions that players perform, all being
determined by step-by-step. Coding the environment makes it both objective and apt to subjective perspective by the player to whom these elements will be helpful.

Some elements in games provide help, others will present obstacles, like real-life situations. This is not much news, but this perspective should also lead to the development of a game that differs from a role playing game such as *Fallout*. Progress along successive branches of action and reasoning is potentially not enough, but we deem as already appropriate the idea to use an essential dimension of computer simulation, namely the ability to provide a sense of novelty. The modeling of a complex system, once the program is launched, would present properties that are impossible to conceive merely from knowledge of the model. This would resonate with the notion of a threshold of emotion and stimulus and the idea of major change, within a complex system.

This point (which was reached by my student) leads both to the most recent frontier developments of neuro-sciences and potentially back to rediscovering notions (like that of “threshold”, or *Reizschwelle*, for instance) in the psycho-physiological studies of experimental psychology at the end of the nineteenth century (for example, the so-called “fundamental law” by Weber and Fechner – see Campagnolo 2008). Understanding the kind of causality linking subjectivity and this approach may indeed be crucial for the study of the reactions by individuals in the face of complex systems, like ecosystems.

**References**

Session 3.

Seoul City in Comparative Perspective

1. Anders Blok (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
   “Seoul City from the perspective of climate risk politics and greening world cities”

2. Sang-Young Shin (The Seoul Institute, Korea)
   “Urban Risk and Policy Agenda for Safe City: The Case of Metropolitan Seoul”
Seoul City from the perspective of Climate risk politics and greening World cities

Anders Blok
(University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
World port cities as cosmopolitan risk community: mapping urban climate policy experiments in Europe and East Asia

Anders Blok & Robin Tschötschel, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen

Abstract

Extending Ulrich Beck’s theory of world risk society, this article traces the emergence of a cosmopolitan risk community of world port cities in Europe and East Asia, constituted around shared imaginations of the global risks and opportunities of climate change. Such urban risk imaginations are shaped and circulated, we argue, within transnational assemblages of local government networks, international organizations, multinational insurance companies and transnational NGOs. Adopting the methodology of mapping urban climate experiments, we then document one policy indication of this cosmopolitan risk community, in terms of the timing, intensity, priorities and modes of government manifested in the climate policy engagements of 16 major world port cities across the regions of Europe and East Asia. The substantial similarities in such policy engagements, we conclude, amount to a new urban-cosmopolitan realism, reshaping urban politics in the face of climate change.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan risk community; world port cities; climate policy experiments; Europe; East Asia
Today such great societal assets have been created, particularly in urban areas, that protection of these areas against climate threats can pay for itself even in cases where extensive investments are required (City of Copenhagen, 2011)

Far more so than in the past, urban space today registers the profitability of non-urban economies – the economy of the port, the mine, the plantation, the large factory (Sassen, 2013)

**Introduction: repositioning port spaces in climate politics?**

With the rise of cities on climate governance agendas (e.g. Bulkeley, 2013), world port cities are emerging as central spaces for negotiating the risks and opportunities of climate change, across local and global scales. In the city of Copenhagen, for instance, the post-industrial harbor space of *Nordhavnen* (‘North Harbor’) is now undergoing major transformations, in efforts to become – in the language of local politicians, planners, investors and activists – the ‘sustainable city of the future’. According to ambitious planning visions, by 2030, this 350-hectare area north-east of city center will form a high-tech eco-district, home to 40.000 people and replete with smart grids, solar panels, bicycle lanes, green roofs – and a flood barrier.¹ As such, the district embodies the wider commitments of the municipality of Copenhagen to become the world’s first carbon-neutral capital by 2025; commitments inscribed in local climate action plans and widely circulated in transnational urban networks. Within the C40 climate leadership group, for instance, Copenhagen is commonly staged as a model of ‘green growth’, leading the way in global sustainability transitions (Blok, 2012).

¹ Visuals and other material are available from the official web-site (in Danish): http://www.nordhavnen.dk/. The flood barrier features as part of the official Copenhagen Climate Adaptation Plan (City of Copenhagen 2011).
Copenhagen policy-makers are far from alone, however, in investing in large-scale harbor redevelopment efforts, seeking to ‘climate-proof’ critical urban infrastructures of energy, waste, traffic and built environment within comprehensive area planning policies. Across a range of major port cities globally, responding to climate change now forms part of collective attempts to revitalize post-industrial ‘port cityscapes’ (Hein, 2011), with former harbor sites mobilized as spaces for showcasing new and advanced models of ‘eco-urbanism’ to the world. Such is the case, for instance, in Shanghai (Dongtan), Melbourne (Docklands), Yokohama (Minato Mirai 2050), San Francisco (Treasure Island Plan), Seoul (Songdo-Incheon), Barcelona (Forum waterfront) and Hamburg (HafenCity). Manifesting a mixture of local and global ambitions, such projects serve as exhibition windows onto global green-tech markets, while simultaneously seeking to reposition their cities as advanced and ‘responsible’ spaces of urban development in a world of shared ecological challenges.

In this article, we argue that such cross-regional similarities in dominant place-making strategies in pursuit of new low-carbon and climate-adapted futures point to central tendencies and tensions in contemporary urban climate politics. More specifically, our main purpose is to show how, and to what effects, world port cities are currently transforming into what Ulrich Beck and others (2013) call a ‘cosmopolitan community of climate risks’. Such communities, Beck argues, form around shared transnational causal-moral narratives and anticipations of endangered futures, and they potentially give rise to new transnational forms of decision-making. In a similar way, we suggest, urban planning and policy elites across world port cities have come to take techno-scientific projections of future sea-level rise, storm surges, and other climate risks as a shared problem-space, working to establish forms of network governance that aim at the implementation of new transnational urban norms. In this process, existing urban spaces come to be redefined within new geographies of climate risk vulnerabil-
ities and techno-economic opportunities. As such, new forms of ‘green’ cooperation and competition emerge, manifesting its effects through a range of local climate policy interventions and experiments in the city.

In order to empirically substantiate the notion of world port cities as a cosmopolitan risk community, the article adopts a mixed-methods approach, meant to capture important local-global interconnections and transformations. First, analyzing key policy documents, we outline how a transnational ‘assemblage’ (Ong, 2011) of world port cities is being relationally co-constructed, within networks of urban policy elites, vis-à-vis new geographies of climate risks and opportunities. This geography is underpinned in part, we show, by concrete organizational forms of collaboration among world port cities. Second, we use digital research methods to document on-going climate policy initiatives in a sample of 16 world port cities in Europe and East Asia, focusing on key inter- and intra-regional patterns in cities’ ‘climate experiments’ (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). This analysis sheds light on broad cross-regional similarities in the timing, intensity, priorities and modes of government manifested in urban climate policy engagements. While it remains an indirect indicator, rather than a direct measure, we take this mapping of climate policy experiments as corroborating the existence and effects of a cosmopolitan risk community on individual city policies.

While a burgeoning literature seeks to address the effects of transnational municipal networks on local climate strategies (e.g. Gustavsson et al., 2009; Lee and van de Meene, 2012; Hakelberg, 2014), most studies focus either on aggregate statistical correlations in

---

2 Following Ong (2011: 4), we define assemblage as a nexus of situated and transnational ideas, institutions, actors, and practices that may be variously drawn together for addressing particular problems (in our case, the problems of urban climate change). We return to this notion in the next section.

3 The 16 cities selected for this study are, in East Asia: Hong Kong, Osaka, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Taipei, Tianjin and Yokohama; and in Europe, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Hamburg, London, Marseille, Oslo and Rotterdam. We account for methodology and selection criteria in section three of this article.

4 We elaborate on some shortcomings of this methodology later on, pointing also to fruitful areas of future research which might adopt a different and complementary set of methods.
global samples or on tracing effects on the ground via qualitative single-case studies (see also Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). Against this backdrop, the framing and data invoked in this article is meant to illustrate that what Ulrich Beck calls ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ (Beck and Sznaider, 2006) may be necessary to address how the global risks of climate change are currently rewriting urban political geographies. We propose world port cities as an adequate ‘cosmopolitan’ unit of research, reflecting the way shared histories, locations, and risk imaginations bring cities together across geographical distances. While, in principle, this research might extend world-wide, our focus is on cities from across Europe and East Asia, regions where climate change ranks first on the agendas of transnational city networks (Niederhafner, 2013). This approach represents, we believe, an important first step.

The article proceeds as follows: in the next section, we unfold the concept of cosmopolitan risk communities, relating this to existing research on how world cities engage in climate politics, before outlining the methodology shaping our study. We then turn to present main findings from our empirical mapping, focusing in turn on temporal, sectoral and inter-regional patterns in urban climate experiments across world port cities. In conclusion, we return to Beck’s (2010) ‘cosmopolitan moment’ of climate change, suggesting that what is emerging, across the transnational assemblage of port cities, amounts to a new ‘urban-cosmopolitan realism’ in a world of climate risk interdependencies.

**Cosmopolitan risk communities: the case of world port cities**

In a recent article, Ulrich Beck and co-authors (2013: 2) define cosmopolitan communities of climate risk as “new transnational constellation of social actors, arising from common experiences of mediated climatic threats, organized around pragmatic reasoning of causal relations
and responsibilities, and thereby potentially enabling collective action, cosmopolitical decision-making and international norm generation”. As such, the concept represents a continuation of Beck’s thinking through the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of global climate change from the vantage point of his ‘cosmopolitan’ world risk society theory (Beck, 2010). Climate change, in these terms, constitutes a socially transformative global risk, unbounded in space and time, manifested in collective anticipations of endangered futures, and intensifying the lived realities of cross-border interdependencies, tying everyday actions to horizons of global concern.

The notion of cosmopolitan risk communities raises difficult challenges for the social sciences as noted in Beck’s underlying quest for methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider, 2006; Beck and Grande, 2010). Overall, this term is meant to invite reflection on how to define alternative units of social-scientific research into present-day cross-border social transformations. While acknowledging ambiguities in this large-scale project, Beck and Sznaider (2006: 3) insist that “the main point for us lies in the fact that the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them, have dissolved and merged together in new forms that require conceptual and empirical analysis”. In other words, methodological cosmopolitanism invites attention to forms of ‘globalization from within’ (ibid.: 9; italics in original), in attempts to register the ‘really-existing relations of interdependence’ that tie people together, ‘from Rio to Tokyo’.

As these remarks make clear, urban formations have played important roles in Beck’s cosmopolitan work from the beginning. Citing Saskia Sassen on global cities, for instance, Beck (2002: 23) notes how the city, understood now as “a node in a grid of cross-

---

5 By ‘world risk society’ (and ‘second modernity’), in short, Beck refers to a new epochal human condition, corresponding to twenty-first century realities, which is shaped by incalculable global risks and manufactured uncertainties resulting from the triumph of first, industrial modernity. Space prevents us from entering into a full discussion of this theory; we return, however, to some of its implications in conclusion.
boundary processes”, by-pass the bounded and hierarchical scale of the national to become itself one of the ‘spaces of the global’. While sketchy, Beck’s approach resonates here with current urban theorizing on the notion of cities as ‘trans-local assemblages’ (Sassen, 2009; Ong, 2011). As Aihwa Ong suggests (2011: 4), for instance, rather than viewing the metropolis as a fixed locality, it should be seen as “a particular nexus of situated and transnational ideas, institutions, actors, and practices that may be variously drawn together for solving particular problems”. This is the sense in which, in this paper, we talk about world port cities as forming a new trans-local assemblage of climate risk engagements.

Recent research on the history, geography and politics of port cities world-wide has added further layers to this ongoing rethinking of urban territories. As Carola Hein (2011: 5) argues, “maritime and associated networks create dynamic, multi-scaled, and interconnected cityscapes”, manifested in places like the Docklands of London and the waterfront of Hong Kong. Such ‘port cityscapes’ and their respective urban ecologies, Hein suggests, have historically been shaped in consequential ways by various flows between port cities, such as those of goods, money, technology, and architectural styles and concepts. As such, the urban form of port cities has come to encapsulate the way these cities are connected through networks of shipping, trade, migration, elites, and so on. To paraphrase Paul Gilroy (1993), world port cities may be said to share the fact of having histories and urban forms centrally shaped by the coming and going of transcontinental ships in motion.6

Amidst ongoing post-industrial transformations since the 1980s, histories of interconnectedness amongst world (port) cities have increasingly been channeled, arguably, into new transcontinental circuits of ‘green’ technology, funding, expertise and ideas (Blok, 2012). Such circuits are orchestrated, centrally, through the emergence of transnational municipal

---

6 This image of transcontinental ships in motion is picked up also by Beck and Grande (2010: 428), as one version of how to rethink units of social scientific research beyond the ‘container’ of nation-states.
alliances and networks, aiming to share expertise and policy know-how on issues of environment, sustainability and climate change, often in the shape of ‘best practice’ models (Bulkeley, 2006). In particular, starting in 1993, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives’ (ICLEI) Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign has grown to encompass more than 1200 cities worldwide, mostly in North America, Europe and East Asia but with membership expanding also in the ‘global South’. Member cities pledge to assess carbon emissions, set reduction targets, and implement local policies and measures.

In recent years, then, a range of transnational urban networks such as ICLEI, CITYNET, Covenant of Mayors and the C40 Climate Leadership Group have come to shape and co-define how world cities engage with issues of climate mitigation and adaptation. In doing so, they also partake to the gradual reshaping of urban hierarchies and identities, by co-constructing particular cities as ‘advanced’ spaces of climate policy experimentation (Lee and van de Meene 2012). At the global scale, research suggests that cities joining transnational urban sustainability networks such as ICLEI tend disproportionally to be ‘world cities’: that is, cities with denser concentrations of globalized service firms in their economy and which absorb the majority of international air passenger flows, Internet activity, and high-skill foreign residents of their respective countries (cf. Lee, 2013). As such, new moral geographies of inclusion and exclusion become evident, as certain world cities emerge as hubs in new ‘green’ flows of technical and policy expertise on urban sustainability.

Such processes of trans-urban norm generation and globalized restructuring in the face of climate change are likely to be strongest, we suggest, in the case of world port cities. Previous research in the United States has shown that the vulnerabilities of coastal proximity

7 The concepts of ‘global’ and ‘world’ cities are widely debated in urban geography. In this paper, we follow Beaverstock, Taylor and others (e.g. 1999) in defining world cities as cities with high concentrations of multinational business service firms, e.g. in accounting, advertising, finance and insurance.
make cities more likely to commit to climate mitigation and adaptation policies (Zahran et al. 2008). In a similar vein, we argue, transnational urban elites nowadays co-construct coastal cityscapes as pertaining to a world-spanning assemblage of shared urban-climatic risks – and of shared opportunities to address these risks in ‘entrepreneurial’ ways. These constituencies include local governments and transnational networks such as ICLEI and C40; international governance organizations such as the OECD and the UN; multinational insurance companies; and transnational environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together, actors from these domains have shaped up in recent years – and especially since 2005 – into a transnational community, centered on sharing specific risk imaginaries depicting world port cities as spaces particularly vulnerable to climatic risks (cf. Becker et al. 2012).

One emblematic illustration of this transnational risk imaginary is the OECD report *Ranking Port Cities with High Exposure and Vulnerability to Climate Extremes* (Nicholls et al. 2008). Based on model projections and economic forecasts, authors estimate the size of exposed populations and the total value of infrastructures at risk from climate change-induced sea-level rise and more frequent storm surges, at present and in the future (2070), across 136 large-scale port cities worldwide. Overall, the paper singles out cities in East- (Tianjin, Hong Kong), South-East- (Dhaka, Ho Chi Minh City) and South Asia (Mumbai, Calcutta) as particularly vulnerable to intensified risks. More than the specific rankings, however, what is noteworthy in our context is the way the OECD delineates a specific urban geography of climate vulnerability, suggestive of world port cities as a shared (and ‘cosmopolitan’) risk community. This discursive framing has since been extended: in 2009, for instance, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), insurance company Allianz, and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research released a joint report showing the devastating effects on OECD’s 136 world port cities if major ‘tipping points’ were to occur in the Earth’s climate system (Lenton et al.,
2009). At the symbolic level, indeed, major transnational environmental NGOs, including Greenpeace and 350.org, have joined the WWF in singling out coastal cities, such as London and Shanghai, as particularly vulnerable to climate-induced sea-level rise.⁸

The urban settings of world port cities, however, are not only discursively invoked as spaces at risk from climate change; they are also relationally positioned, and actively positioning themselves, as spaces of opportunity in addressing these risks. Symbolic of this, in July 2008, representatives of port authorities in 55 large-scale port cities worldwide met in Rotterdam, resulting in a joint World Ports Climate Initiative (WPCI). Based on the recognition that, as hubs in global supply chains, ports “have many opportunities and the responsibility to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions”⁹, port authorities agreed to work together toward the increased use of non-fossil shipping fuels, improved energy efficiency and expanded shore-side supplies of cleaner or renewable energy. Such activities have since been implemented, for instance, in the ports of Amsterdam, Hamburg, Gothenburg and San Francisco.¹⁰

More generally, port and coastal cities figure prominently among the select world cities active in climate adaptation and mitigation efforts within transnational municipal networks. Indeed, existing research suggests that coastal cities world-wide appear to have higher propensities than non-coastal cities to participate in ICLEI and C40, likely reflecting greater overall city-level concern with the risks of climate change (Lee and van de Meene, 2012; Lee, 2013). Such shared concerns have also given rise to new local government initiatives focused specifically on coastal cities, including the C40 Connecting Delta Cities (C40 CDC) network headquartered in Rotterdam. By sharing knowledge and best practices on adaptation strategies

---

⁸ Greenpeace, for instance, list these and other cities on their web-site, as illustrative of the ‘impacts’ of climate change (http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/impacts/sea_level_rise/).
⁹ Quote from the so-called World Ports Climate Declaration agreed at the Rotterdam meeting as the foundation of WPCI: http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/data/docs/about-us/Declaration.pdf.
¹⁰ For the onshore power supply campaign of the WPCI, see: http://www.ops.wpci.nl/.
among cities such as New York, Copenhagen and Jakarta, the network hopes to simultaneously raise the global image of these cities as climatic ‘first-movers’. Within the C40 CDC, for instance, Rotterdam brands itself as “the perfect showcase for climate adaptation”, illustrative of how climate risks are widely cast as spur to new technical innovation and economic growth in the city (cf. Evans and Karvonen, 2013).

In sum, our research, as well as existing evidence, suggests that world port cities are being shaped into strategic spaces of climate politics, positioned within new transnational geographies of climate risk vulnerabilities and techno-economic opportunities. This is the sense in which we talk about an emerging cosmopolitan risk community, based on shared transnational risk imaginaries and pragmatic reasoning on past responsibility and future opportunities among a set a ‘mobile’ urban policy elites (Blok, 2012; Beck et al., 2013). Researching these dynamics of urban transformation, however, raises methodological challenges. Specifically, much research into urban climate responses rely on case study methods, generating rich data on a small set of cities, but failing to address wider transnational urban patterns (e.g. Gustavsson et al., 2009; Jeffers, 2013). Conversely, existing quantitative research (e.g. Lee, 2013; Hakelberg, 2014) provides a highly aggregate picture, with little sense of on-the-ground activities in the cities surveyed. In order to address this twin challenge, we conducted an empirical mapping of climate policy activities and initiatives in 16 world port cities, distributed across the regions of Europe and East Asia. This mapping, we believe, enables us to identify significant patterns of transnational urban transformation, while at the same time providing meaningful insights into on-going climate policy engagements in specific cities.

**Mapping urban climate policy experiments: methodology and data**
In methodological terms, the notion of world port cities as risk community suggests a new ‘cosmopolitan’ unit of social-scientific research, defined not by national borders but by an emerging globalized urban geography of climate risk interconnectedness (cf. Beck and Sznaider, 2006). However, research so far has largely failed to follow through on this promise of methodological reworking. This is true even in the case of the most ambitious attempt thus far to map out the global dynamics of urban climate politics. This work, carried out by researchers in the Durham Urban Transitions project, relied on a ‘quasi-random’ sample, mapping out a total of 626 climate policy ‘experiments’ in 100 large-scale cities worldwide (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). While setting a valuable baseline for follow-up studies (such as our own), this database in and of itself does little to address the question of how cities are being reshaped into trans-boundary risk communities.

In this article, we emulate Harriet Bulkeley and her Durham team by adopting their method of mapping urban climate engagements through the generation and analysis of descriptive statistical data on so-called climate policy experiments across multiple world port cities. In line with this (Bulkeley and Broto, 2013), we define ‘urban climate policy experiments’ as purposive and strategic interventions into the socio-technical infrastructures of these cities, with the explicit aim of generating new forms of learning, experience, or innovation for the purpose of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (mitigation) and/or vulnerabilities to climate impacts (adaptation). More clearly than ‘projects’, for instance, the notion of experiment serves here to recognize the often tentative nature of these policy interventions; the sense of testing or establishing best practice that frequently accompany them; and the ways in which they are used by local governments as a means of supporting discursive claims

---

11 The project web-site is available at: http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/projects/urbantransitions.
as ‘advanced’ spaces of climate politics.\textsuperscript{12} Across a range of literatures on cities and ‘low-carbon transition’ (e.g. Bulkeley et al., 2011; Evans and Karvonen, 2013), this notion of socio-technical experimentation has been shown to constitute a dominant modality of how urban governments seek to address the risks and opportunities of climate change.

Like Bulkeley and her team, we foster a comparative approach capable of capturing the extent and diversity of urban climate policy experiments across cities. However, unlike the existing global Durham database, we define and interrogate the particular geography of world port cities in the regions of Europe and East Asia, in order to mobilize data as indicative of policy patterns within this specific transnational risk community. In doing so, we thus seek to repurpose the ‘methodological globalism’ (Barnett and Bridge, 2013) embedded in the Durham study within Beck’s more cosmopolitan approach, attentive to researching the formation of particular new trans-boundary urban geographies in the face of shared climate risks. For this purpose, in what follows we survey a selection of 16 ‘core’ world port cities in Europe (eight) and East Asia (eight), chosen in part on the basis of our expectation – derived from Beck’s analytical framework – that policy engagement with the risks and opportunities of climate change is here particularly intense and subject to broad cross-regional similarities. As we will show, these expectations are largely corroborated by our study.

The case cities have been selected on the basis of the following criteria. First, our focus on port cities in Europe and East Asia marks a continuation of analytical work on the varieties of risk governance across these world regions (Beck and Grande, 2010), and also builds on existing empirical findings to the effect that, while global in scope, urban climate policy experimentation is particularly widespread in these two regions (Broto and Bulkeley, \textsuperscript{12} Experiment is thus used here in a sense clearly distinct from its scientific usage. Also, while sometimes wedded to a language of technical innovation, our use of the term is broader, encompassing also interventions – such as some urban adaptation efforts – aimed at less tangible forms of social learning.}
2013; Niederhafner, 2013). Second, within Europe and East Asia, cities were selected using a combination of factors and indicators, including: overall geographical spread and regional coverage; membership in at least one transnational climate network; the existence of official carbon reduction policy targets; and a ‘world city’ indicator to characterize levels of integration into international economic networks of global service provisions. On all of these indicators, the sample aims to achieve comparable variations within and between regions (see table 1 for details).

Table 1: Key descriptive characteristics of the 16 sample world port cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population¹ (in million)</th>
<th>World City Ranking²</th>
<th>Carbon Reduction Target³</th>
<th>Inter-City Network Membership⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>A+</td>
<td>25% (2005/2030)</td>
<td>3: C40, C40 CDC, WPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>8% (1990/2010)</td>
<td>2: ICLEI, WPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>10.04</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>25% (1990/2020)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, WPCI, CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>23.02</td>
<td>A+</td>
<td>40% (1990/2020) b</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, C40 CDC, CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>A+</td>
<td>11% (2020/2020) b</td>
<td>2: WPCI, CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>27% (2008/2020)</td>
<td>2: WPCI, CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>12.94</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>40% (1990/2020) b</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>25% (1990/2020)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, WPCI, CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>40% (1990/2025)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, WPCI, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>23% (2008/2020)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, WPCI, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>100% (1990/2020)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, C40 CDC, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>40% (1990/2020)</td>
<td>3: ICLEI, WPCI, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>A++</td>
<td>40% (1990/2020)</td>
<td>5: ICLEI, WPCI, C40, C40 CDC, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>20% (2008/2020)</td>
<td>1: WPCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>50% (1991/2030)</td>
<td>4: ICLEI, C40, WPCI, CoM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>B-</td>
<td>50% (1990/2025)</td>
<td>5: ICLEI, C40, C40 CDC, WPCI, CoM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Data from the UN Demographic Yearbook, City proper boundaries, for all cities except London (same source, urban geographic area). Taipei (demographic information on the city’s homepage). Tianjin and Shanghai (2010 official Chinese census data).

² Based on the Globalisation and World Cities Research Network classification.

³ Reduction targets taken from the cities’ official climate/energy plans, web presence, or a commitment registered at a carbon emissions registry. Format: target in percent, (baseline year, goal year).

⁴ Six Networks included. Data from each network’s official homepage. ICLEI = International Cooperation of Local Environmental Initiatives. C40 CDC = C40 Connecting Delta Cities. WPCI = World Port Climate Initiative. CN = Citynet. CoM = Covenant of Mayors.

⁵ National carbon intensity target, both cities are priority areas.

⁶ Business as usual estimate as baseline for comparison.

⁷ Yokohama is not on the official list, Tokyo is category A+.

13 In terms of the inter-city networks surveyed here, Tianjin is an exception. However, this city is active in a range of other international climate efforts, including city-to-city cooperation with Singapore.
Apart from membership, part of our sampling strategy has been to select cities demonstrating some level of active participation within, and visibility towards, the two main transnational climate alliances of ICLEI and C40. Concretely, this means that we have included cities only if they host at least one climate policy experiment recognized by this transnational peer community as an advanced ‘flagship’ initiative and a potential best practice model. We gauge such recognition in terms of cities’ experiments being featured on official organizational web-sites or documents from ICLEI and/or C40 (see appendix 1). Alongside serving to demarcate our sample of world port cities, this procedure also demonstrates one concrete empirical way in which (at least some) climate policy experiments in these cities are linked to the wider transnational risk community. This community, we might say, serves as a transnational arena for cities to gain local climate policy legitimacy, while simultaneously casting specific cities as ‘globally’ advanced spaces of climate policy engagement from which other cities worldwide may seek to learn (cf. Lee and van de Meene, 2012).

In more general terms, we have relied on three primacy approaches and sources in order to build up our new database of world port city climate policy experiments: a review of key literatures; the existing Durham Urban Transitions database; and extensive Internet searches (combining cities’ names with key-words such as ‘climate’, ‘mitigation’, ‘adaptation’, and so on). Since 11 of the 16 sample cities were already in the Durham database, this provided an important starting point as well as a resource for initial cross-validation of search and classification methods. From here, and in the case of the five ‘non-Durham’ cities, climate experiments were added to the database according to systematic searches through the websites of local, regional, and national governments; private and civil society organizations; as well as news reports for each city. The overall result is a database containing a total of 244
distinct entries, one for each urban climate policy experiment; on average, this number of experiments per city in our data is well above that of the Durham study.

The numerical distribution of projects across cities is shown in figure 1. What stands out, initially, are *intra-regional* rather than inter-regional differences. Specifically, one city in each region – Hong Kong in East Asia, London in Europe – stands out as hosting a markedly higher share of the regions’ overall number of climate policy experiments. This pattern is consistent also with the findings of the Durham group (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). The same is true when comparing overall distributions across our sample cities: here, whereas for each overlapping city our database contains more experiments than the Durham study, the *relative* distributions are very similar.\(^{14}\) Moreover, even when correcting for this search bias, comparing our 16 world port cities to the existing Durham database yields a clear picture: our sample stands out as hosting a significantly higher proportion of climate policy experiments than non-coastal world cities.\(^{15}\) This finding of ours serves to strengthen the idea that we are indeed dealing with a particularly intense urban-cosmopolitan risk community.

---

\(^{14}\) Comparing our city data to that of the Durham database in the 11 cases of overlap, we find a consistent pattern whereby our database contains in the range of 1.5 times more experiments than the latter. Most likely, this pattern reflects a combination of differences in search time and heuristics and an absolute growth in the number of climate experiments in the intermittent years (2011-2013) between the two studies.

\(^{15}\) It bears noting that such a tendency (coastal vs. non-coastal) is already visible in the Durham database, although this was never picked up for analysis. Also, compared to only minor differences in the Durham data, what we find when calibrating our data vis-à-vis the Durham database amount to statistically significant differences (at the 0.05 level, using the Kruskal-Wallis test for one-way analysis of variance).
Following the blueprint of the Durham study, each urban climate experiment has since been coded according to key socio-technical and policy characteristics, allowing for comparison within and across cities. First, to gauge the nature of climate policy priorities and commitments across cities, each climate intervention is coded according to its main sectoral focus, distinguishing between categories of urban infrastructure (energy, water, waste); built environment; urban form (new urban/suburban development); transport; carbon sequestration; and adaptation. Each of these broad categories covers a range of more specific activities: built environment, for instance, covers issues of retrofitting, use of materials, and various energy-efficient technologies (see Broto and Bulkeley, 2013 for details). Moreover, it should be noted that the first five categories contain interventions whose primary aim is mitigation, even when – as is sometimes the case – they may embed some secondary adaptation element. Experiments are coded as adaptation only when this is the main policy focus.

Second, to assess the role of local governments and other policy actors participating in urban climate interventions, we code each experiment in terms of which actor is ‘leading’ it,
i.e. is mainly responsible for its initiation, implementation and funding. As is the case with sectoral focus, assessing such leadership poses occasional challenges given that most experiments in our database are multi-stakeholder initiatives involving some form of recognized partnership between actors at different governance levels, either ‘vertical’ (e.g. between local, regional and national governments) or ‘horizontal’ (e.g. between governments, transnational networks, civil society organizations and private actors) (cf. Bulkeley and Broto, 2013). Still, in the vast majority of cases, information on who is mainly responsible for a specific climate policy experiment will be explicit from its web-sites and documents.

While these categories follow the Durham Urban Transitions project, we also added two additional layers of coding, reflecting hypotheses about the dynamics of world port cities as cosmopolitan risk community. First, we code each climate policy experiment in terms of its year of initiation, providing us with a finer-grained picture of the temporal dynamics in urban climate engagements than afforded by the Durham database.¹⁶ Second, and related, we code experiments in terms of the political orientation – on a left-right scale – of the incumbent city mayor at the time of the projects’ initiation. Previous studies in the US have shown that left-leaning local governments, i.e. with a majority Democratic vote, are more active in voluntary climate policy initiatives (Zahran et al., 2008). To explore the extent to which such patterns are visible also in transnational urban climate politics, we gather available information on how mayors label themselves vis-à-vis the local landscape of political parties. In other words, our coding is not meant to express any ‘universal’ definition, in that it remains relative to the way ‘left’ and ‘right’ political orientations are discursively deployed in each urban setting.

¹⁶ The Durham database only distinguishes projects in terms of a binary temporal coding (pre- and post 2005, the year of Kyoto Protocol ratification).
While we acknowledge clear limitations in this measure, we believe it is still warranted by the potential it generates for new comparative insights and follow-up studies.\(^{17}\)

In sum, we believe the data and methodology achieves an important repositioning of the question of urban climate politics, away from both *local-national* and *global* perspectives (the latter embedded in the Durham study), and towards a more *cosmopolitan* approach to urban-transnational risk communities. Even so, we need to acknowledge some built-in limitations in our approach. First, in terms of research practicalities, our data embeds a certain ‘Euro-centric’ bias, in terms of the languages used and not used to conduct our searches.\(^{18}\)

This should be kept in mind, even as we believe the *lingua franca* nature of English, and the fact that local governments promote their initiatives towards world-wide elite audiences, mitigates the issue to a large extent (an assumption confirmed for us in the case of Japanese cities). Second, and more fundamentally, the database we have constructed suffers from a certain reification of ‘the city’ as a bounded unit of research, a picture at odds with the priority given to trans-boundary relations and flows in debates on methodological cosmopolitanism. Adopting complementary methods, such as interviews or ethnography with transnational urban networks, might have helped in bringing ‘policy mobilities’ in the urban climate domain more sharply into focus (cf. McCann and Ward, 2011).

Still, when interpreted as *indirect* indicators of those wider transnational urban changes in the face of climate risks posited by our analytical framework, we believe the data presented here provide a valuable contribution and baseline for future follow-up studies. The rudimentary data we have presented so far already suggests that world port cities in Europe

\(^{17}\) Hence, we acknowledge that what the left-right divide *means*; how it is reflected in *actual* policies across different areas; and what exact *role* the mayor plays in local government decision-making, is all subject to wide variation across the cities we study. Such variation is not captured (nor indeed intended to be captured) by our measure and data. We hope our approach may spur further research on these important topics.

\(^{18}\) In practical terms, searches were conducted in the following languages: English, French, German, Danish, Norwegian, and Japanese. The main omissions and sources of potential bias is Chinese and Catalan/Spanish.
and East Asia are indeed emerging as an urban-cosmopolitan risk community, when judged from the point of view of the intensity of these cities’ climate policy engagements. In what follows, we document a range of broad cross-regional similarities in such engagements to further corroborate the notion that port cities world-wide are currently being repositioned within transnational assemblages of shared urban concern with climate change risks and related techno-economic opportunities. We return to these similarities in the conclusion, noting an emerging urban-cosmopolitan policy realism.

Climate politics in world port cities: temporal, sectoral, and inter-regional patterns

We turn now to present and discuss the main findings from our mapping of climate policy experiments across the 16 world port cities in Europe and East Asia. We will concentrate our analysis around the following three main questions: first, in terms of temporal dynamics, when does climate change become a visible political issue in these cities, and how (if at all) does this relate to shifting left-right orientations in local politics? Second, in terms of foci for climate-political engagement, what types of socio-technical interventions are these cities undertaking, and what role does local governments play in leading such multi-stakeholder urban climate policy processes? Third, looking across these two previous questions, what are broad patterns of inter- and intra-regional similarities and differences across European and East Asian world port cities, and how might we account for such patterns?

Temporal dynamics: the rise of urban climate politics?

To address the question of temporal dynamics in urban climate politics and the possible role of shifting local political contexts, figure 2 presents aggregate data for all 16 world port cities
in terms of the left-right political orientation of the incumbent mayor at the year of initiation of given climate experiments. In essence, this way of organizing the data – which treats the cities as pertaining to a single cosmopolitan risk community – is meant to highlight two important cross-regional tendencies. First, the figure suggests a distinct narrative of the waxing and waning of climate change as an urban policy issue, reflective of wider events in global climate (and economic) politics. Second, this narrative is seemingly intertwined with a political repositioning of climate change on urban agendas, from being predominantly driven by centre and centre-left local governments to becoming a more ‘consensual’ issue picked up across the political spectrum. We will expend on these two points in turn.

Figure 2: Mayors’ political orientation at year of initiation, all climate policy experiments

\[19\] The Chinese cities of Tianjin and Shanghai are coded as ‘centre’. Note that, while we use a category of ‘right’, no mayors were coded as such for the relevant time period/experiments (hence its absence in figure 2).
First, varying intensities of climate policy engagement across world port cities stand out clearly: following a slow start, climate change picks up as an urban policy issue around 2005-06; then culminates in 2009; followed by a sharp drop and subsequent slow reemergence. On the one hand, this narrative confirms existing findings to the effect that urban climate politics is a fairly recent phenomenon, picking up worldwide mostly after 2005 (Bulkeley and Bruto, 2013). At the same time, however, it adds an important qualification: urban climate policy is not a case of linearly growing intensities of engagement. Rather, such engagement seems to wax and wane in tandem with other processes and events in global climate politics, notably the massive build-up and subsequent decline of worldwide climate-political expectations and mass media attention leading up to the 2009 United Nations COP15 Summit in Copenhagen – combined, arguably, with adverse effects on public budgets from the onset of global financial crisis (see, e.g., Broadbent et al., 2013).

Second, in terms of left-right politics (and keeping measurement issues in mind), the overall pattern suggests a repositioning of climate policy engagements across world port cities from around 2005 onwards, in which climate experiments are increasingly initiated (also) in cities dominated by centre-right local governments. This tendency proves robust when checking for the aggregate effect of political shifts over time at the level of individual cities. In other words, whereas until around 2005 climate policy initiatives are mainly positioned as an urban priority in centre-to-left-dominated cities, our findings are consistent with a narrative of the gradual repositioning of climate interventions as a more ‘consensual’ urban policy arena, dominated by economic and technical rationales (e.g. Raco and Lin, 2012). This reading reinforces the point that the transnational assemblage of world port cities emerges in relation to a twin narrative of climatic risks and techno-economic opportunities.

---

20 Because our data generation only encompasses the first eight months of 2013, in this figure, we leave out data for projects initiated during this year (bringing the total down to 232). Projecting ahead, the trend of slightly increasing overall numbers of climate policy experiments looks to have continued in 2013.
Underlying these aggregate patterns, of course, one finds variation at the level of specific cities, in terms of local institutional processes shaping climate policy-making. The case of London, for instance, is well documented (e.g. Bulkeley, 2014: 162f): here, strategic climate policy ambitions picked up around 2004-05, under Labour party rule, as manifested by the city’s leading role in establishing the C40 network as well as a new London Climate Change Agency (LCCA) in 2005, chaired by the mayor and supported by the private sector and environmental NGOs. The resulting 2007 London Climate Change Action Plan set ambitious emission reduction goals, to be achieved in large part through new socio-technical investments in decentralized energy production and efficiency – commitments carried through, initially, to the new Conservative government following the May 2008 local elections.21 These changes in climate policy institutions and ambitions are reflected also in our data, where the number of new climate experiments hosted by London grows steadily over the years 2005 (1) to 2009 (8), thus contributing to and reinforcing aggregate trends.

In similar ways, our database allows a certain ‘profiling’ of climate policy trajectories in specific world port cities. Hence, for instance, the cities of Hong Kong (centre political orientation), Copenhagen (centre-left) and Barcelona (left) stand out as ‘early movers’ in initiating climate initiatives, thus accounting for a sizeable share of total experiments prior to the year 2000. Conversely, climate policy engagements in the cities of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Seoul – all with centre-right local governments – pick up strongly only in 2009, thereby accounting (together with London, then a centre-right city) for a significant share of the political repositioning of urban climate politics outlined above. While it is beyond our scope to explain these trajectories at the level of local institutional and discursive settings, on this point, we believe our data lends itself as a starting point for more situated comparative study.

21 The new conservative mayor, Boris Johnson, since came under heavy criticism for his apparent endorsement of climate skepticism and failure to live up to London’s carbon reduction targets.
Sectoral priorities and leadership in urban climate policy?

Turning now to our second question, in terms of socio-technical priorities and the role of local governments as leaders of multi-stakeholder climate policy initiatives, figures 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics for each city on the sectoral and leading actor distribution of climate experiments, respectively. Broadly speaking, this part of our data mostly corroborates certain main findings of the Durham Urban Transitions study (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013) – although, as noted, the absolute number of climate experiments for our sample of world port cities is well above their global average. However, in terms of relative distributions, this particular cosmopolitan community of port cities does not seem to stand out sharply from the urban climate policy priorities and modalities of other world cities.

Figure 3: Sectoral distribution of climate policy experiments per city
Across the 16 world port cities, the pattern is strikingly similar: urban climate policy experiments concentrate in sectors of the built environment and the urban infrastructures of energy, water and waste. Digging deeper into the data reveals that experiments in these categories most often focus on technical rather than social forms of innovation, and often promote energy efficiency as a main target. Experiments focused on urban form are much less frequent, likely owing to the additional challenges associated with addressing carbon mitigation via integrated planning measures (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013: 97). Transport interventions are present in some but not all of the cities, whereas carbon sequestration projects are still comparatively rare. Most notably, perhaps, given the way port cities are constructed as at-risk spaces from climate impacts, specific adaptation interventions still constitute only a small proportion of cities’ climate efforts – although more visibly so in places like Rotterdam, Singapore, Copenhagen, Taipei and London, reflective of local policy priorities.

Figure 4: Leading actor composition of climate policy experiments per city
In terms of modes of urban climate governance, figure 4 confirms evidence from both case-study research (e.g. Gustavsson et al., 2009) and the Durham study (Bulkeley and Broto, 2013), to the effect that local governments play a prominent role in leading a majority of climate policy experiments in these world port cities. This is true even as a majority of experiments, as noted, are constituted around forms of partnership, predominantly with private actors but occasionally also with international organizations (including the EU), national and regional governments, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs). As argued in literatures on urban governance (e.g. Bulkeley and Kern, 2006), such partnerships enable forms of cross-sectoral consensus-building, while also redistributing authority through an increasing importance of non-governmental and transnational actors in urban policy-making. Our data confirms such tendencies, in that voluntary, self-regulatory and incentive-driven initiatives are frequent across the 16 cities, with legal regulation used more sparingly.
Whereas previous research points to the predominance, relative to other regions, of large private actors in Asian cities’ climate experiments (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013: 99), on this point, our findings suggest more intra- than inter-regional difference. Specifically, the share of privately led climate initiatives is higher in the cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Amsterdam and, to some extent, Hamburg – a pattern hinting that modes of urban climate governance are shaped by more local and contingent institutional arrangements rather than region-wide (or global) political-economic forces. In Amsterdam, for instance, private partners are centrally involved in various ‘smart city’ initiatives, aiming to test and implement a range of socio-technical innovations, including a new electric car charging system and various energy reduction measures. On this issue as well, while beyond the scope of our present study, the data lends itself to more in-depth follow-up research into the specific histories and political-economic settings shaping variations in modes of urban climate governance.

**Inter-regional comparison: regional low-carbon models?**

Our third and last question pertains to the overall pattern of inter-regional similarities and differences manifest in our sample of world port cities, when treated as a comparison between the two regions of East Asia and Europe. As already noted a few times, what stands out so far – in terms of both temporal, sectoral and policy leadership dimensions of urban climate experiments – are intra- rather than inter-regional variations as well as broad cross-regional similarities. This is a significant finding in that it corroborates the interpretation of these world port cities as pertaining to an emerging urban-cosmopolitan risk community, with policy responses shaped by shared circulations of transnational risk imaginaries and ‘best practice’ models of techno-economic opportunity in addressing climate risks (Blok, 2012). Notably, these cross-regional governance similarities seemingly hold true even as urban forms, and
resulting sustainability challenges, arguably vary in systematic ways among large-scale East Asian and European cities (e.g. Sorensen, Marcotullio and Grant, 2004).

Adding more nuance to this picture, previous research does suggest a characteristic form of urban climate policy experimentation in Asia, where interventions led by private actors in urban energy and other infrastructures predominate relative to other regions (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013: 101). To assess the extent of such tendencies in our sample, figure 5 presents regionally aggregated data on the sectoral composition of climate policy experiments in East Asian and European world port cities. Overall, the figure lends some support to the above finding, in that urban infrastructure interventions are more prevalent in East Asian cities, whereas experiments in European cities more frequently target the built environment. However, these tendencies are still fairly subdued, manifesting themselves against a backdrop of overall similarities in dominant socio-technical formats or models (cf. Blok, 2012).

Figure 5: Sectoral composition of climate experiments in Asian and European port cities
Space prevents us from exploring these socio-technical interventions in any depth, including the way they are shaped by local struggles over the meaning of urban sustainability, even as models and expertise circulate globally via trans-urban networks (Bulkeley, 2006). One example, with which we opened this article, pertains directly to the port city histories of the cosmopolitan risk community under study here, i.e. the rise of ‘smart’ eco-urbanism models being showcased as part of large-scale harbor redevelopments, such as Nordhavnen in Copenhagen and Minato Mirai 2050 in Yokohama. This phenomenon arguably points to the wider internationalization of self-styled ‘eco-city’ policies and practices, particularly since the mid-2000s (Joss et al., 2013). Looking more closely into such processes in East Asia, one finds regional specificities: the on-going Tianjin Eco-city mega-project, for instance, is developed jointly with Singapore planners and investors, testifying to the power and attraction of the ‘Singapore model’ of high-tech, business-friendly urban development in China (Pow, 2014). While we leave the comparative exploration of such regional dynamics for future work, what our data suggests, in short, are certain broadly shared cross-regional tendencies, in terms of how local governments mobilize climate policy experiments in order to reposition their cities as ‘advanced’ spaces of urban change in a world of global risks and opportunities.

Conclusion: the new cosmopolitan realism of world port cities?

In this article, we attempt to show how and to what effects major world port cities in Europe and East Asia are currently being reshaped into an urban-cosmopolitan community of climate risks and opportunities (Beck et al., 2013). This reshaping of urban politics, we suggest, involve new transnational assemblages of urban elite actors, discourses and practices (Sassen,
2009; Ong, 2011), organized in particular via transnational local government alliances such as ICLEI and C40. Some of this emerging cross-border geography, we emphasize, pertains specifically to coastal cities as spaces joining together in the face of shared anticipations of global climate risks. Hence, world port cities are increasingly being cast as strategic spaces of climate politics that, whilst vulnerable to the intensified risks of sea-level rise, storm surges and so on, are capable of joint policy action towards climate mitigation and adaptation. To individual world port cities, conversely, we suggest that this provides new transnational arenas for gaining climate policy legitimacy and green-tech branding opportunities.

In terms of methods, we invoke Ulrich Beck’s central notion of methodological cosmopolitanism in order to move beyond both localized case-studies and the global perspective manifest in existing survey approaches (Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). Specifically, and in order to capture important local-global interconnections and transformations, we conceptualize world port cities in Europe and East Asia as a new ‘cosmopolitan’ unit of research, tied together by shared histories of maritime and associated flows and networks (Hein, 2011). By mapping climate policy experiments (Bulkeley and Broto, 2013) across 16 ‘core’ European and East Asian world port cities, we demonstrated how there is both intra-regional variation and important cross-regional similarities in the timing, intensities, priorities and modes of governance invoked in these cities’ climate policy engagements. Combined with the finding that our world port cities, on average, host a significantly higher number of climate policy experiments than non-coastal world cities, we take these cross-regional similarities as corroborating the notion of world port cities as an emerging cosmopolitan risk community.

We acknowledge the need for follow-up in-depth ethnographic studies into the specific institutional arrangements and policy interventions at work on the urban ground, including in terms of how post-industrial port cityscapes are being reshaped into models of eco-
urbanism in several cities. Despite this limitation, we believe our data and approach constitutes an important intervention in ongoing debates on urban climate politics. Whereas much debate so far remains caught in somewhat dichotomous political terms – contrasting, for instance, the ‘neo-liberal growth mentality’ hegemonic among urban policy-makers to the pursuit of ‘greater equality or sustainability’ in climate adaptation (Jeffers, 2013; cf. also Hodson and Marvin, 2010) – our Beck-inspired approach is meant instead to highlight how a new policy terrain of ‘urban-cosmopolitan realism’ seems to be emerging across world port cities in Europe and East Asia (cf. Beck and Levy, 2013). This urban-cosmopolitan realism, we argue, is driven by a simultaneous sense of the risks and opportunities arising from the need to find collective solutions to the new global interdependencies of climate change. As such, it transcends simple dichotomies of strategic self-interest versus moral concern, cooperation versus competition, or local versus global, and instead opens up a new (contested) terrain in which multiple policy actors negotiate emerging norms of ‘responsible’ urban development.

More profoundly, to take seriously Ulrich Beck’s notion of cosmopolitization in the face of global risks requires an acknowledgment that climate change substantially redistributes the very territory of urban politics, in part through the emergence of cosmopolitan risk communities. On the one hand, this entails a partial dislocation of urban authority, as transnational assemblages of urban policy elites circulate new forms of authoritative climate risk knowledge that impinges on specific city spaces (cf. McCann and Ward, 2010). On the other hand, the encounter with global risks also potentially serves to reopen new civic spaces of politicization at the city level, where it entails posing critical questions of (un)accountability and (in)justice vis-à-vis new transnational risk interdependencies (cf. Sassen, 2009). In this context, our data on climate policy experiments admittedly only establishes a certain baseline against which these open-ended questions should be further explored. What we have demon-
On this note, and in conclusion, we hope that our Beck-inspired methodology may help bring into research and policy focus the new interconnected spaces opening up in European and East Asian world port cities, spurring further attempts to renegotiate local and global urban futures in the face of climate change. Subsequent research should aim to substantiate how new forms of urban-cosmopolitan policy realism manifest itself on the ground in specific cities, and the extent to which it proves effective in opening up genuinely alternative low-carbon trajectories. One key question in this respect, we believe, is the extent to which local and transnational climate policy elites prove capable and willing to engage new ‘cosmopolitan’ urban publics in forms of experimentation and responsibility that go beyond the currently dominant focus on techno-economic innovation, to include a stronger emphasis on forms for social learning across cities. While urban climate politics will continue to be a space of open-ended contention, the world port cities of Europe, East Asia and beyond, we argue, are promising spaces to search for such emerging trans-boundary solidarities.

Appendix 1: ‘Flagship’ climate policy experiments recognized by ICLEI/C40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>‘Flagship’ experiment</th>
<th>Climate alliance link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>URL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>Taipei Clean Air (combining several projects)</td>
<td><a href="http://cityclimateresponsibleawards.com/2014-project-taipe-clean-air/">http://cityclimateresponsibleawards.com/2014-project-taipe-clean-air/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>Yokohama smart city project</td>
<td><a href="http://cityclimateresponsibleawards.com/2014-project-yokohama-smart-city/">http://cityclimateresponsibleawards.com/2014-project-yokohama-smart-city/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Bike Friendly Policies</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iclei-europe.org/members/member-in-the-spotlight/archive/amsterdam/">http://www.iclei-europe.org/members/member-in-the-spotlight/archive/amsterdam/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>OPS, WPCI</td>
<td><a href="http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/onshore-power-supply/ops-installed/ports-using-ops.html">http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/onshore-power-supply/ops-installed/ports-using-ops.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>Rotterdam Climate Proof</td>
<td><a href="http://c40.org/case_studies/climate-proof-adaptation-strategy-2010">http://c40.org/case_studies/climate-proof-adaptation-strategy-2010</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Beck U, 2010, “Climate for change, or how to create a green modernity?” Theory, Culture & Society 27(2-3) 254-266

Beck U, Sznaider N, 2006, “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda” The British Journal of Sociology 57(1) 1-23


This paper is forthcoming in *Environment & Planning C*; please do not cite this version


Bulkeley H, 2013 *Cities and Climate Change* (Routledge, London)


City of Copenhagen, 2011, “Copenhagen Climate Adaptation Plan”, www.kk.dk/klima

177
Evans J, Karvonen A, 2013, “‘Give me a laboratory and I will lower your carbon footprint!’ – urban laboratories and the governance of low-carbon futures” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 38(2) 413-430


Hakelberg L, 2014, “Governance by Diffusion: Transnational Municipal Networks and the Spread of Local Climate Strategies in Europe” *Global Environmental Politics* 14(1) 107-129

Hein C (Ed), 2011 *Port Cities: Dynamic landscapes and global networks* (Routledge, London)

Hodson M, Marvin S, 2010, “Urbanism in the anthropocene: Ecological urbanism or premium ecological enclaves?” *City* 14(3) 298-313


Lee T, 2013, “Global Cities and Transnational Climate Change Network” *Global Environmental Politics* 13(1) 108-127
[This paper is forthcoming in *Environment & Planning C*; please do not cite this version]


McCann E, Ward K (Eds), 2011 *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis)


Sassen S, 2009, “Cities are at the center of our environmental future” *Sapiens* 2(3), http://sapiens.revues.org/948

Sorensen A, Marcotullio P J, Grant J (Eds), 2004 Towards Sustainable Cities: East Asian, North American and European Perspectives on Managing Urban Regions (Ashgate, Aldershot)

Session 4.

Participatory Risk Governance and its Possible Indicators

1. Sang-Jin Han (Seoul National University, Korea)
   “Introductory Note: What do we mean by Participatory Risk Governance?”

2. Dukjin Chang (Seoul National University, Korea)
   “Disaster Mapping and SNS”

3. Sabine Selchow (London School of Economics and Political Science, England)
   Participatory Risk Governance in a Cosmopolitized World: What is it and how might it look?

4. Zheng Lu (Tsinghua University, China)
   “From the Chinese Experience of Social Governance”

5. Sue-Bock Moon (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)
   “Crowdsourcing as a Key Enabling Technology to Participatory Governance: Risks and Possibilities”
Urban Risk and Policy Agenda for Safe City: The Case of Metropolitan Seoul

Sang-Young Shin
(The Seoul Institute, Korea)
Urban Risk and Policy Agenda for Safe City
The Case of Metropolitan Seoul

2015. 3. 16.

Sang-Young Shin
(Research Fellow, The Seoul Institute)

Introduction

Safety is a basic condition for quality of civic life and urban sustainability
Mature urban society in 21st century means higher urban risk and vulnerability

This presentation looks over urban risk issues and suggests several policy agenda for urban safety and resiliency of metropolitan Seoul

Contents
1. Urban Risk: Disaster, Daily-life Accidents, and Crime
2. Demographic Change and Urban Environments
3. Citizens' Perception about Urban Risk
4. Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency
Urban Risk

Natural Disaster

- Repetitive, intensified urban flooding and landslides resulting from urban development and extreme weather events due to climate change

[Graph showing property damage, dead & missing, and refugee numbers over time]

Repellive Flood Damage Areas

[Image of a flooded area with roads submerged]

[Image of a landslide with trees and houses affected]

184
1 Urban Risk

Manmade Disaster & Daily-life Accidents

- Human casualties are most caused by road traffic accidents
- Property damages are caused most by urban fire

Annual Occurrence vs. Human Damage

Annual Occurrence vs. Property Damage

- Urban Fire
- Explosion
- Collapse
- Others

185

- Seongsu Bridge Collapse (Oct. 1994) - 49 Casualties (32 Dead)
- Sampoong Department Store Collapse (Jun. 1995) - 502 dead, 937 injured, 6 missing
1. Urban Risk

- Crime
  - Violent crime (homicide, robbery, assault, sexual assault, burglary) continue to be at a high level
  - Sexual crime increases rapidly

![Crime Graph]

2. Demographic Change and Urban Environments

- Demographic Change
  - Demand for safety and welfare increases as vulnerable populations increase

![Demographic Change Chart]
2. Demographic Change and Urban Environments

- **Built Environments**
  - Buildings and facilities get older, denser, bigger, higher, and deeper
  - Urban spaces get more vulnerable to large-scale multi-hazards

---

**Age Distribution of Buildings (2013)**

- Below 10 yrs.: 12.4%
- 10~20 yrs.: 18.5%
- 20~30 yrs.: 37.3%
- 30 yrs. and over: 34.7%

(Sources: 

---

**Age Distribution of Road Facilities (2012)**

- 0~5 yrs.: 21.3%
- 6~10 yrs.: 23.3%
- 11~15 yrs.: 20.9%
- 16 yrs. and over: 35.4%

(Sources: 

---
Demographic Change and Urban Environments

High-rise Buildings (above 31 stories)

Depth Distribution of Underground Facilities

Demographic Change and Urban Environments

Low Land Development and Impervious Surfaces

- Low urbanized areas vulnerable to flooding are 42.3% of built-up areas
- Impervious surfaces increase stormwater runoff
  - Average impervious ratio: 47.7% (2010)

Low Land Development (Below H.W.L.)

Impervious Ratio
2 Demographic Change and Urban Environments

- **Climate Change**
  - Natural disaster risk increases as temperature, precipitation, and rainfall intensity increase

![Annual Average Temperature and Precipitation Graphs](image)

3 Citizens' Perception about Urban Risk

- **Overall Perception**
  - Overall score on urban safety is 49.1/100 points
  - More dangerous than in the past
  - Optimistic for the future

![Questionnaire Survey Results](image)
3 Citizens’ Perception about Urban Risk

- **Perception by Respondent Type**
  - Gender: Female 53.1%, Male 45.4%
  - Age Group: 19-29 yrs. 30%, 30-39 yrs. 35%, 40-49 yrs. 40%, 50-59 yrs. 55%, 60 yrs. and over 60%
  - Income Group (Monthly Income): Below 1 million won 60%, 1~2 million won 55%, 2~3 million won 50%, 3~4 million won 45%, 4~5 million won 40%, 5~6 million won 35%, 6 million won and over 30%
  - Area: North East 30%, North West 35%, Central 40%, South East 45%, South 50%
  - Residential Type: Detached/single and multiple family 30%, Non-residential and Others 55%

- **Importance and Safety Level by Urban Risk Type**
  - Deed urgent improvements of crime prevention and manmade disaster mitigation as citizens perceive the safety levels are lowest while the importance levels are highest.
3 Citizens’ Perception about Urban Risk

- **Evaluation on Government and Citizen**
  - Not satisfied with safety management of administrative agencies
  - Perceive citizens’ safety consciousness is very low

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Activities of Safety Management</th>
<th>Citizens’ Safety Consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: %)

4 Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- **Framework**

Risk Management

- **Risk**
  - Hazard
    - Natural Disaster
    - Manmade Disaster
    - Daily-life Accidents
    - Crime
  - Vulnerability
    - People
    - Facilities
    - Areas

- **Measures**
  - Prevention
  - Preparedness
  - Response
  - Recovery
  - Software
  - Hardware

- **Institutions & Operations**
  - Law
  - Plan & Implementation
  - Cooperation & Participation
  - Technologies
4 Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- Risk Assessment
  - Develop urban risk monitoring and assessment systems
    - Organize DB and statistics
    - Develop risk indicators
    - Regular monitoring
    - Support to policy development and priority
    - Publish to citizens

- Hazard
  - Strengthen the role of local government to prevent crime
    - CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design)
    - Victim protection
Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- Manage the safety of old and complex built environments
  - Maintain old urban infrastructure facilities
  - Manage the safety of big complex buildings
  - Special management of fire-vulnerable houses and buildings
  - Seismic-resistant design
  - Participation of private experts to facility inspections
  - Safety management by utilizing sense and network systems

- Mitigate natural disaster and adapt to climate change
  - Comprehensive and customized measures to flood prone areas and landslide prone areas
  - Integrated drainage management systems at the catchment scale
  - Low impact and distributed stormwater management systems
  - Flood insurance program, hazard maps, etc.
Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- Reduce damage of human life by traffic accidents
  - Improve black spots of traffic accidents
  - Pedestrian oriented design, etc.

- Extend the scope of urban safety
  - Healthy City, Wellbeing City, etc.

Kernel Density of Traffic Accidents (Vehicle to Human), 2013

Extended Scope of Urban Safety

- Short-term, Acute
  - Protection of People, Property, and Urban Functions

- Long-term, Chronic
  - Protection of People

Vulnerability

- Need a special consideration of the safety for vulnerable social groups and areas
  - Urban safety is to say welfare
  - Secure the ‘right to safety’ (minimum level, adequate level)

Two Types of ‘Right to Safety’

- Secure a ‘minimum level’ of safety that are universally acceptable to every people or area
- Secure a ‘adequate level’ of safety in the long term
Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- Strengthen place-based approaches
  - Spatial congeniality among different hazards (e.g., multi-family detached residential areas with higher levels of risk in crime, traffic accidents, natural disaster, and daily-life accidents)
  - Importance of urban planning and community building (e.g., Urban Renaissance)

Approach by Hazard or Government Section

Measures

- Balanced approach through prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
- Balanced approach between hardware and software
- Green safety by strengthening environment-friendly measures
- Smart safety by utilizing information and communication technologies (anytime, anywhere)
4 Policy Agenda for Urban Safety and Resiliency

- Multi-purposed approaches
  - Link safety measures with other policy goals (e.g., welfare, job creation)
  - Combine safety facilities with uses of ordinary days (e.g., stormwater drainage with roadway, park with stormwater detention)

### Institutions & Operations

- Need a long-range comprehensive plan for urban safety
  - The Seoul Master Plan for Safety Management recently made, 2014 is still disaster-centered and administrative agency-centered
- Strengthen coordination capability and expertise of safety management
  - Create a duty of Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) for expertise
  - Increase safety related budget
  - Performance management systems
- Utilize ICTs for information provision, education, and training
- Need active participation and cooperation of diverse stakeholders
  - Mismatch between the place of accident and the agent of responsibility
  - Multi-dimensional characters of safety management (individual, organization, community, nation, and global)
  - Safety management is not only the responsibility of administrative agencies
## Conclusion

- Until recently, urban safety issues were at a low policy priority
  - Development cost saving in the short run but more public costs in the long term
- Securing urban safety is a good way of concerning the social disadvantaged and future generations
- Investment in urban safety looks high cost burden in the short run but is public goods which benefits are accrued in the long term

---

**Thanks.**
Introductory Note:
What do we mean by Participatory Risk Governance?

Sang-Jin Han
(Seoul National University, Korea)
What do we mean by Participatory Risk Governance?

March 16, 2015

Han Sang-Jin
Professor Emeritus, SNU
Visiting Professor, PKU

Key Questions

- Given the varieties and complexities involved in the public perception of risks and their likelihood in East Asia (among citizens of Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo), how should we select those risks that deserve public attention for participatory risk governance?
  - -- By state authority?
  - -- By experts and specialists?
  - -- By citizens?
### Response from Seoul Citizens

**Danger Most Serious**
- Nuclear Waste, Radiation: Yet likelihood is low
- Environmental Pollution: Likelihood is also high
- Economic Crisis: Likelihood is also high

**Danger & Likelihood Equally High**
- Rich & Poor Disparity
- Corruption
- Violent Crime
- Cyber-crimes
- Unemployment
- Adult Decease
- Industrial Accident
- Traffic Accident

### Response from Beijing Citizens

**Danger Most Serious**
- Earthquake: Yet likelihood is low
- Nuclear Waste and Radiation: Yet likelihood is low
- Foodstuffs Contamination: Likelihood is also high
- Environmental Pollution: Likelihood is also high

**Danger & Likelihood Equally High**
- Rich and Poor Disparity
- Adult Disease
- Traffic Accidents
- Cyber-crimes
- Unemployment
- Industrial Accidents
**Magnitude of Danger Compared**

- **Seoul: Magnitude of danger**
- **Beijing: Magnitude of danger**

**Likelihood of Occurrence Compared**

- **Seoul: likelihood of occurrence**
- **Beijing: likelihood of occurrence**
Discourse on Governance in China

Xu Xiangling, Beida

Chen Guangjin, CASS

Social Transformation and State Governance: Political Reform and Policy Choice in China

Discourse on “State Governance” (國家治理) at Beijing Forum on Nov. 8

“A number of transformational crises are threatening China’s economy, society, and political stability, and they are also huge challenges to the state governability of China.”
“The Innovation of Social Governance in the Process of Social Transformation of Contemporary China”

Discourse on Social Governance (社會治理) at East Asian Sociology Meeting, Oct. 25, 2014

“The main object of the innovation of social governance is to establish a kind of modern system of social governance based on the public participation and so-called deliberative democracy in order to realize the self-regulations of the society in China.”

Why social governance in China?

According to Chen Guangjin (Director of Institute of Sociology at Chinese Academy of Social Science)

- the social stratifications and the emerging of new social classes;
- The rising of the middleclass
- The huge size of floating population
- The rising inequality of income
- The diversification of social values and interest pursuits from different social classes and/or interest groups
- All of these changes means that the traditional pattern of social management based on the centralization of power and planning economic system is becoming outdated year by year
Decision by CCCPC

to reform the pattern of social governance from the traditional one focused on the social control and regulation which are based on the centralization of power by the government to a new one which will be based on the decentralization to the society and general participation of the public.

Goal of State Governance

— The future political reform would be the one focusing on advancing state governability but base on the premise that fundamental political system remains unchangeable. It is only this gradual reform that could promote both the democratization of political systems and the responsiveness of government and officials, as well as overcome the challenges of political and government systems due to transformational crisis. In brief, gradual guidelines would continue to affect the choice of political system reform in China.
Goal of Social Governance

“The main object of the innovation of social governance is to establish a kind of modern system of social governance based on the public participation and so-called deliberative democracy in order to realize the self-regulations of the society in China.
Amnesty International

Policing the Candlelight Protests in South Korea

Executive Summary AI Index: ASA 25/008/2008

The candlelight protests in central Seoul against the resumption of US beef imports due to fears of BSE or ‘mad cow disease’ began on 2 May 2008 and continued almost daily for more than two months. Tens of thousands of people from all walks of life attended the demonstrations, with at least 100,000 on 10 June, the 21st anniversary of South Korea’s pro-democracy movement.

---

Research Paths for Social Governance of Risks

[Diagram showing various research paths and stakeholders involved in risk management.]
Testing Procedures of Social Governance Model

Participatory Risk Governance

- Two Dimensions of Participation
  - Crowdsourcing participation: Big Data
    “How to collect big data available in the society and construct a model of participatory risk governance?
  - Deliberative participation: Reflexive Citizens
    “How to produce big data along the process of active human involvement and use it for public deliberation when we construct participatory risk governance?
Thank You
Disaster Mapping and SNS

Dukjin Chang
(Seoul National University, Korea)
Detecting Disasters on Twitter: The Case of Busan

Dukjin Chang* and Ghi-Hoon Ghim**
* Professor, Department of Sociology, Seoul National University
** CEO, Cyram Inc.
March 16, 2015

1. Disaster-related tweets by districts

The most frequently mentioned districts in disaster-related tweets are "Sasang-gu" and "Buk-gu." "Dong-gu," "Yonje-gu," and "Yongdo-gu" are hardly mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>순위</th>
<th>지역명</th>
<th>트윗수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>28,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>북구</td>
<td>25,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>기장군</td>
<td>19,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>해운대구</td>
<td>16,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>수영구</td>
<td>5,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>동래구</td>
<td>4,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>4,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>남구</td>
<td>3,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>2,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>1,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>부산진구</td>
<td>1,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>서구</td>
<td>1,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>중구</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>영도구</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>연제구</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Safety accident–related tweets by districts

The most frequently mentioned districts in safety accident–related tweets are "Sasang-gu" and "Buk-gu." "Dong-gu," "Yonje-gu," and "So-gu" are hardly mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>순위</th>
<th>지역명</th>
<th>트윗 수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>12,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>북구</td>
<td>11,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>해운대구</td>
<td>7,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>남구</td>
<td>2,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>수영구</td>
<td>2,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>부산진구</td>
<td>1,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>기장군</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>동래구</td>
<td>1,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>금산구</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>효도구</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>연제구</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Crime–related tweets by districts

The most frequently mentioned districts in crime–related tweets are "Haewoondae-gu" and "Suyong-gu." "Jung-gu," "Gangseo-gu," and "Yongdo-gu" are hardly mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>순위</th>
<th>지역명</th>
<th>트윗 수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>해운대구</td>
<td>5,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>수영구</td>
<td>3,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>2,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>남구</td>
<td>2,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>동래구</td>
<td>1,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>기장군</td>
<td>1,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>부산진구</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>금산구</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>연제구</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>영도구</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>금산구</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Natural disaster–related tweets by districts

The most frequently mentioned districts in natural disaster–related tweets are "Gijang-gun" and "Buk-gu." "Yonje-gu," "Dong-gu," and "Busanjung-gu" are hardly mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>순위</th>
<th>지역명</th>
<th>트윗 수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>기장군</td>
<td>18,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>북구</td>
<td>13,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>12,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>해운대구</td>
<td>7,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>수영구</td>
<td>10,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>광산구</td>
<td>10,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>서구</td>
<td>5,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>중구</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>남구</td>
<td>4,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>3,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>동래구</td>
<td>3,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>영도구</td>
<td>1,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>부산진구</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>연제구</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Traffic accident–related tweets by districts

The most frequently mentioned districts in traffic accident–related tweets are "Haewoondae-gu" and "Saha-gu." "Busanjin-gu," "Gijang-gun," and "Jung-gu" are hardly mentioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>순위</th>
<th>지역명</th>
<th>트윗 수</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>해운대구</td>
<td>5,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>사하구</td>
<td>3,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>사상구</td>
<td>3,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>동래구</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>수영구</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>북구</td>
<td>1,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>중구</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>남구</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>연제구</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>영도구</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>금정구</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>동구</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>중구</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>기장군</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>부산진구</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participatory Risk Governance in a Cosmopolitized World: What is it and how might it look?

Sabine Selchow
(London School of Economics and Politics Science, England)
Participatory Risk Governance in a Cosmopolitized World: What is it and how might it look?

Sabine Selchow
London School of Economics & Ludwig-Maximillians-University Munich

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to open a discussion about how risk governance could look, and what it should look like, in a cosmopolitized world. With that, the paper starts on the premise that we are living in a cosmopolitized world.

Following Ulrich Beck, the cosmopolitized world is a world shaped by the process of ‘cosmopolitization’ and by what he calls ‘global risks’. With ‘cosmopolitization’, Beck refers to a process that is the product of the ‘unwanted [in the sense of unintended] and unobserved side effect of actions that are not intended as ‘cosmopolitan’ in the normative sense’. It is ‘an unforeseen social effect of actions directed to other ends performed by human beings operating within a network of global interdependence risks’, as he puts it. As such, it is a reflexive process which brings the ‘global other’ into the midst of other ‘global others’.

At the same time, and closely enmeshed with it, the cosmopolitized world is shaped by what Beck calls ‘global risk’. With ‘global risk’, he refers to a particular kind of uncertainty, namely the potential consequences of ‘industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’. There are two distinct aspects to the potential consequences of ‘industrial, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility’, i.e. ‘global risks’. First, they constitute a specific kind of uncertainty that cannot be simply ‘tamed’ through a ‘traditional’ modern imagination, i.e. through the logic of ‘risk’ as we know it. Second, they need to be seen as the ‘fruits’ of the process of modernization – not its dark side-effects.

If one takes Beck’s diagnosis seriously, it is apparent that it holds profound implications for how to think about the world and how to do politics in it. In the imagination of the ‘cosmopolitized’ world, key premises that underlie the conventional imagination of the world, namely the equation of society with national society, and the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, are deconstructed and dismantled. In fact, they are actually not only deconstructed and dismantled but replaced by a different logic: the logic of ‘cosmopolitisation’. This implies the need for a shift, in the social sciences, from methodological nationalism towards methodological cosmopolitanism, and from a national outlook to a cosmopolitan outlook regarding other social actors, again, where the adjective ‘cosmopolitan’ refers to the process of ‘cosmopolitization’ and not to the normative project of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan outlook, and social sciences based on methodological cosmopolitanism, acknowledge that ‘[t]he national outlook, together with its associated grammar, is becoming false. It fails to grasp that political, economic and cultural action and their (intended and unintended) consequences know no borders, indeed, it is completely blind to the fact that, even when nationalism is reignited by the collision with globality, this

2 Ibid., 48.
can only be conceptualized from the cosmopolitan perspective\(^6\), e.g. by understanding the revival of exclusive nationalism as a fight against the ‘cosmopolitization’ of life worlds.\(^7\)

The paper stresses that adopting the cosmopolitan outlook, and pursuing social sciences based on methodological cosmopolitanism, does not simply imply a rethinking of institutions through a cosmopolitan lens, i.e. a rethinking of such institutions to fit a(n imagined) cosmopolitized world, but to rethink them from within a cosmopolitized world. This holds a profound challenge, which requires a completely new grammar and nothing short of a radical and creative rethinking of what is meant by key concepts, such as ‘participation’.

The paper starts by sketching the contours of the cosmopolitized world as a lived reality and outlines the implications this reality has for our perception of and existence in it. Grounded in this discussion, it argues that, if we follow Beck and acknowledge the reality of the cosmopolized world and ‘global risks’, risk governance processes, such as the integrative and participatory approach that the ICRG\(^8\) proposes, need to be integrated into what can be called a ‘cosmopolitan risk governance habitat’. This would mean that all phases of the risk governance process would be coloured by the ‘cosmopolitan risk governance habitat’, i.e. the complexity of the cosmopolitized reality would be brought into the process of dealing with risks.

The paper outlines the nature of the ‘cosmopolitan risk governance habitat’ as a social environment in which the state and future of a local cosmopolitized reality is collectively negotiated and reflected. Particularly noteworthy here is that such an approach inevitably implies the ‘participation’ of the ‘global other’, even if such another is actively excluded.

The paper concludes with ideas about how a ‘cosmopolitan risk governance habitat’ could be facilitated as an essential part of risk governance in a cosmopolitized world of ‘global risks’.


\(^7\) Ibid., 4.
